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PREFAC E 
President John F o  Kennedy ,  in a speech to the 1 9 62 graduating 
c lass at West Point , mentioned a type of warfare which has become partie-
ularly important today o  He observed: 
This  is another type of warfare==new in its intensity, ancient in 
its ori gin--war by guerri l las � subversives , insurgents D assassins=­
war by ambush instead of by combat , by infiltrat ion instead of 
aggression- -seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy 
instead of engaging him . l 
This  study proposes to e xamine the Civi l War in East  Tennessee in 
the light of what we know about unconventional warfare todayo As the 
name unconventional would imply,  the records of such activities are 
scarce . As a result ,  many of the facts have had to be pieced together 
from local hi stories , memoirs , letters , newspaper accounts � and stories 
told by the descendants of a number of the participants . Most of their 
stories have lost nothing in the rete l l ing over the several generations 
which h ave e lapsed s ince the Civil  War; verification is impossible o Use 
of such stories has been limited to assisting the author in attempting to 
get a feeling for the times o 
This  study wil t" employ some terms and ideas which are specifically 
the tools of the mi l itary historian o  These are likely to  be  unfami liar 
to the reader not intimately associated with them" Hence i t  seems advis-
ab le to  have avail ab le definitions of  some of  the more important terrns o  
! Extracted from a speech by President John F .  Kennedy, West Point , 
June 6 ,  1 96 2o Cited in Mi l itary Review , Uni ted States Command and 
General Staff School ,  XLII (November0 l962) � l l3  • .  
i i  
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Appendix I contains a glossary of these terms which are especial ly 
re lated to unconventional warfare and which will  be used in this study . 
There is  s ti l l  a controversy among historians as to the type of 
conflict that was fought between 1861 and 1865. But there i s  no doubt 
about the fact that i t  was a ware and» for the purpose of this study0 war 
may be defined as " • • •  a violent interaction between two organized 
pol itical groups (governments or otherwi se) . "2 Warfare is  a particular 
variety of mil itary activity involving specific forces 0  weapons . or tac-
tics . I t  need not emp loy al l of a participant 9 s  capab i lity, nor is  i t  
necessary for that part which is employed t o  conform to any specific pro-
portion or to be used according to any set pattern.  Any war may be 
fought by using any form of warfare to the degree which each antagonist  
assumes wi l l  result  in victory for his  particular cause . Unconventional 
warfare may be defined as that method of warfare used by the indigenous 
people of an area in opposit ion to an enemy occupying fo�ce. 3 The effort 
is usually supported and directed from outs ide the zone of conflict by a 
government friendly to those who are res isting. In  unconventional war-
fare there are three major components : guerrilla  activities . evasion and 
escape , and subvers ion. The technical requirements of all  three have a 
2samuel P .  Huntington» "Guerril la Warfare In Theory and Policy0" 
in Modern Guerri lla  Warfare0 Frank Mark Osanka (ed . )  (The Free Press of  
Glencoe , New York, 1962)0 xv-xvi .  
3nepartment of the Army0 Special Warfare u.s. � (U . S .  Govern ­
ment Printing Office 0 Washington0 1962), 8; Air TinTvers1ty, USAF Counter­
insur�ency Course ,  Se lected Readin�s (Maxwell Air F orce Base�62)0 
1-�; ,eter Paret and John W. Shy, Guerril la  Warfare and u.s. Mi litary 
Policy: A Study ,"  The Airman , IV (May • 1962), 11. Also helpful is  U.s. 
Air Force Manual 1r:T, Glossary of Standard Terms (GPO, Washington 0 1962). 
common bas is p and in Appendix I I  are discussed in detai l from the point 
of view of guerri l la  operations . 
iv 
This study is divided into s ix chapters . In  the firs t �  unconven= 
t ional warfare is  re lated to  the Civil  War background with attention to  
the problem of  i ts legitimacy as  a method of  warfare . In the succeeding 
three chapters � unconventional warfare D as it  unfolded in East Tennessee 
between 1 861  and 1 865 , is presented in some detail . Chapter two sets the 
background and ends with Colonel s. P. Carter9s raid in early 1 861 . 
Chapter three continues the narrative through General Ambrose Burnside v s  
successful occupation of Knoxvi l le in late 1 863. The fourth chapter 
considers the remaining years of the war. Chapter five is devoted to 
escapes involving East  Tennessee throughout the war. The concluding 
chapter summarizes the war in E ast Tennessee from the viewpoint of 
unconventional warfare . 
I wish to express my s incere thanks to all  of those who have 
he lped and encouraged me in this undertaking. My special thanks to 
P rofessor LeRoy P .  Graf who directed this study and to Professors Stanley 
J. Folmsbee and Ralph w. Haskins who patiently gave their t ime and 
valuable suggestions . However,  for the final product I must assume ful l  
responsibility. 
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CHAPTER I 
A CONSIDERATION OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
The twentieth century, marked by the Communist Revolution, by two 
world wars , and by the advent of nuclear power, has produced a renewed 
interest in all  aspects of unconventional warfare . In fact , the interest 
has been so universal among mi litary forces that perhaps it is losing the 
distinction of being considered unconventional .  1 Widespread considera-
tion of this type of warfare real ly began with the World War I I  res ist­
ance movements . 2 The Russian peasants resisting Hit ler ' s drive to the 
heart of Russia gained international acclaim . As fascinating and coura-
geous as their efforts were , i t  was left to a l ittle-known Chinese 
Communist leader� Mao Tse-Tung, who stunned the Western world with a 
strategic guerri lla victory over the Nationalist government in 194 8 1  to 
focus attention upon the importance of irregular forces in warfare . 3 
I .  
Unconventional warfare is no substitute for the orthodox 
1John Forth Amory , Around .!l!!. Edg\2.!, �. ! � Approach � the 
Problems £! American Foreign Policy (C lar son N .  :ott�r, New York , 1961), 7-8. The same not1on is held by c. M .  Woodhouse 1n h1s foreward to Otto Hei lbrunn ' s  Partisan Warfare (Frederick A .  Praeger , New York , 1962) . 
2Most useful studies of unconventional doctrine , strategy, and 
tactics have appeared after thi s  period . The studies of T .  E .  Lawrence 
and Francis Lieber are notable exceptions to which later reference wi l l  
be made . 
3F .  F .  Liu ,  A Mi litary Histort of Modern China, 1924- 1949 (Prince­
ton University Press, Pr1nceton , 195 ):-2s7-6o. 
1 
2 
considerations of position and mass movement .  Yet , the conventional 
methods of warfare cannot be ful ly understood unless the unconventional 
is considered as an adjunct to it. In it is found the expression of the 
people in re lation to the political connotations involved. With the 
advent of total war, everything "enemy" becomes a target . The battles 
between armies in the field are no longer the whole story. Ideologies , 
resources , and non-combatants become targets .  In defense , the people 
respond with a harassing offensive against the enemy , waged on their own 
terms . This response of an attacked people is  older than formal war or 
its study. 
The Spaniards provided the name by which such a response of a 
people to invas ion is most commonly known . 4 During Napoleon ' s  victorious 
march through Spain in 1808 , the Spanish army disintegrated in the face 
of the onslaught . It  reorganized itself into smal l independent units 
which were se lf-sustaining in limited actions . To identify this force. 
the Spanish attached the suffix for smal l  (il la) to their word for war. 
guerra. Thus the new term guerri l la, "small  war 0" was coined. 5 
4Joseph P .  Kutger, "Irregular Warfare In Transition , "  Milita!1: 
Affairs , XXIV (Fal l ,  1960) , 1 14 . This same article appears in Franklin 
Mark Osanka, ed. , Modern Guerril la Warfare (The Free Press of G lencoe . 
New York , 196�J. 39-52. The activities of the Spanish guerril las against 
the French in 1807  are vividly described by c. s. Forester in his two 
novels , .!h!, �and Death !2, � _Fre_n_ch_ . 
5virgil Ney, Notes On Guerrilla War, Principles and Practices 
(Command Publications • Was'h!ngton , 196l),S. See also Bret "Yank" Levy • 
Guerrilla  Warfare (Infantry Journal Press , Washington. 1942) . 56; Virgil 
Ney , "GUerrilla Warfare and Modern Strategy•" Orbis ,  I I I  ( Spring . 1958) • 
reprinted in USAF Counterinsurgency Course Se lected Readings (Maxwel l  Air 
Force Base , 1�. R, 1-14. 
3 
Western mi li tary thought was s low to recognize the significance of 
the guerri l la  war. Perhaps it was for thi s reason that Colonel Nemo (a 
� 2.:., plume in the Revue Mi l itaire Generale of France) claimed:  "Regular 
armies have almost never succeeded in gaining the ascendancy over guer-
ril l a  operations of any importance . Perhaps it is because of a subcon-
scious desire to hide this  impotence that the great commanders have 
minimized the role  of guerri l la operat ions . "6 
The traditional military pol icy of the United States fol lowed the 
standard European pattern , even though its early experiences indicated a 
preference for the unorthodox and irre gul ar . 7 A tradition of irregular 
warfare has existed in this  country since its early Colonial days . The 
Jamestown Colony under Captain John Smith neutralized a vastly superior 
Indian threat by using accepted guerri l la tactics .8 The French and 
Indian Wars provided further training in guerril la tactics for both 
6"The Place of Guerri l la Action in War �"  trans lated and di gested 
from a copyrighted artic le by Colone l Nemo in  Revue Mil itaire Generale 
(France , January� 1957) , Mi l itary Review p Unite d States Command and 
General Staff School ,  XXXV I I  (November, 195 7)� 99. (Hereafter Mi l .  Rev . , 
u.s.) Heilbrunn � Partisan Warfare , 14 , credits the guerril la as -seing-­
""· -• • almost invested with the nimbus of invincibility." Virgi l Ney 
remarks ,  "Guerri l la warfare • • • mocks the formality which is  the hal l­
mark of  the traditional mi litary profession ."  Guerri l la  Warfare , 5. 
7Robin M.  Wi l l iams , Jr., "Are Americans and The ir Cultural Values 
Adaptable To the Concept and Techniques of Unconventional Warfare?" The 
Annals of the American Academy of Po litical and Social Science , CCCXLy--
(May, 1�2).82. - -
Bwuuam s. Powel l �  "Aftennath of the Massacre : The First Indian 
War • 1622-1632 ,"  Virginia Magazine £!. History � Biography, L XV I  (Janu­
ary,  1958) , 44�75. 
Colonial and British troops . 9 The lessons of fire and maneuver. cover 
and concealment were we l l  known by the English-speaking forces on the 
continent l ong before the American Revolution . 10 Volunteer bands of 
patriots under Marion � Sumter, Pickens , and others virtually won the 
1 1  South for the revolutionary government .  Al l of these actions offered 
valuab le lessons in the art of unconventional warfare , but none para!-
leled the modern military technique quite so closely as those which 
developed during the American Civil War . I ndividual irregulars , partie-
ularly of the Confederacy, have had their apologists. The names of 
Forrest ,  Mosby, Morgan, Quantril l ,  and scores of local personalities are 
wel l  known. Some are exce l lent studies � but other more panegyric works 
seem to have had little influence on the traditional military interpre­
tations of  the war. 1 2  Perhaps it is because preoccupation with mass 
movements and technological advances has until  very recent t imes not 
demanded a study of any other threat than maximum mi l itary force . 
9Louis Morton , "The End of Formalized Warfare ,"  American Heri-
tage , VI (August , 1955) , 12- 19 .  ----
10John K .  Mahon , "Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare , 1676-
1 7941"  Mississippi Val ley Historical Review, XLV (September, 1958) , 254-
275 . 
l lJac Wel ler, "The I rregular War In the South ," Mi litary Affairs , 
XXIV (Fal l ,  1960) , 135 . 
4 
12As of this  writing, a close check of the many new studies of the 
Civil War, as wel l  as Thomas J. Presslyv s very fine Americans Inte�re t  
Their  Civi l War (Princeton University Press , Princeton , 1954) , has ailed 
to reveal any-concerted effort to explain the s ignificance of guerril la 
fighting in the war. The above is also avai l able  in paperback (Coll ier 
Books , New York , 1962) . 
The peculi arities associated with guerri lla warfare need some 
clarification before applying them to the situation in East Tennessee. 13 
5 
I n  the larger sense , unconventional warfare is  a politico-mi l itary strug-
gle having as i ts target the total war-making capab ility of an enemy. 
The key elements are the population and their reaction to the conflict.  
Men schooled in the art of warfare are not impressed with what they 
consider an improper, if not ungentlemanly.  way to fight . As time has 
passed it has become increasingly c lear that there are rules in unconven-
tiona! warfare every bit as demanding as those on the conventional 
battlefie ld , rules which must be mastered  i f  victory is to be won. 
Guerril las and partisans are the practitioners of this art and it 
is wel l  to understand how they fight . General ly . an undesirab le polit-
ical situation prompts a response of opposition from some of the more 
politically active of the population .  Armed w ith a cause , employing 
propaganda and direct action, a nucleus of i rregulars seeks to draw 
others into the movement .  I f  the occupying government fails  to stifle 
the activity at the outset ,  the irregulars wil l  attract more adherents 
until  they are strong enough to pose a threat to the formal authority. 
As they expand their organization and activities, their  very presence 
poses a strategic threat to their opponents . 
The tactics used range from s imple sabotage to attacking supply 
depots ,  from assassinations to raids , and from aiding enemy deserters to 
helping friendly escapees rej oin their army. The emphasis is on 
13For a more detai led study of Unconventional Warfare Operations , 
Doctrine , and Tactics , see Appendix I I .  
6 
inventiveness , ingenuity, and s implicity in all  things . The rul e  for 
attack i s  never openly to engage the enemy . If  there i s  t ime for the 
enemy to react defensively,  the action must cease .  The pattern is  to 
strike , retreat and strike again 0  keeping the enemy continual ly off 
balance and al lowing him no rest . 
The missions undertaken by irregular units , e ither s ingularly or 
' 
in  groups , must impair the enemy ' s  combat effectiveness ,  reduce his war 
potential , attack his morale , or subvert his will  to fight ; failing in 
any of these , the action should be avoided . In unconventional warfare , 
success or failure has only two measurements =-the disruption caused the 
enemy and the loyalty of the popul ation to the irregulars . Both must be 
obtained to win .  
At  the heart of any resistance movement are dedicated men with 
stamina and knowledge of the area in which they fight . Their  life i s  
unnatural ,  brutal , and severe . The unconventional warfare they embrace 
comes very c lose to demanding of them a primitive state of life in which 
the jungle law of the survival of the fittest prevails . In this fight , 
stealth,  surprise , cunning , and deceit are the i rregular ' s constant com-
panions . These traits are as  ready to destroy him as  he  hopes they wi l l  
h i s  enemy. When he uses them in concert with others , he embraces a 
c landestine way of l ife and hopes for a better future . For the indivi d-
ual , there i s  little that is  real  except his goal , and with t ime even 
thi s  becomes obscure . T .  E. Lawrence emphasized this point when he said 
that underground movements are more in the nature of "• • •  an influence. 
an idea,  a thing intangib le , invulnerab le , without front or back , 
14 drifting about like a gas . "  
7 
Irregular warfare has often been dismissed by historians as e ither 
an unfit or unimportant sub j ect . 15 Changing conditions , however, have 
prompted modern scholars to revise this  approach and to attempt to weave 
such combat into the historical pattern. A new importance is seen in the 
response of a people to the turmoi l and disrupt ion caused by unconven­
t ional warfareo 16 A whole society may be radically changed or perman-
ently disfigured as the people react to the resulting abnormal pressures 
of direct participation . 
The people of East Tennessee were confronted with just such a sit-
uation in 1 861 .  Against the backdrop of a conventional war and the 
peculiar political s ituation of the time, their reaction seems particu-
larly significant today because some of the prob lems they faced a century 
ago now chal lenge the world . But of more intrins ic value to the student 
of history is the opportunity to view a wel l -known situat ion from a 
s l ightly different perspective , thereby providing one more opportunity to 
try to understand the past as it really was . 
I L  
The struggle to estab lish the legitimacy of unconventional warfare 
14cited in F. o. Miksche , Secret Forces , The Technique of Under-
ground Movements (Faber and Faber, London , 1950) �2 . --
15Louis Morton , "The Historian and the Study of War,"  �· XLVI I I  
(March , 1962) , 599-6 13. 
16J. K .  Zawodny, "Unconventional Warfare , "  .!!!!, American Scholar,  
XXXI (Summer, 1962) , 384 . 
8 
was a prob lem at th e outs et of the Civil  War ev en as it  has b een in 
modern times o Both the Union and Confederate governments found it neces-
sary to  cope with the questions concerning the employment and treatment 
of irregular forces .  Confederate thinking was far i n  advance o f  that of 
the Union l eaders in this  sphereo Even before a shot was fired 0  private 
citizens were advocating the formation of irregulars to hamper a Federal 
invas iono17 The Confederate authorit ies �  however�  were reluctant to 
sanction irregular forces o In Junej 1 86 1 ,  General Robert Eo Lee advised 
a Virginia regimental commander against equipping such a unito  On th e 
27th of \farch� 1862 �  th e Virginia r,eneral Assemb ly did authorize such a 
force of from 10 to 20 compani es of 100 men each to b e  organized in the 
same  manner and paid as th e Confederate Army o President Davis expanded 
the idea to inc lud e al l of the Confederacy� and on April 2 1 ,  1 862 , he  
authoriz ed partisan bands and grant ed them governmental recognitiono 
A lmost immediately pressure was brought to b ear to curtai l the formation 
of these  irregular forces o The adventure and lack of formality which 
they offered s erious ly hampered normal recruiting o  Despite official 
pressures , by rnid-SeptemberP 1 86 2 �  eight southern states possessed irreg-
ular units o But the concept was sti l l  unacceptab le to professional 
military meno General Henry Hethj commanding the District of L ewisburg , 
viewed such groups as : 
o o o organized bands of robbers and murderers o o o o They do as they 
pl eas e==go where they pl eas eo The effects of this  organization upon 
1 7carl E o  Grant P "Partisan Warfare, Hodel 1 86 1 �1 865 • "  Mi l o  �o, 
!;!,o�o � XXXV I I I  (November , 1958) , 4 2 o  
the volunteering has been very injurious . �fany • especial l y  the 
worthless , like the privi lege of fighting, as they say ,  on their own 
responsibility, which interpreted� means roaming over the country,  
taking what they want and doing nothing . 1 8  
Other reports from field officers told the same story , but even as late 
as February, 1 863 , units were sti l l  being activated ,  though official 
policy stated the contrary.19 
Meanwhi le , Union forces were being instructed to deal with anyone 
9 
engaging in guerri l la  warfare " • • •  according to the severest rules of 
mi l itary law . "20 On the 22nd of December, 186 1 1  General Henry w. Hal leck 
decreed the death penalty for irregulars in the Department of the 
M . . 2 1  lSSOUrlo He included anyone who aided "insurgent rebels •" holding 
them pecuniari ly l iab le for United States property destroyed . On the 7th 
of April , 1 862 , General John c. Fremont issued orders to annihi late the 
·1 1 · h M • D "  • 22  guerr1 as 1n  t e ountaln 1 str1ct . By July ,  Generals Ulysses Grant 
1 8The War of the Rebe ll ion: A Compi lation of the Official Records 
of the UniOn and �ntiderate Armies7(129 vois .  ana-inaex Washington , 
1880-1"961), sir:' t, Vol. 51, Pt . 2, p .  526 . (Hereafter cited as�:!·) 
19  On the 3rd of January, 1 863 , James A .  Seddon, who succeeded 
George w. Randolph as Confederate Secretary of War, reported that though 
reluctant to disband existing units ,  no more would be formed .  Special 
Order Number 13 , Adjutant and I nspector General ' s  Office , issued three 
weeks later, authorized Major  Wicks to form a partisan unit .  Grant , 
"Partisan Warfare ,"  45 ; £·�·• Ser. IV• Vol . 28  pp . 4-5 , 31 , 71 - 72 .  
2°Cited in Grant, "Partisan Warfare�>" 4 7 .  
2 1  2.·�·• Ser. I ,  Vol .  8 ,  pp . 4 76 =78 � 8 82 . 
22General Orders No.  1 1 , Headquarters Mountain Department , April 
7 ,  1 86 2 ,  ibid. , Ser. I ,  Vol . 5 1 , Pt . I, p .  568.  
-
10 
23 and Grenvil le Mo Dodge were doing the same in Tennesseeo The war 
behind the war was becoming intensely  bitter and confusedo 
A status needed to be estab lished for guerri l la forces with 
respect to the laws and customs of waro In the North � during the summer 
of 1 86 2 ,  General Halleck initiated a study of the problemo24 He wrote 
Doctor Francis L ieber�  professor of history and political economy at 
Columbia College , a recogni zed authorit y  on the usages and customs of 
war, asking him to make public his views on guerri l la warfareo Lieber' s 
reply was brief but lucid, and was in the form of an article entitled 
"Guerri l la Parties Considered with Reference To the L aws and Usages of 
Waro o o o"25 The professor noted that writers of the laws of war had 
neglected the irregulars , and as a result the term guerril la was often 
misused , which resulted in confusion. He sought to distinguish among the 
various types of irregular activities P to define them0 and to accord to 
each certain specific rights according to categoryo Guerril las Q he felt 0  
were armed men, not an integral part of  an organized armyp who raided 0  
destroyed, massacred, and who characteristical ly  gave no  quartero Thi s  
23!.!?.,!io ,  Sero  I ,  VoL 1 7 "  Pto 2 p  Po 69; Grant , "Partisan Warfare�>" 
47 0 
24I n  August ,  Lincoln recal led Hal leck from the fie ld to assume the 
duties and title of General in Chief of the Armyo No fie ld commander.  
the general was an apt mi litary theorist and the year before had pub= 
lished his International Law or Rules Regulating the Intercourse of 
States in Peace and War, whicn-was highly regarde�n mil itary circles o 
Frank Freidel , Francrs-Lieber, Nineteenth Century Liberal (Louisiana 
State University Press , Baton Rouge p 1947) � 324o · 
25Ibido , 329-3 1 ; Grant , "Partisan Warfare •" 48 o  For the compl ete 
work see Qo!o• Sero I I I ,  Yol o 2 ,  PP o 301 = 309o 
11  
placed them outs ide the rul es of waro Partisans he regarded as detached 
parts of the army" If they did not pi l lage or refuse to give quarterQ 
they were to be  treated as any other regul ar soldiero A uniform was no 
requirement" Any clothes were acceptab l e  so long as dis guise or conceal � 
ment was not the intent o Bri gands • detached so ldi ers who robbed or 
attacked the enemy without or against authority� were to be put to deatho 
Spi es ,  war rebels who renewed war in an occupied territoryD and conspir= 
ators planning to renew war� were also sub ject to th e extreme penaltyo 
Lieber v iewed bushwhackers � whom the Confederates tri ed to justify 
as "citizens of thi s Confederacy who have taken up arms to defend their 
homes and fami l ies ," as not l egally fal l ing into a status which would 
warrant their b eing considered as prisoners of war merely b ecause they 
had taken up arms in summons to a Confederate proclamation o 26 
Lieber tri ed to formulate  a rule of reas on for the treatment of 
guerril las and bushwhackers o If  they were captured in fair fight and 
open warfare, they should b e  prisoners of war until definite crimes or 
k i l ling of captives was proved against them o 2 7  If they were captured in 
a district fairly occupied by mi litary force or in the rear of the army 0 
they were c learly bri gands and not prisoners of war o Li eb er was not 
certain how hi s theori es would apply in a ci vi l  war inasmuch as municipal 
26cited in Grant01 "Partisan Warfarep" 47o See also the exchange 
of l etters between George Wo Randolph and John B o  Clark which explains 
the Confederate position in this mattero F rank Hoore01 The Rebel lion 
Record , A Diary of American Events ( 1 1  vols o �  p lus supp!ement D New York01 
1861- 1 86� , Supplement (Doc o Noo 66) D 362 c 
27Freidel 5 Lieber ,  3 30o 
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l aw would have to be consideredo  However� he admonished in clos ing: "So 
much is certain, that no amy ,  no societyD engaged in warD any more than 
a society at peace ,  can al low unpunished ass assination �  robbery. and 
devastation, without the deepest injury to itse l f  and disastrous conse­
quences which might change the very issue of the waro"28 Field command-
ers were quick to see the s ignificance of Lieber' s definitions andD 
choosing to i gnore thi s technical ity � i ssued them as general orders in 
al l departments . 
The first  occasion to apply Lieber' s concepts arose in the pris-
oner of war exchange i ssue . A lthough there had been a number of pris-
oners re leased early in the war on parole � there were no formal discus-
sions on exchange until February 23 � 1 86 2 o  The primary reason for this 
del ay was that the United States did not cons ider the Confederacy as a 
nation ; therefore any negotiations would be tantamount to official 
recognition . Meetings had taken place only between mi l itary representa-
tives . In July , an agreement as to terms and points of exchange was 
final ly reached by the two governments .  And i t  was not until October of 
1 862 that representatives for each side were selected and the armies got 
down to the serious business of putting the carte l of July 22 into 
effecto The status of partisans had been an issue from the s tart . Mr. 
Robert Ould , the Confederate representativeD ins isted that they be 
treated as any other soldier and included in the exchange . L ieutenant 
28cited in ibid . ; Grant , "Partisan Warfare p" 48=49 ; 2.·!•1) Ser .  
I I I ,  Vol . 2 ,  p .  30� 
1 3  
Colonel w. H .  Ludlow, the Union agent , did not agree with the southern 
viewpoint , and the negotiations reached a deadlock . By coincidence 0 
General Robert E. Lee had just written to George w. Randolph 0 the Confed= 
erate Secretary of War, informing him of the capture of a number of Union 
prisoners by Colonel John D .  Imboden ' s partisans . These captives were 
being retained unti l  some of  Imboden's men who were Union prisoners were 
included on the l i st of those e l i gible  for exchange . The Secretary 
passed this  infonnation on to Mr. Ould with the instructions to " .  o o 
inform the agent of the United States that prisoners taken by our parti=  
san corps wi l l  not be  exchanged until the enemy consents to  exchange such 
of the partisans as fall into their hands . " 29 Ludlow took the prob lem to 
the Union authorities . Final ly,  on November 20g he was al lowed to inform 
Mr. Ould that prisoners from irregular units would be exchanged as any 
other soldier. The same day al l units under the Department of Virginia 
received a circular in which Ludlow announced that " •  • •  the body of 
Confederate troops known by the des ignation of partisan rangers and whose 
officers are commissioned by the Confederate government and who are regu= 
larly in the service of the Confederate States are to be exchanged when 
30 captured ."  
The b ickering over the status of those involved in unconventional 
warfare did not stop here despite the s imp le and straightforward language 
Ludlow used in the circular. Official correspondence continued to be 
e xchanged which clearly emphasized the basic point of contention and 
29 �·�·• Ser. I I ,  Vo l .  4 ,  pp . 91 8 ,  601�03 �  6 14 �  621 . 
30Ibid . , 739.  
-
disagreement between the two s ides .  The l ine of demarcati on between 
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partisan operations and guerril la warfare was not distinct . Attempts to 
codify the rules of war continued in the North . and final ly  re ached 
fruition with the publication of War Department General Orders 100 on 
April 24 � 1863,  under the title " Instructions for the Government of  
Armies of the United States in the Fie ld . "31  
These directions constitute the first comprehensive codification 
of the laws of war. 32 Essentially,  it was a handbook on how American 
soldiers would conduct themselves in war. It l aid down rules concerning 
the protection of civilians , their rights P and their property" It 
provided commanders with specific guides  as to  who fe l l  under military 
jurisdiction and under what circumstances .  Mi l itary authorities and 
experts on international law a like lauded i t .  Chief Justice Chase of the 
United States Supreme Court found that it warranted high prai se . After 
the war it was used as the bas is of an international code of war which 
in turn led to the Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907.  "The historical 
importance of the code of ins truction is evidenced by the fact that it 
31Ibid . e  Ser. I I ,  Vol .  5 ,  pp. 6 71 �6 82 . This  order remained in 
effect untlithe eve of World War I when it was replaced by Fie ld Manual 
27= 10 9  Rules of Land Warfare. For a discussion of this order and its 
effects to t he-mOdein day see Freide l , L ieberp  334=4 1 .  General Halleck 
had prematurely  issued the parts concern1ng parole and exchange under 
General Orders 49,  O .R . , Ser. I I ,  Vol .  5 p  pp . 306�07. For Lieber9s code 
see Coitressional GTooe , 3 7  Cong. , 3 Sess., 1 1 799  1323 ; 38 Cong.0 1 Ses s. �  
262 .  e revise d art1cles of war fai led to pass Congress;  s o  t his  i s  the 
only record availab le .  The military version of the rules of land warfare 
is  printed in ful l  in �·�· · Ser. I I I , Vol . 3 ,  pp . 148=64 . 
32Freide l ,  Lieber, 339- 40 ;  Frank Freide l , "General Orde r  100 and 
Mi litary Government ,"  MVHR, XXXI I (March • 1 946) , 555=56 . 
-
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remained in force until the e ve of World War I when it was superseded in 
19 14  by the Rules of Land Warfare . "33 
--- ----
Almost immediately after the order was published , Mr . Ould wanted 
a clarification as to when it applied to each side . 34 He wished to use 
certain acceptab le portions of it against the Federal Government to gain 
an advantage for the Confederacy from the exchange program . The Confed-
erate Government initial ly tried to make propaganda use of the order,  but 
this soon stopped as they became occupied with the more pressing problem 
of defending Vicksburg. Three important accomplishments may be attri-
buted to  the order.  It met the need for some kind of guidance which 
heretofore had been lacking. It resulted in a l imi ted Union gain ins o-
far as it reduced certain abuses in e xchange and parole which had bene ­
fited the Confederacy. 35 Final ly, it  served as a face-saving device for 
the Union in that prisoners could be exchanged without according formal 
recognition to the Confederate Government . 36 
The Confederate Government meanwhi le was having a difficult t ime 
maintaining the status of their  partisan units . Al l through l 863 D con-
tinual criticism was levied against them. In January, 1 864 , new charges 
of terror tactics and plunder again brought these units under official 
33Grant , "Partisan Warfare ," 52 . 
34Wi l l i arn  Best Hesseltine , Civi l  War Prisons , A Jtug� in War Psycholog� (Ohio State Uni vers ity Press , �l urnbus , 19�0 , ;�·!·• 
Ser. II, o l .  6 ,  p .  744 .  
35 Ibid,, Ser. I I ,  Vol .  4 ,  p .  946 ; Vol . 6 ,  pp . 32-33 . 
-
36Freidel , Lieber, 337. 
scrutiny, 3 7  Their acti vities had become too open and were too often 
criticized to be allowed to enj oy further official recognition . On 
Feb ruary 1 7, 1 864 1 the Confederate Congress repealed the Act of April , 
1 86 2 1  which had authorized the forming of partisan units . 38 
Meanwhile , unconventional activities continued throughout the 
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battle zones . C ommanders on both s ides sti l l  took the pragmatic view of 
destroyi ng guerri l las ,  partisans , and irregulars who,  for their part , 
continued to wreak havoc upon the enemy whenever and wherever possiblee  
Officials on both s ides seemed keenly aware of the dangers inherent in 
unconventional  warfare , and they made herculean efforts to legis late it 
into contai nment . But, from an overal l standpoint�  resistance was sti l l  
in  the hands of  the people and they decreed that it would continue. 
Under these conditions , a "protracted conflict" was a natural result­
ant , 39 Somehow the fact had been overlooked that " o  • •  the deciding 
factor in war--the power to sue for peace--was [ in the Civi l  War] trans­
ferrred [ sic ]  from government to people and that peace-making was a -
product of revolution . "40 By their individual and col lective acts on 
37Ibid . , 339 ; O .R ., Ser .  I ,  Vol . 33 p  pp . 1081=83 ; Vol . 6 1  pp . 
1047-48; Grant , "PartTs in Warfare ," 5 3 .  
382·�· • Ser.  I ,  Vol . 32 1 Pt . 3 8  p .  668 ; Vol . 33 , pp . 1 252-53 . 
39For the best treatment of this subject . see Ann Fremantle (ed . ) 1 
Mao Tse-tung: An Anthology of His Writings (The New American Library. New 
m . !962). 1!6'-42. --
40J .  F .  c .  Fu l ler, The conduct of War , 1 789-196 1 •  A StWd y  o f  the I mpact of � F rench, Indurtrial 1 and RUsrlan Revolut1ons on.,!!. and I ts 
Conduct-rRutgers University Press ,  New Brunswick0 NoJ., 196i), 10 8 .  
both sides . irregular forces demonstrated that this war was more than 
army confronting army ; it  was also people against people , idea against 
idea.  It  was a total ity of c ommitment from which one side would emerge 
1 7  
as the victor , having completely cru�hed the will  of the other. By tacit 
approval , no quarter was to be gi ven . 4 1  The idea was old,  but the 
application was modern in every sense . 
In East Tennessee , unconventional warfare was a choice made by 
those most directly affected--those confronted with a force which to 
their way of thinking intended to deprive them of their place in the 
Union . The threat to them was real . So was their resistance . Resorting 
to force seemed to be the sure way to hold out against the enemy until 
outs ide aid could reach them and with overpowering force drive the enemy 
out and preserve their ideology. The fee ling of oppression was spontan­
eous and it invo lved a high  degree of emotionalism . Many lessons had to 
be learned by trial and error, and the years between 1861  and 1865 were 
to be trying one s for this i solated region . 
41� •• 99 .  
C HAPTER I I  
T HE KEY ELEMENTS COMBINE 
1860- 186 1  
Three qual!ters of the way through the e ighteenth century, the New 
England colonies embarked upon the uncertain venture of estab lishing a 
nation. By 1 789 ,  i t s  predicted fai lure no l onger seemed certain,  yet the 
European nations were sti l l  unwil l ing to concede that its avowed repub-
l ican principles could end�re . lf by some quirk of fate the stated aims 
of the United State s  did succeed,  then thi s new nation would  serve as a 
threat to the social structure upon which the European empires were 
founded ,  The differences i n  political systems openly conflicted upon the 
high seas , and the result was the War of 1 812 . By no stretch of the 
imagination could a great mil itary victory be claimed by the United 
States . Far more pre�ious though was the tacit recognition that the 
United States was actually a sovereign nation fully recognized as such 
among the European powers of the day, "It  marked the beginning of 
America as a truly independent power.  • • • Now Americans looked west-
ward • •  • • State after state was added to the Union. " 1 New political 
al liances were formed. The Federalist Party was ec lipsed by a rising 
flood of national ism .  The nation became aware of itse lf,  and sections 
soon found grounds to differ as deeply among themselve s  as the country 
luenry Steele Canmager . "Se �tmd War of American Independence ,"  The 
� � _T_i_me_s_ Magazine , June 17  • 1962 , 1 8-20 ,  
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had with foreign powers . No longer was the question one of whether we 
should be free , but rather of whether we should be free together or as 
separate entities . The controversy became more bitter by the mid-
19 
nineteenth century. Violent demonstration replaced compromise. Nat ional 
interests degenerated into provincial sectionalism ; unyie lding and 
bitterly absolute . Unity disso lved as the nation ' s  president-elect 
clandestinely entered Washington on the night of February 22 , 186 1.2 
Embarrassment and derision though were not Mr. Lincoln ' s  main problem. 
He faced a Confederate government representative of a new South which 
viewed the abolition of slavery as a direct threat to its economic sur­
vival.3 On March 4 ,  1861, Jefferson Davis ,  recent ly e lected pres ident of 
the Confederacy, raised a new flag over the capitol bui lding in Montgom-
4 ery, Alabama. Lincoln refused to recogni ze the existence of a new 
nat ion . "He considered the Union unbroken , no matter what had been said 
and done at Charleston ,  at Hontgomery, or el sewhere , and he would act on 
the assumption that the states that said they were out of the Union were 
eternally in it . "5 Peace was impossible , and the focal point became Fort 
2Bruce Catton. The Coming Fury. The Centennial History of the 
Civil  War, (Doub leday �o . ,  New YOrK, 'm'l ) • 224-25. --
3.!l!2..' 235 . 
4Ibid . , 258 ; Jefferson Davis , The Rise and Fall  of the Confederate 
Governmeiit1'2 vols . , New York ,  1881 )  ,-r; "2'4b;' �- 'tr7";JournaT o"t the 
Congress of the Confederate States of America, 1861 - 1 8 65 (58 Cong:-2 Sess . 
Sen . Doc .""lro:-2"34 , Washington , 1964:"0'5) , I, io, 1-2. 
5catton , The Coming Fury, 265 ,  See also "Lincoln ' s  First Inaug­
ural Address ,"  Inaugural Ad<rre5ses of the Presidents of the United States 
from George Washington , 1 789, to Jonn �Kennedy, 196r-(�Cong. 1 Ses s . ,  
Iro'ti'Se Doc. No , 218 , Wash1ngton-;-1 �, -119-26. 
Sumter.  When General P, G ,  T ,  Beauregard ' s  artil lery batteries she lled 
the fort on the morning of Apri l 12 , 1861•  the C i vi l  War began .  Before 
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it was over, many o l d  ideas about warfare would be discarded and many new 
ones tried . During the next four years war would change and become 
modern. 
The Confederate s trategy was to defend the South rather than to 
attack the North, whereas Federal forces were obliged to attack the South 
in order to preserve the Union . 6 Thus the Federal A rmy had to fight the 
enemy on his terms and in his territory.  The deeper the Federal forces 
penetrated into the Confederacy. the more vulnerab le their supply lines 
became . Partisan b ands of hos tile Southerners harassed the Federal  rear, 
dis rupting communications and des troying supplies . Federal mil itary 
commanders were not prepared for such warfare . They would discover that : 
Nothing is more terrible than partisan warfare , and e very partisan 
war has been a �ong war in spite of the superiority in regul ar forma­
tion of the invading side , In short . the problem of part isan warfare 
is  very simi lar to the maintenance of law and order during peace 
time--it normal ly takes ten or more policemen to catch an armed 
crimina l ,  but se ldom more than one armed criminal to do down a 
policeman . 7 
Thus , as the Union Army advanced ,  i ts strength diminished. Hal f  
the army was noncombative--guarding lines o f  communicat ion, on leave ,  
s ick , or on special detai l .  The South. on the other hand , could contest 
every foot of territory at ful l  strength as they had no rear to defend . 
6J .  F .  c. Ful ler, The Generalshi� of Ulysses s. Grant (Indiana 
Uni versity Press . BloomingtOn .  1958) , 4 .--
7Ibid . , 4 7 ,  
Mass was clearly on their s ide . Under these c ircumstances , the task of 
Federal authorities was to create a Southern rear . 8 The National Army 
moved down the Mississippi , eastward through Chattanooga and At l anta to 
Savannah , and then north to Richmond. In effect , a huge right fl ank 
whee l e xtending over a thousand mi les and taking three years to accom-
plish created a rear and was decisi ve .  Sherman he ld George D .  Johnston 
9 in North Carolina whi le Grant ' s  pressure pounded Lee ' s  army to defeat . 
2 1  
While this grand strategy was e vol ving and the nation re luctantly 
came to accept a long conflict as inevitable ,  Tennessee faced a prob lem 
that a hundred years later would plague many of the world ' s  smal ler 
nations--unconventional warfare . 
During the turbulent period before the April 15th cal l for troops , 
Tennessee , being a border state like Kentucky , tended to favor the pres­
ervation of the Union. 10 Within the state , however,  there were pressures 
at work to influence the state to fol low the C onfederacy . Isham G. 
Harris ,  who had come to the governorship in 1 85 7 ,  proved to be the leader 
of this movement .  His pro-southern sympathies were wel l  known, but , in 
view of the state ' s  position in the 1 860 presidential election, there 
seemed little to fear from his influence . 1 1  The vote recorded an 
Bu. s. Grant Personal Hemoirs (2  vols . ; c. L .  Webster and Co. • 
New York , 1 885 - 1886� , 502-05, 
9Ful ler , Grant,  4 8 .  
10Mary Emi ly Robertson C ampbel l ,  The Att itude of Tennesseans Toward 
� Union , 1 847- 1861 (Vantage Press , New-York ,  1961):-199. 
l lJ .  Ruben Sheeler, "The Deve lopment of Unionism in East Tennessee , 
1860- 1 866 ," !.!!.;, Journal 2£. Ne gro History, XXIX (April , 1944) , 1 76-77 .  
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apparent anti-secession majority of 16 1 000 , 1 2  When Governor Harris 
attempted to cal l  a convention to settle the re lat ionship between state 
and Federal  governments , his effort was defeated .  Undaunted ,  Harris con-
tinued to al ly with the Confederate cause and s ought to put the power of 
the state into that camp . There seemed l ittle hope that the state might 
be successfully maneuvered away from the Union unti l  the President ' s  cal l 
for volunteers gave Harris the opportunity to defy openly the cal l 8  
replying that : "Tennessee wil l  not furnish a s ingle  man for the purpose 
of coercion ,  but 50 1000 if necessary, for the defense of our rights and 
those of our Southern brethren . "1 3  He cal led a special l egis lative 
session which , at his bidding , entered into a milit ary league with the 
Confederacy. By thi s  act the pol itical structure of the state remained 
associated with the Union, but its entire mi l itary capab il ity was placed 
in the hands of Jefferson Davis . 14  Earlier, the governor had authori zed 
the raising of a provisional force for the protection of the state , and 
had with foresight s tationed 15 companies of the force in Knox vil le to 
1 2The vote was Breckinridge (Southern Democrat), 64 , 809 ; Be ll  
(Constitutional Unionist ), 69 1 1 76 ;  Doug las (Northern Democrat ), 1 1 , 330 . 
Weston Arthur Goodspeed , Historr of Tennessee From the Earliest Time To the Present (The Goodspeed Publ1sh:rng Co. , Nashvil l e;-1886) , 777�o-one 
candidate ran on a policy of disunity, but , of the three , Breckinridge 
was the only advocate of Southern rights , which were to be defended at 
any cos t .  John D .  Hicks , The Federal Union (third edition ; Houghton 
Mifflin Co . ,  New York , 195!}; 547-48. 
1 3o. R . , Ser, I I I ,  Vol . 1 ,  p .  81 , The original document is in the 
Tennessee-state Archives , Nashvi lle , Tennessee . Governor Harris appears 
to have changed his mind several t imes concerning the figure 50 ,000 . 
75 1 000 has been marked out and the above figure substituted .  There are 
several  other il legible changes . 
14Wi l li am  R .  Garrett and Albert v. Goodpasture , 
see , I ts People and Its Institutions From Its Earliest 
1963 tTJie Brando�o-:-;-Nas fiviile , 19o�5!6. 
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preclude any trouble from this section of the state . 15 The majority of 
voters in West and Middle Tennessee favored the Confederacy two to one , 
whi le the reverse was true in East Tennessee . 16  The only thing remaining 
to take Tennessee out of the Union was the technical ity of the popular 
vote which was arranged for the e ighth of June . For al l intents and 
purposes , Tennessee was Confederate . 
Most Tennesseans refused to go along with the governor or the 
maj ority popular vote , To the Southerner, such a refusal was treasonable ,  
and to  the Unionist heroic . Those espousing the Southern cause thought 
East Tennessee Unionists inconsistent in advocating that secession was 
i l legal and then advocating the secession of E ast Tennessee from the rest 
of the state . On the other hand, Eas t  Tennesseans felt that it was 
Middle and West Tennessee who were at fault while they sought only to 
maintain the status quo. Sectionalism h ad long been a problem in the 
state , and many argued that the eastern section of the state merely used  
the war as a pretext to  carry out a policy of separate statehood which 
had been advocated by Andrew Johnson twenty years earlier. 1 7  Moreover , 
slavery was of l ittle interest to E ast Tennesseans . Their lack of wealth 
made them feel  no sympathy toward a s laveholding aristocracy. 1 8  �fany 
15 O.R., Ser. I ,  Vol .  3,  p.  109 ; Journal of the Confederate Con-
gress ,  1 8'bl ";' Part I ,  272 ; Sheeler, "UnionlSm ln-ya'stTennessee ," 1 �  
16campbel l ,  Attitude o f  Tennesseans , 2 1 2 ; Charles c. Anderson, 
F ighting � Southern Federal s-(Neale Publishing Co . , New York , 1912 ) , 10.  
1 7Tennessee Senate Journal , 1841-42 , p.  495 ; Tennessee House 
Journal ,  1841-42, p .  663. 
1 Bverton M.  Queener, "East Tennessee Sentiment and the Secession 
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al so fe lt  a deep dislike of the Democratic Party, which in East  Tennessee 
was associated with secession .  
Whi le the governor was busy taking the state out of the Union , 
Eas t  Tennesseans were feverishly trying to prevent it. In  February ,  
1 86 1 , when the plan o f  the governor became evident , T. A .  R .  Ne lson ,  
Horace Maynard , John Baxter ,  Andrew Johnson, and others began a stump 
campaign to preserve the Union . 19  By the end of May , a convention in 
Knoxvi l le indicated that the citizens of East Tennessee wanted no part of 
secession , and that they ful ly intended to organize forces to foster the 
Union . 20 Quiet ly they went about marshal ling their strength in the 
various counties . ) By August ,  Joseph A .  Cooper of Carter County had 
organized and ,  to some e xtent , trained  500 men . 2 1  Soon there were an 
Movement , November 1 860-June 1 861 , "  East Tennessee Historical Society ' s 
Publications , No. 20 ( 1948) , 82-83 ; Thomas Perkins Abernethy , From Fron­
tier to Plantation in Tennessee , A St3�; in Frontier Democracy-rRempfiis 
StateCol lege Press7""Memphis , 1955), ; Frank Merrit , E
K
rly History of 
Carter County, 1 760- 1 861  (Archer and Smith Printing Co . , noxvil le ,  --
1956), 748 !! pass1m. 
19o . P. Temple , East  Tennessee and the Civil War (Robert Clarke 
Co. , Cincinnati ,  1899) , -r19-223 ; N .  G .  TaylOr wrote : -w.rennessee is  for 
the Union as long as it can be honorab ly maintained,  in other words as 
long as it lasts . "  N ,  G ,  Taylor to T .  A .  R .  Nelson,  Jan. 3 ,  1 861 , Ne lson 
Papers (McClung Col lection ,  L awson McGhee Library, Knoxvi l le ,  Tennessee) . 
See also Merritt ,  History of Carter County, 165 -6 7 ;  The Express , Jones­
boro, Tennessee , July 5, 1 �1 ,  clipp1ng 1n Nelson ' s  S"crapbook (McClung 
Collection , Lawson McGhee L ibrary, Knoxvil le) . 
20samuel W ,  Scott and s .  P .  Ange l , History of the Thirteenth 
Tennessee Volunteer Cavalry, USA (P . w. Ziegler and:c07; Ph1ladeiphia ,  
1963), 39-40; Campbell ,  Attituae � Tennesseans , 201-04 . 
21o .  P .  Temple , Notab le�� Tennessee (Cosmopolitan Press , New 
York , 1912) , 104. 
estimated 10 , 000 men ready to resist Confederate encroachment . 22 Their 
preparedness was doubtful , but their resolute intention to preserve the 
Union was clear to al l .  East Tennessee Unionists had no intent ion of 
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leaving the Union ,  an idea they expressed at a Convent ion he ld in Greene-
vi lle  on the 1 7th of June . Unlike the earlier protest meet ing at Knox-
vi l le ,  this was an ultimatum . For those who could read the s ignsb i t  was 
the beginning of an open revolt. Six months earlier, Dan Worley had 
written his daughter from Bul l ' s  Gap that in Knoxvi l le there was constant 
dread of insurrection over the secession issue . 23  
On the opening day of  the Greenevi l le Convention, T .  A .  R .  Nelson 
presented to the 296 de legates a paper entit led "A Dec larat ion of 
Grievances . "24 East  Tennesseans , it dec lared,  would not j oin the Confed-
eracy. If  left alone , no violence would result ; if  not left alone , the 
Federal Government would be asked to send mi litary aid immediate ly. I f  
any de legate was threatened o r  any East Tennessean jeopardized i n  any 
way , retaliation by force would be swift . The final provis ion authorized 
the raising of forces to back the stand taken by the Convention de legates . 25 
These were impossib le conditions for a secession-minded government 
22£·�· • Ser. I ,  Vo l .  4 ,  pp . 364-65 . 
23Dan Worley to his daughter (unnamed) , 14  Dec . 1 860. Kings ley 
Roswel l Letters , 1 850- 1885 (Special Col lections , University of Tennessee 
Library , Knoxvi l le) . 
24Beatrice L. Garrett , "The Confederate Government and the Union­
ists of East Tennessee" (unpubl ished Master ' s thesis , The Univers ity of 
Tennessee , Knoxvi l le ,  August , 1932) , 5 -6 ,  
25Proceedings of the East Tennessee Convention (H. Barry' s Book 
and Job Office , KnoxviT1 e;-1 �, 1-27. 
to meet .  I f  their cause was to succeed,  they needed absolute support 
26 
from all of the people to justify their position. Resistance in any form 
would be a s ign of Confederate weakness ;  a display of a fatal flaw in the 
fabric of the Confederate argument .  
That the Greeneville  Convention was al lowed to meet , i t  has been 
said , reflected the Confederates ' desire to maintain peace and order in  
E ast Tennessee and to  be as  benevolent  as  possible in  carrying out their  
policies . 26 Actual ly9 there was nothing else  they could do. Humanitar= 
ianism was hardly their motivating factor ;  the decis ive motivat ion was 
mi litary expediency. The Unionists of East Tennessee fe lt themselves on 
firm ground for several reasons . Firs t ,  technical ly Governor Harris had 
separated Tennessee from the United States fol lowing a "Declaration of 
Independence" rather than by secession .  Under the circumstances , he 
could not reasonab ly deny a section of the state a simi lar right. In  
addition, the Confederates championed States ' rights .  To  deny either 
principle to part of the state was to deny the validity of their whole 
cause and they would not dare to do this , particularly since they would 
26Garrett , "Confederate Government in E ast Tennessee ;• 22 !!, passim. 
The author argues that Union resistance forced the Confederates to aban= 
don their benevolent pol icy toward East Tennessee. This  fai ls to take 
into account the principle of  occupation as being untenab le to the people 
regardless of the means employed to carry it out .  A people  were having 
an unwanted political structure imposed upon them when by vote they had 
indicated it as undesirab le . Legal means of being heard had been 
thwarted ; so to them active resistance seemed to be the only answer. 
Confederate occupation� regardless of its application. they fel t 9  was 
unwarranted, and they moved to thwart it . The Confederates 0 on the other 
hand, felt they could do nothing el se .  They could not permit an area of 
enemy strength to exist within their very heartland ; so they sought to 
remove i t j  if for no other reason than survival . Thus was l aid the 
political foundation for an unconventional war to develop .  
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have t o  depend heavi ly upon the righteous image they created . They could 
i l l  afford to create a hypocritical picture to the world , especially 
s ince they sought aid for their cause from other countries . I t  would not 
l ook good to suppress internally  the very thing they sought to gain. 
Secondly, applying force upon East Tennessee would be duly noted in other 
uncommitted border s tates and sections at a t ime when the Confederate 
Government desperately sought to recruit these states into their fold . A 
precedent of forceful compliance was hardly the thing to  use to win 
sympathy from the unaligned .  Third,  the use of force to  combat resist-
ance now would be i l l  timed .  The Confederate Government desperately 
needed time to organize and solidi fy its policy. Its troops l acked 
training and ski ll , being at this time l ittle more than a mob with a 
common cause . To provoke armed resistance would be virtual suicide and 
could fracture i rreparab ly the image of unity they sought to present . 
Fourth , in the early days of the war,  military position was of paramount 
importance . E as t  Tennessee was a strategic bottleneck , a fact which had 
not escaped the notice of either side .  From the Southern point o f  view , 
the rai lroad which passed through the val ley was a vital l ifeline of 
communication j oining the distant parts of the Confederacy. 27  The l ink 
between Richmond and Montgomery had to be kept open at al l cost to pre-
serve the territorial  integrity of the new government . I t s  loss would 
2 70iiver Tay lor , Historic Sul l ivan , A History of Sul livan County , 
Tenness7e With Brief Bio5raphies of the Makers of Histo� (King Pr1nting Co . ,  Br1St�enn. ,  l§o ) , 2lb ; �R. ,  Ser .  r .  VOl . 31 , t .  3 ,  pp . 5 46-47 ;  
Vol .  4 ,  pp . 1 75 1 3701 3 74 ,  3 79 ,  382; 387 , 390 ; Ser. I I ,  Vol . 1 1  p .  9 1 1 ;  
R .  Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N .  Dupuy, !!!! Compact History 2.!, ,!!:!! Civil !!!, 
(Hawthorn Books Inc , , New York , 1960) 1  32 , 6 7 .  
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mean that troops and equipment from the Gulf  states wou ld have to detour 
hundreds of mi les around the mountains by way of At lanta and Charlotte 
before they could be moved north . The Union forces , and in particular 
President L incoln ,  saw the area as one whichp if completely control led, 
could effectively divide the rebel l ious states into two separate groups 
and destroy any hope of presenting a formidab le � unified force agains t 
the country. Each l ittle pocket could be quick ly put down before the 
whole insurrection reached a state of warfare . The strategy then of both 
sides became one of denying the use of East Tennessee to the other. The 
Union would h ave to supp ly outside aid quickly to the men of the area 
before the Southern occupation became too strongly entrenched . 28 Since 
the Confederates could i l l  afford to provoke the inhabitants , they had 
little choice but to move cautious ly , hoping to gain support by diplomacy 
rather than force . 
By Apri l , 1861,  it  seemed certain to the East Tennesseans that 
help in the form of General Buel l ' s  forces was on the way. Both General 
McClel lan and Lincoln himsel f were anxious to come to the aid of the 
be leaguered mountain people . 29 Both be lieved that an early show of force 
would guarantee control of this strategic area and deprive the Confeder-
ates of a necessary communication link . This  view seemed reasonable 
inasmuch as Lincoln still  viewed the issue as one of a rebel l ion to be 
28�·�· • Ser. I ,  Vol .  5 2 ,  Pt . 1, p .  191 . 
29Wi lma Dykeman, The French Broad (Rivers of America Series ,  Carl 
C armer (ed. ) ,  Rinehart and co . , New York , 195s) ,if6 :  o.R. , Ser, I ,  Vol . 
4 ,  pp , 342-43 ,  347 ; David J, Harkness , "Abraham L incoln and Cumberland 
Gap,"  University 2f Tennessee Newsletter, XXXVI I I  (Apri l , 1 959) 1 4 .  
29 
contained rather than as a fu l l-scale war to be won. Buel l  in the fie ld  
faced an entirely different issue , that of overextending his  supply lines 
in an area vulnerable to enemy interdiction. Realizing that at best his 
move would be but a gesture inviting expul s ion at the enemy ' s whim , he 
did nothing , which in the end analys is was probab ly worse than a ges ture . 
I t  soon became evident that resistance was to be determined not by 
Confederate occupation policy but by the bas ic ideol ogy of the area--the 
desire to remain in the Union .  To many , state Confederate troops in the 
K . 11  . A . 1 f · · · 30 noxv1 e area s 1nce pr1 were a constant source o 1 rr1tat1on. 
Ostensibly, these were provis ional troops for state protection . But , to 
the East Tennessee Unionists , they were the enemy. Probably no matter 
what policy the Confederates had pursued , i t  would have been ineffectual 
in stemming the overall attitude favoring resistance . The concept of 
national loyalty was too deeply ingrained in the minds and hearts of 
\ 
these mountain people  to be neutralized by  a few conci liatory gesture s . ) 
At the Greenevi lle Convention, secret agreements had been made 
with Robert K. Byrd (Roane County) , Joseph A .  Cooper (Campbel l  County) , 
R .  E .  Edwards (Bradley County) , s .  c .  Lange ley (Morgan County) , and 
others secret ly to train and organize a force of 500 men . 31  By July 1 ,  
the Adjutant-General in Washington had detailed Lieutenant Wi l l iam Nelson 
to recruiting duty in East  Tennessee . Not only was he to raise a force , 
but he was to del iver 10 , 000 arms to be used in the area . 32 General 
30 �·�· . Ser. I ,  Vol .  5 2 ,  p .  109 . 
3 lo .  P .  Temple ,  Notab le � � Tennessee , 104 . 
32 �·�· . Ser, I ,  Vol , 4 ,  pp . 25 1 -5 2 .  
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McCle l l an, with his army in Virginia ,  fe lt that if these arms were 
del ivered, he could break through into East Tennessee and " • • •  break 
the backbone of secession .  " 33 That the Confederates were aware that arms 
and men were ready to be sent into East Tennessee is evidenced in the 
fol lowing letter: 
I came through East Tennessee today .  There is true ly [sic] great 
disaffection with these people . It is current ly reported and 
be lieved that Johnson has made an arrangement at Cincinnati  to send 
10 ,000 guns into East Tennessee and that they have actual ly been 
shipped through Kentucky to Nicholasvil le , and are to be handed over 
there to near the Kentucky line and p laced in the hands of Union men 
in Kentucky on the line to be conveyed to Union men in East Tennessee . 
They openly proclaim that i f  the Legislature refuses to let them 
secede they wi l l  res ist  to the death and cal l upon L incoln for aid . 
Nelson,  Brownlow,  and Maynard are the leaders . I f  they were out of 
the way we would be rid of al l the troub le . That they wil l  give us 
trouble I doubt not unless they are prompt ly de lt [sic] with . They 
re ly on aid from Southern Kentucky and Lincoln . Yollimust see Davis 
and get him to order Floyd down to about Cumberland Gap to intercept 
these arms if  they attempt to cross into Virginia .  Governor Harris 
has ordered one regiment to the various passes on our northern bor­
der, but the people here say they are not sufficient . A number of 
Union Companies are forming and dri l l ing dai ly in the disaffected 
districts for the avowed purpose of resistance . Let the Government 
look closely to this movement .  Unless nipped in the bud , it may 
become very troublesome . 
In Haste , yours truly, 
Sam. Tate . 34 
The arms for which Johnson and Maynard had s o  urgent ly pleaded 
began arriving in Kentucky about mid-.Ju ly • and according to plan began 
33o . R .  • Ser. I ,  Vol . 2 ,  pp . 201 , 206 ; Jacob D .  Cox , "War Prepara­
tions in The North ," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Robert Under­
wood Johnson and C larence C 1augh Bue1 , edTtors-(4 vo 1s:;-The Century Co . , 
New York , 1 884- 1888) , 132 .  
34samue l Tate to  Robert Toombs , June 28 ,  1 861 , �·�· • Ser . I ,  Vol . 
5 2 ,  Pt .  2 ,  p .  1 16 ,  
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fi ltering into East Tennessee . 35 Between 5 1 000 and 10 1000 stands o f  arms 
were be lieved to have been distributed . 36 
Exaggerations by both s ides have made it impossible to determine 
the exact strength of the res istance movement at this time 1 and in  a 
sense the question is unimportant . What is important i s  that the situa-
tion seemed serious enough for the Confederates to appoint General Felix 
K .  Zo llicoffer commander of the newly formed command in East Tennessee . 37 
Assuming command on July 26 1 he immediately sent the standard warning of 
threatened invasion and uprising to Richmond , probably to justify addi­
tional manpower. 38  His warning was heeded , and by mid-September he had a 
force of 1 1 1 457  men . 39 
Warnings of impending disaster to the Confederate cause continued 
to reach the Southern capitai . 40 Just  as regularly , Unionists in East 
Tennessee continued to plan a resistance program whi le they waited for 
Federal aid from the Union . The continual movement of troops into the 
area confirmed their worst suspicion that intimidat ion was the policy of 
35James T. C arter to Andrew Johnson, July 15 1 186 1 1  Andrew Johnson 
Papers , Univers ity of Tennessee , Knoxville . These papers , currently 
being edited by Professors LeRoy Graf and Ralph Haskins of the History 
Department , are being catalogued according to date for easy access . 
36Anderson, Southern Federals ,  30 . 
37 �·�· • Ser. I ,  Vol . 4 1  p.  3 75 .  
38� • •  377- 78. 
39� • •  409 . 
40w .  G .  Swan to Jefferson Davis 1 July 1 1 1  186 1 1  O. R . 1 Ser. I 1  Vol .  
4 1  366-67 ;  Walker to I .  G .  Harris ,  July 1 8 1  1 86 1 1  ibid .7 �69- 70 ;  Report 
of T .  J .  Cannon from Loudon , 1 86 1 1 �· • Vol . 1 0  � 1 1  pp . 285-86 . 
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the Southern government . The Athens [Tennessee] � denied thi s  suspi­
cion, stating on July 26 : "We speak by authority in dec laring that they 
[Confederate troops] are not here to intimidate our people • • • they 
wi l l  protect and defend each and every citizen in his rights . "  Force 
would only be used in self-defense or if absolutely necessary. 41  Thi s  
guarantee was of as l ittle s ignificance as was the policy o f  conciliation 
which Zol l icoffer was directed to pursue . 42  At thi s  juncture , the wi l l  
t o  resist was strong among some of the more political ly attentive , while  
the vast majority of  the people were apparently indifferent , as is 
usual ly the case . Indications were that Union support was on the way .  
Armies could not be far behind the arms that were coming across the 
Kentucky border. To the more aggressive East  Tennesseans , it  seemed only 
a matter of defying the Confederates for a short whi le , long enough to 
reach the area.  Morale among the resistors was high , and the whole 
situation had the aura of an adventurous game of hide and seek e This  is 
not to say the matter was not serious , but merely  that the gravity of the 
s ituation was not ful ly realized .  There seemed little cause for worry as 
East Tennesseans demonstrated against Confederate troops and tried to 
outwit the soldiers ' efforts to discover their hidden guns . At Tucka-
leechee Cove about 18 miles south of Knoxv i l le ,  Frederick Emert , who had 
buried his gun , swore to searching soldiers that he had no gun on this 
41Athens [Tennessee] �. July 26 , 186 1 . 
42Harris to Davis , July 1 3 ,  186 1 ; s. Cooper to Zol licoffer,  July 
26 , 3 1 , 1 861 , O, R. , Ser, I ,  Vol , 4 ,  pp . 4 74- 75 ,  374 , 377.  
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earth . 43 
At various ral lying points , Union men began to gather to formulate 
res istance plans. During one such gathering , near Wal l and Gap in Blount 
County , some fifteen hundred people raised the United States flag on a 
large pole to symbolize their faith in the Union .  The Confederates . 
though , intent upon gaining control of this trouble spot within their 
lines , had dispatched a cavalry unit under a L ieutenant John White to 
disarm the mountain men. 44 Upon reaching Maryvil le , L ieutenant White 
spent the night in the home of Judge Jesse Wallace , who warned him about 
the flag and advised him to leave it alone . The next morning, L ieutenant 
White and his troops moved out in the direction of Tuckaleechee Cove and 
through the narrow pass parallel ing Little River .  After marching for 
several hours , they came to the clearing in the center of which flew the 
nat ional flag . Some of White ' s  men were about to cut it down when he 
stopped them . Then , prudently,  he formed his troop , saluted the colors , 
and continued into the mountains . Everywhere they went , the soldiers 
were cordial ly received,  but they were unable to find any weapons and 
43Wi l l  A .  McTeer, "Among Loyal Mountaineers ,"  Mi scel laneous Pam­thlets on the Civil War (Special Col lections , University of Tennessee­
ibrary:-Knoxviiie) ,�4. 
44Ine z  E .  Burns , Histor� of Blount County, Tennessee , From War 
Trail to Landing s�git ' 1795-1 s�(The Tennessee H1stor1ca1 CommisSiOn , 
�asnvi1Te , 1957) , - o .  the same story was reprinted in the Knoxvi l le 
News-Sentine l ,  July 1 8 ,  1 962 , written by Hal Boyle ,  entit led "They 
Saluted--and Survived."  Both accounts probab ly used the McTeer pamphlet 
previously cited. The story was verified in its essential details  by 
9 7-year-old Robert Weare , who l ives near the area and heard the story 
from his father who participated in the incident . Personal interview 
with the author, August 19 , 196 2 .  
returned empty handed some weeks later to Maryville . 
What they did not know at the time they entered Wal land Gap was 
that they were completely surrounded by mountaineers with more than a 
hundred and fifty rifle sights zeroed in upon them . Had they made one 
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move to desecrate the flag , they would never have left the gap alive . As 
it  was , they were watched, not molested, and allowed to return alive 
because of the honor they showed the flag . 
Simi lar acts of defiance , preliminaries to irregular warfare , were 
being carried out over all  of East Tennessee . Militari ly , such acts were 
ineffective , but they did serve to crystal l i ze the determination to 
thwart the Confederate forces . 
East Tennessee proved to be an ideal location in which to fight an 
irregular war, as may be seen by an examination of s ome of the economic 
and geographic factors involved.  
Gueril la [ sic] warfare was nothing new to the people of the Cumber­
land mounta1ns . Their forebears had been trained to such fighting by 
Indian warfare and had continued the custom in their personal feuds , 
I t  was only natural that this would be the accepted method of battle 
in this region. 45 
In these uplands , " • , • the Union men were usual ly the mountain men par 
excel lence , the mountaineers among mountaineers , owners of smal l farms , 
d t f t t 1 ,.46 a voca es o s rong cen ra government • • • •  I t  was they who formed 
the backbone of resistance , Perhaps they were i gnorant , i l l -informed, 
and altoge.ther too s imple  and naive , viewing things in singu larly black 
45Thurman Sensing ,  *h�p Fer14son ,  Confederate Gueril la  (Vander­
bilt University Press ,  Nas v1lle ,  1 42) , x ,  
46nykeman 1 French Broad , 80 . 
and white terms , They may have been truculent , haters of change , proud 
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and overly concerned with the simple life ,  but they could fight and would 
when provoked. Characteristical ly, these men were " •  • •  independent , 
passionately devoted to liberty , hardy, brave and so attached to their 
mountains that they would rather live in poverty there than in wealth in 
cities or even in the plains . "47  They were a people with a cause,  ab le 
and willing to fight , providing one of the essential elements of an 
unconventional war, 
"Parson" Brownlow, a circuit  rider preacher now turned political-
editor, was the self-appointed spokesman of these Unionists .  He added 
the fol lowing comment to an already volatile situation: "We can never 
live in a Southern Confederacy and be made hewers of wood and drawers of 
water for a set of aristocrats and overbearing tyrants .  • • • We have 
no interest in common with the Cotton States . We are a grain-growing and 
stock raising peop le , and we can conduct a cheap government , inhabiting 
the Swit zerland of America, "48 
I t  became clear, as the opposing armies moved into position, that 
there was no longer a possibility of compromise ; only one side could 
emerge as the absolute victor . The war had been preceded by years of 
antagonism and propaganda .  Al l sense of  moderation had been lost in  the 
political sphere and so  it would be in the coming conflict,  evoking in 
47Temple ,  East Tennessee and the Civi l War, 76 . 
--...- - - -
48Knoxville Whig, January 26 1 1 86 1 . The same attitude of deter­
mined resistance was reported �n Harper' s Weekly, XXI I I  (August ,  1 861) , 
405 1 and in the New York Times. urglng help be given to East Tennessee , 
on July 6 ,  1861 and October 16, 1 861 . 
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soldier and civi lian alike a primitive spirit of tribal fanaticism . Thus , 
inexorab ly , events in East  Tennessee moved toward unconventional warfare . 
East Tennes see differed markedly from the rest of the state in its 
geographical formations . I t  was generally composed of a series of high 
parallel  ridges running northeast and southwest , with a series of smal ler 
j agged ridges crossing val leys and breaking the landscape to such a 
degree that a l abyrinth was formed by the position of these crests . The 
result of this  formation was isolated val leys , coves , and hidden passes 
which favored a defender who knew the country .  Forces moving through the 
area would be further limited from straying from wel l -used paths by the 
dense forest and undergrowth characteristic of these low, mature moun-
tains . It  might take hours to hack through the vegetation across a 
val ley no wider than a quarter of a mi le  and with only a five hundred-
foot variance in altitude . Movement was further hampered by the lack of 
roads through the area, the result of two factors . F irs t ,  the main roads 
fol lowed closely the paths of the rivers flowing through the vall eys ; 
hence they tended to paral le l the ridges , avoiding the higher elevations . 
Most routes crossing the ridges were hardly more than footpaths or animal 
trai l s .  Second , the funds avai l able for pub lic improvements in the 
1 830 ' s  had been premature ly exhausted on rai lroad construction ; hence 
there were no turnpikes worthy of the name in the whole section . 49 The 
49Mary u. Rothrock (ed. ) • The French Broad-Hol ston Countrr• A History � Knox County ,  Tennessee�ast Tennessee Historical Soc1ety, 
Knoxville· , �) . 236 ; s.  J. Folmsbee , "The Turnpike Phase of Tennessee ' s  
I nternal Improvement System of 1836- 1838 1"  The Jour,nal of Southern 
History, I I I  (November, 1 937) , 45 3 ,  77 .  ---
movement of armies through thi s  country could hardly be made en masse . 
Travel was possible only in smal l self-sufficient groups confined to 
we ll-defined trai ls . As a result •  an invader could come only with 
difficulty into the area.  
lfui le E ast Tennessee was remote . ringed by mountain barriers . it 
enclosed fertile productive fie lds • a potential granary for the govern-
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ment which controlled it . Comprising al l of the territory from the North 
Carolina boundary to the center of the Cumberland P lateau 1  it contained 
13 , 1 1 2  square miles of territory divided into thirty-four countie s . 50 
The scene was set ; the batt le lines drawn ; the forces ready. The 
native E ast Tennesseans realized that they hel d  the advantage of mobil ity 
and surprise over the regul ar forces of the Confederacy. They could not 
be brought to battle  unless they desired i t .  Their knowledge of the 
countrys ide . together with their impregnable mountains . provided them 
both with hiding places and with bases from which to strike . The fact 
that the population favored resistance erected still  another barrier 
against successful Confederate occupat ion . The Confederates attempting 
to win support were forced to continue their policy of restraint . 
General Zol licoffer repeatedly issued proclamations stating that his aim 
was but to preserve order and not al ienate the people , but all  to no 
• t  5 1  ava1 • 
50charles Lynnval Larew , Historic Tennessee (Historic Tennessee 
Publishing Co • •  Knoxvi ll e .  1937) . 8. 
5 1Garrett .  "Confederate Government in East Tennessee •"  1 8-22 ; 
Q·�· •  Ser. I I •  Vol . 1 •  p ,  83 1 •  contains Order No . 3 in which Zol licoffer 
In Carter and Johnson counties , training camps were so obvious 
that Colonel w . E .  Baldwin was sent to disperse them , arrest those who 
res isted,  and , if  necessary, ki l l  their leaders o 52  General Zol licoffer 
ordered Captain McClellan ' s  cavalry detached to help Baldwin. 53  Mean-
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whi le , Captain James Fry was ordered into Greene County to neutralize a 
Unionist force being trained by a Captain David Fry . 54  These displays of 
force seemed to quel l  the spirit of the Unionists in the separate areas , 
but as quickly as they were quieted in one place , trouble  erupted in 
another. 
An indication of these activities may be seen in the work of 
Wi l liam Clift of Hamil ton County who had taken over a Cumberland Presby-
terian meeting ground and was us ing it  as a way station for refugees 
escaping to the north. Many of the men arriving were being organized 
into companies and were being armed with the weapons smuggled in  from 
Kentucky . When the state adjutant general , James w. Gi l lespie , and some 
400 men were sent to stop Clift ' s  work , no shots were fired . 55 The 
"Cross Roads Treaty" between Colone l C lift and General Gi l lespie was 
stated his intention to carry out a policy of conciliation . On the sur­
face , it probab ly did some good in that it de layed open resistance until  
late fal l ,  thus giving the Confederates more time to solidify their  con­
trol over key areas . It did l ittle to stem the tide of res istance . 
52P .  P .  Lee to w .  E .  Baldwin , August 26 , 1 86 1 ,  in �·�· • Ser. I I ,  
Vol .  1 ,  p .  823 .  
53zo llicoffer to  W .  E .  Baldwin , September 1 ,  1 86 1 ,.  �· , 833 . 
54  Athens [Tennessee] �� September 13 , 1 861 . 
55Temple , Notable  Men of Tennessee , 95 -96 ; J .  s. Hurlburt , History 
2! � Rebe l l ion � Bradley'County (n.p . ,  Indianapolis , 1 866) 1 66-71 .  
s igned on the 19th of September. C l ift promised to s top resis tance and 
to remain l oyal and peacefu l , whi le Gi l lespie p romised that there would 
be no Confederate mi l itary intervent ion into the l ives of the inhabi =  
tants " 56  
Anger was provoked in East Tennes see when the property of those 
39 
who had fled north was ordered sequestered and Landon C .  Haynes was 
5 7 appointed to sel l the property,  The Enemy Alien Act of August 8 ,  1 86 1 ,  
was a l s o  appl ied by Jefferson navis to East Tennessee .  I ts effect was to 
dec lare every Unionist an enemy and to l abe l those who had been in 
Federal territ ory and returned to East Tennessee as spies or combatants 
regardless  of the ir s tatus if they were over  fourteen years of age . 5 8 A 
wave of ar.res ts on any p rete xt made matters wors e ,  Profess ing sympathy 
for the Uni on was cause enough to be taken into custody, 59  True , many of 
the cases  were thrown out of the c ivi l courts e but the damage had been 
done ; the peop l e  had been al ienated ,  
The Confederate forces in the area were reduced after mid= September 
when Zol l i coffer was ordered north toward Kentucky to intercept the Fed= 
eral force under Bue l l  moving toward Tennes see . 60 Union i rregul ars 
56Gi lbert E .  Govan and James w .  Livingood � Chattanooga Count ry� 
1 540- 195 1 &  From Tomahawks to TVA (E . P .  Dutton and C o . � - New York � 1 9 5 2 )  � 
1 85 - 86 . 
- - -
5 7 �:�. , Ser.  I ,  Vol .  4 , Pt . l D pp . 586=92 , -
5 8� • • Ser, I I ,  Vol . 2 5  pp . 1 368- 70 ,  
59Garrett , "Confederate Government i n  E ast Tennessee ;• 27= 29 ; 
Knoxvi l le Whig , September 2 1 1  1 86 1 , in Ne l s on� s Scrapbook . Vol . XI I I •  1 87.  
60 O . R . , Ser, I ,  Vo l ,  4,  pp . 476 - 77 .  
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harassed Knoxvil le  and engaged Colonel Wo  B .  Wood ' s  men there . These 
raids continued with increas ing boldness until  suddenly ,  on September 29 , 
they stopped. 61  Guerril las were demonstrating their power to  move and 
attack at wil l ,  a clear indication of their strength o The Confederates 
were now edgy , and even Zoll icoffer was having second thoughts about his 
ft 1 .  62  so  po  1cy. It was obvious that the Union men s ought to drive a wedge 
more deeply between the Confederate mi litary and the inhabitants .  I f  the 
mi litary was forced to get tough , the people  would resent them more , and 
those who until  this time had been indifferent would by default s ide with 
the growing band of Union guerri llas .  
Through October and into early NovemberQ apprehension continued to 
mount as the Confederate authorities became increas ingly aware of the 
extent of the discontent in East Tennessee . Conci liation ,  many fe l t ,  had 
failed . The rai lroad was in danger of being destroyed , and events proved 
so  critical that General A .  s. Johnston ordered two infantry regiments 
and seven cavalry companies to j oin Zol l icoffer ' s  command . General w. B .  
Wood expected his two hundred  men holding Knoxvi lle  t o  be overwhelmed in 
a general Unionist uprising and rebel l ion .  "Unionists are talking e xult-
ing ly of the approach of the Lincoln Army • • •  and their intention to 
j oin it . "63 Wood needed troops immediately ; otherwise the railroad, 
6lw . B . Wood to Zollicoffer, October 2 8 ,  1 861 , �· •  482 .  
62zol licoffer to w .  B . Wood , October 30 , 1861 , �· ·  490 . 
63Ibid . , 5 09- 10 . 
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stores , and his commi ssary might fal l into enemy hands . 64 Landon c .  
Haynes lent his voice of concern by warning Jefferson Davis : " •  • •  the 
rai lroads wi l l  be destroyed ,  the bridges burned , and other calamities not 
necessary to mention wi ll  fol low. "65 Strangely enough , this was the very 
night chosen by the Unionists to carry out a coordinated attack against 
all  the rai lroad bridges in East  Tennessee in their first organized 
guerril l a  attack . 
P lanning for the bridge-burning operation and the subsequent link 
up with regular Federal forces moving into East Tennessee from Kentucky 
began as early as July , 1 86 1. w. B .  Carter of Carter County • a preacher 
and Union sympathizer, went to Washington with the plan. 66 In conference 
with President Lincoln, General McClel lan ,  and Secretary of War Stanton , 
he outlined the two-part program . The nine rai lroad bridges in East 
Tennessee along the East Tennessee and Virginia and the East Tennessee 
and Georgia rai lroads were to be s imultaneous ly destroyed by indigenous 
partisan bands o With communications b locked,  a strong strike force of 
Federal regulars would move into the area and take the key military posi-
t ions from the Confederates o With Federal aid , Unionists in  the area 
would come out of hiding and , once armed,  would help with the occupation 
and en masse j oin the regular army. 6 7  The force thus confronting the 
64wood to Benj amin, Nov . 4 1  1 861 , �o • Ser. I I ,  Vol , 1 ,  pp . 836-37 .  
65Landon C o  Haynes to  Jefferson Davis , Nov .  8 1  1861 1 �· • 837-38 . 
66�o e Ser. I ,  Vol o 4 1  P •  284 . 
6 7Temple � East Tennessee and the Civi l War, 370- 72 , 375- 77. The 
whole incident is�cribed in Chapter-xvii , 366- 87.  See also , Temple , 
Notable � �  Tennessee , 3 10 .  
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Confederacy would be formidab le ;  forage was avai l able  locally from the 
abundance of the val ley and from captured mi l itary stores . In  effect , a 
Union spear would be poised at the heart of the Confederacy ready to 
s trike down the val ley toward Montgomery. The Confederacy would be 
bisected,  and they would be deprived not only of the railroad but of the 
manpower and food availab le in East Tennessee . 
The whole operation was heartily endorsed by  the Union authorities , 
particularly President Lincoln . 68 Carter returned south with two regular 
officers , Captains Wi l liam Cross and Daniel Fry ,  to begin preparations . 
Meanwhi le , the army relief force under the command of General George H .  
Thomas began to move into position in Kentucky . 69 Actual ly ,  his force 
was never adequate to accomp l ish its assigned task e and reflected more a 
case of po litical wishful  thinking than mi litary realism. Stil l ,  Thomas 
deployed to make as adequate a display as was possib le . He intended to 
take Cumberland Gap ,  strike Knoxvil le , and then send troops in both 
directions along the rai lroad and hold it against possible  counterattack . 70 
He moved out toward his obj ective earlier than he had anticipated in late 
October, an action necessitated by the reported movement of a strong Con-
federate force under Zol licoffer which had already begun a movement into 
6 8  2·�· • Ser. I ,  Vol . 5 2 ,  P t .  1 ,  p .  191 . 
69Temple , � Tennessee � �  Civil �� 3 7 1 .  
7°Francis F .  McKinney, Education in  Violence , The L ife of  George 
H. Thomas and the History of the Alib or-the Cumberlana-(wayne�tate 
rrnivers1ty-,r:ress; betroit ,-r9br}, ![ pass 1m .  
71  Kentucky. The actual s i ze of  the force was never ful ly agreed upon, 
but it was large enough to force Thomas to dispose of it before he 
carried out his primary mission. He met little  determined resistance , 
and moved on to Lebanon ,  Kentucky , ready to advance into E ast  Tennessee 
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in early November .  At this point , General Sherman decided that the whol e  
72 plan was tactical ly unsound , and he ordered Thomas back, There was 
really l ittle e l se that could have been done as Thomas ' supply l ines 
would have been confined to a s ingle pass=-Cumberland Gap .  His reserves 
were too weak to exploit the gains of his strike element even if it had 
achieved surprise . In addition , the enemy had forces far superior to 
those of Thomas on three s ides , and could have concentrated an attack at 
any p lace along his  thinly dispersed force almost at wil l .  The Confeder-
ate forces , by retaking Cumberland Gap 0  could easily have sealed him 
tightly into the val ley and annihi lated him , In effect , to have proceeded 
into East Tennessee would have been tantamount to mil itary suicide no 
matter what l imited success might have been achieved. Sherman rightly 
dec ided that the price was prohibitive in view of what could be accom-
p li shed .  From thi s  point unti l  the end of the war, East Tennessee was 
re legated to a strategical ly insignificant area from a military point of 
71Thomas to Sherman, October 2 2 ,  1 86 1 , O . R . , Ser. I I ,  
"�"� "�"'  I 889 ; Thomas to A .  Scharpf, November 1 2 ,  1 86 1 �  1b1d . , Ser. , 
354-55 ; Garrett , "Confederate Government in E aS't'T'ennessee ,"  
Vol . 1 ,  p .  
Vol .  4 ,  PP• 
36 . 
72 Templ e ,  Notable  P.fen of Tennessee , 310 ; O .R . ,  Ser .. I ,  Vol . 4 1  
pp . 342-43 ; ibid . , Vol .  7 ,  pp:-439 et tassim ;  ibid7, Ser .  I I ,  Vol .  1 ,  
pp . 833 et passt'm ;  Jesse Burt , "East ennessee;-t"incoln, and Sherman," 
East Tennessee Historical Society ' s  Publications , No . 34 ( 1962) , 16-2 1 .  
view . Strategic planning now cal led for bypassing the area ,  striking 
south along the Mississippi and Tennessee rivers , and then swinging 
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toward the coast south of the mountains in order to strangle the Confed-
eracy. The mi l itary commanders seemed to reali ze what Lincoln was slowly 
learning ; this  was ful l-scale war, not a po lit ical revolt which wou ld be 
quickly subdued . 
In the meantime , the partisan bands in East Tennessee went about 
their preparations , confident that soon the gray=clad soldiers would be 
overrun by a tide of b lue-uniformed soldiers rushing to their rescue , 
quite unaware that Thomas had been recal led o The date of the uprising 
was set for the night of November 8 o  Carter had been given $ 2 �500 to 
carry out this part of the operation , and �  considering the rather small  
sum , he  did remarkably well . 73 
On October 2 7 ,  Carter informed General Thomas that things in E ast 
Tennessee looked very bad . But he assured the general that i f  he cou ld 
get enough men , he would defeat the Confederates and save the rai lroad ; 
otherwise the bridges would be destroyed o 74 Thomas received the note on 
November 4 ,  and the very next day he sent Carter' s letter to Brigadier 
General w.  To  Sherman together with a plea for enough troops so that he 
might resume his mission . 75 On November 7e Thomas wrote to Andrew 
73Temple , East  Tennessee and the Civil  War, 371 : HcKinney • Educa­
tion in Violence ,-rt1; Scott and�gel t thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry,  
59-'6t:-
74carter to Thomas , October 27 ,  1 861 , �·�o �  Ser. I I ,  Vol . I ,  p .  800 . 
75Thomas to Sherman , November S ,  1 86 l p  �· • 89 1 .  
Johnson in London , Kentucky , that all  attempts to continue into East 
Tennessee had failed and that the mission was to be aborted . 76 
In addit ion to Sherman ' s  re luctance , General �1cC lel lan had not 
sent any troops , probab ly expecting Brigadier General D .  c .  Buel l  to 
follow orders and support the upris ing by occupying the area south of 
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Cumberland Gap ,  seizing the rai lroad , and severing communications between 
Virginia and the Mississippi River. 77 Bue l l ' s  over-cautious re luctance 
to comply with directives seems somewhat characteristic of the general .  78 
However, in this  case as in Sherman ' s withdrawal of Thomas , it would have 
been mil itari ly unsound to carry out the move . As it turned out , the 
fai lure to get troops into Tennessee did not hinder Carter' s  final plan 
of action , s ince he had in the meantime decided to destroy the bridges 
and wait for Federal he lp before attacking the Confederates .  
Parties had been se lected to attack and destroy each of the target 
bridges ,  and on the night of November 8 each group moved into position . 
The chief agent responsib le for the bridges in lower East Tennessee , from 
the Hiwassee River to Bridgeport , was A .  �1 . Cate p who quietly and effec­
tive ly destroyed his targets and disappeared.  It  would be thirty-five 
years before anything at al l was learned about the part icipants in this 
76Thomas to Johnson , November 7 8  1 86 1 ,  �· 
77McClel l an to Bue l l ,  November 7, 1 86 1 �  �· 
78John G .  Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln , A History ( 1 0  
vols . ,  The Century Co, , New York , 191 7) , V, 66-74. Bue lT replaced Sher­
man on November 9 ,  186 1 ,  and the command ' s  designation was changed from 
the Department of the Cumberland (deactivated) to the Department of the 
Ohio .  Burt , "East Tennessee , L incoln and Sherman ," 19 .  
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action . 79 This was indeed an outstanding performance from the standpoint 
of guerril la  warfare . There was neither loss of life nor equipment in 
accomplishing the assigned mission .  
But , if  effect iveness characterized the handling o f  the four 
southern bridges , debacle describes the attack upon the others . Of the 
remaining five , only one , the Lick Creek bridge , was successful ly des�  
troyed .  Two attempts were completely aborted ,  and at Strawberry Plains 
faulty intel l igence caused W ,  c .  Pickens and his party to b lunder into a 
s ingle  guard, James Keelan . 80 A fierce struggle and wild shooting ensued ,  
and when everything ended a few moments later, Kee lan had fled b adly 
wounded,  Pickens had been shot in the thigh ,  and several others suffered 
superficial wounds . Only then was it discovered that no one had any 
matches , they having either been forgotten or l ost . E xpecting Confeder-
ate reinforcements to arrive at any moment , the attackers fled. Thus 
ended the bridge-burning mission . The final result  was : five bridges 
destroyed with only one man badly wounded ; four bridges untouched .  But 
the Confederate reaction was one of panic and apprehension . 8 1  Communi-
cation lines along the rai lway had been cut . There was no way of te l l ing 
if thi s  was the s ignal for a ful l -scale Federal attack or not , but rumors 
were spreading wildly and the defenders prepared for the worst .  
79Temple , Notable � �  Tennessee , 85�86 . 
8°Knoxvi l le Register, November 1 3 ,  1 861 , in Hrs . W .  T.  Wood ' s  
unpub lished manuscript,  Strawberry P lains , Tennessee ; Temple ,  East 
_T ... e_nn_e_s_se ... e_ � � C ivil !!:.• 382 . 
8 1J .  H .  Lewis to Jefferson Davis , November 1 1 , 1 86 1 , £·�· • Ser .  
I I , Vol . 1 ,  p .  839 . 
Transportation was disrupted ; the movement of army supplies was 
rendered impossibl e . 82  The te legraph between Chattanooga and Richmond 
had been knocked out along with the railroad bridge s . 83 Troops were 
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rushed to East Tennessee , though the Confederate commanders had l itt le or 
no idea of what they faced in the area . 84 Colonel Daniel Leadbetter was 
placed in charge of the Eas t  Tennessee rai lroads and of reestab lishing 
tel egraph communications . ss 
Union men,  according to the initial plan ,  began to gather on the 
8th of November at pre-selected s ites to await the arrival of the regular 
forces . As many as 1 , 000 men began to assemb le in the Strawberry Plains 
area,  and on the banks of the French Broad River near Underdowns Ferry a 
large force held off a Confederate attack for several hours before dis­
pers ing. Some 300 men were gathered in Sevier County. 86 
Colone l Daniel Stover (a son-in- law of Andrew Johnson) mustered the 
Union men in Carter County and proceeded to Carter v s  Depot (Zoll icoffer) , 
intending to destroy the railroad bridge over the Watauga River.  I nstead ,  
they merely captured it  from its two guards and waited for the main body 
82Branner to Benj amin, November 9• 1 86 1 8  ibid . , Ser .  I ,  Vol . 4 ,  
p .  23 1 .  -
83w . H .  Mackal l to General Polk , November 9 1  1861 , �· •  5 31 -32 . 
84\'1. H .  Hackall  to Brig. Gen . Hardee , w .  F .  �1oore to John Letcher,  
Gen. Zol licoffer to  Gen . w .  B . Wood, Johnston to Harris , November 9 ,  
1 861 , �· ·  230-32 , 531 . 
85cooper to Leadbetter,  November 10 , 1 861 , �· • 234 .  
861'1. B .  Wood to Cooper ,  November 1 1 ,  1 86 1 , ibid . , Ser.  I I ,  Vol .  1 ,  
p .  840 ;  R .  Branner to Sec . of War Benjamin, �. ,-s43; Temple ,  Notab le 
� � Tennessee , 386-87.  
of Carter County volunteer irregulars to join them . 87  The next dayt 
l tOOO men, variously armed t  j oined Stover' s band and a l l  gathered at 
E l izabethton . Stragglers from nearby Johnson ,  Washington,. and Greene 
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counties soon j oined the unit ,  and they al l moved out to attack a nearby 
Confederate detachment commanded by Captain McClel lan .  However, when 
they encountered his pickets they withdrew, elected a leader, and went 
into camp .  During the night a few shots were exchanged , but noth ing was 
decided. By the next day, it became apparent that s omething had gone 
wrong. The irregular force which had gathered found that it did not 
receive the expected Federal leadership . Lacking direction and with no 
idea of what was happening , the men disbanded.  
In  Hami lton County , Wi l liam Clift was active again . After the 
bridge burnings he had abrogated the treaty with Colonel James W .  
Gi llespie,  the Tennessee state adjutant general . Men were gathering once 
more on his farm for what history has cal led the "Second C lift War. " On 
November 1 2 ,  Colonel W ,  B .  Wood was sent from Athens , Tennessee , to meet 
an A labama unit and together with them converge on C lift and wipe out his  
88  force . I n  the subsequent encounter, shots were exchanged in  a confused 
and poorly coordinated engagement which resulted in no loss of life . 
87Robert L .  Owen to Benj amin , November 1 1 ,  1 86 1 , O . R . ,. Ser. I I ,.  
Vo l .  1 ,  p .  839 ; Scott and Ange l ,  Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalryt 66� 73 ; 
Danie l E l l i s ,  Thri l ling Adv�ntures of Daniel E l lis , the Great Union Guide 
of East Tennessee for a Period of Nearly Four Years �tJinf the Great 
�utnern Rebeliion�arper and !Tother,'N�ork, 18 , 8;-Tempie , 
Notab le � � Tennessee , 385 . 
88o . R . , Ser. I ,  Vol . 4 ,  pp . 242 ,  244 . The battle i s  described on 
pages 242':'5'0'. 
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C l ift ' s  force dispersed,  and General Wood reported to Confederate 
Secretary of War Benjamin that "the rebe l l ion in East  Tennessee has been 
put down in some of the counties and wil l  be effectively suppressed in 
less than two weeks in all  the counties . " 89 
The story was the same al l over East Tennes see , What had begun as 
an operative plan to remove the Confederates soon floundered . A dis-
pirited mob s lowly dispersed,  stil l  not knowing what had happened . 
Res istance seemed to have crumbled.  Evident ly the Confederates had but 
to continue their present policy to be assured of a docile and yielding 
peop le in E ast Tennessee . The hoped for Union attack into East Tennessee 
had been cal led off . There was nothing that indigenous partisan groups 
cou ld contribute unless they were organi zed ,  and it was now obvious that 
they were not . Their morale was shattere d ;  their wi l l  to resist des­
troyed. They had also disobeyed the cardinal rule of guerri l la warfare 
by attempting to engage in regular army activities without either the 
training or the equipment . 
At thi s juncture , the Confederate authorities made a key b lunder, 
a b lunder which would drastical ly revise the situation in East Tennessee . 
Reasoning that their po licy of conciliation had fai led,  from the highest 
authority down to the field commanders , the unanimous decis ion was to 
employ terror tactics . 90 Secretary of War Benj amin ' s  instructions for 
deal ing with the East Tennessee Unionists were quite plain: 
89!!?.!.!! • •  250 .  
90Garrett,  "Confederate Government i n  East Tennessee • " 46 . 
1st Al l such as can be identified as having been engaged in 
bridge burning are to be tried summari ly by drum-head court-martial 
and if  found gui lty, executed on the spot by hanging . I t  would be 
we l l  to leave their bodies hanging in the vicinity of the burned 
bridges .  
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2nd A l l  such as have not been so  engaged are to  be  treated as 
prisoners of war and sent with an armed guard to Tuscaloosa Alabama, 
there to be kept in prison at the depot selected by the government 
for prisoners of war. Whenever you can discover  that arms are con­
cealed by these traitors , you wi l l  send out detachments ,  search for , 
and seize the arms , In no case is  one of them known to have been up 
in arms against the government to be released on any pledge or oath 
of al legiance . The time for such measures is past . • • • Such as 
voluntarily take the oath of allegiance , and surrender their arms , 
are al one to be treated with leniency. 
P , S .  Judge Patterson [a  son-in- l aw of Andrew Johnson] , Colonel 
P ickens , and other ring- leaders of the same c lass must be sent at 
once to Tuscaloosa j ai l  as prisoners of war . 9 1  
The Confederate area commander informed General Cooper  that " • • •  
a mild or conciliating policy wi ll  do no good ; they [the Unionists] must 
be punished ; and some of the leaders ought to be punished to the extent 
of the law. Nothing short of this wi l l  give qui et to the country . .. 92 To 
emphasize that he meant what he said , he again p laced Knoxvi l le under 
strict martial law. General Zol l icoffer also changed his views . "The ir 
[the Unionists ]  leaders should be seized and held as prisoners . The 
leniency shown them has been unavai ling . They have acted with base 
duplicity and should no longer be trusted , "93 Governor Harris felt that 
"this rebel lion must be crushed out instantly, the leaders arrested . and 
9lo . R . , Ser. I a  Vol . 7, p .  70 1 ,  
- -
92w .  B .  Wood to Cooper,  November 1 1 .  1 86 1 , ibid • • Vol . 4 ,  p .  236 , 
� 
93zol licoffer to W ,  B ,  Wood , November 1 2 .  1 86 1 •  �· •  Ser,  I I ,  
Vol , l a  pp . 842-43 . 
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summari ly punished .  "94 A .  G .  Graham proposed that a l l  Unionists i n  E ast  
Tennessee be  stripped of  their lands and possessions and together with 
their fami lies be forced to leave the country. 95 
The wholesale roundup began immediately.  In Greenev i l le ,  at a 
court-martial ordered by Colonel Leadbetter on November 30,  four men were 
ordered executed. 96 Jai ls and prisons al l over East Tennessee were being 
fil led to capacity with known or suspected Unionists . "Parson" Brownlow 
was captured and hel d  unti l  March, 1 86 2 ,  when he was sent north mainly 
because he was too important to be executed and too dangerous to be 
al lowed to remain in the South. 97  
Judge Samue l Mi l ligan recal led the force and brutality of  the 
trials of two bridge burners ,  Fry and Hinchie (also reported as Hens ie ) . 98  
They were brought to Greenevi l le ,  and within two hours their bodies were 
hanging on a large oak tree behind the rai lway station . "Their b odies 
94Harris to Davis , November 1 2 ,  1 861 , ibid . ,  Ser. I ,  Vol .  4, p. 240 ,  
-
95A .  G ,  Graham to Davis ,  November 1 2 ,  1 861 , ibid . , p .  239 . 
-
96Temple , E as t  Tennessee and the Civil  War , 393- 9 7 ;  Thomas w .  
Humes , � Mountaineers of Tennessee-cogden Bros . & co. , Knoxvil le ,  
1888) , �7. Those executed included David Fry. I t  was l ater discov­
ered that he was the wrong man , not the Captain Fry who had been sent to 
East Tennessee to he lp Carter organize the uprising . 
9 7o . R . , Se_r. I ,  Vo l ,  7 ,  pp . 740 , 742 , 745 , 763-64 , 772 , 774- 76 , 
785 t 800 . -8!3 ,  8 19 ,  
9 8samuel Milligan, "�iemoir, 1 863- 1869 ," unpublished  handwritten 
manuscript in the possession of s .  J .  Mi lligan (grandson) , Greenevil le , 
Tennessee . A microfilm copy is in the Tennessee State L ibrary and 
Archives , Register number 13 ,  Mi ll igan ' s story is corroborated in  its 
essentials in Leadbetter to Benj amin, November 3, 1 861 ; Leadbetter to 
Cooper,  December 8, 1 861 , O .R . , Ser. I I ,  Vol , 1 ,  PP • 726 , 747 ;  Temple , 
East  Tennessee and the Civ!l-war, 393 ; Goodspeed,  Hi story of Tennessee , 
� - - - - -
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were left swinging in the air  al l that afternoon , and through the night , 
and until  4 oclock p .m .  the next day • •  • • Other union men under guard 
were forced to cut them down, dig their graves and bury them . .. 99 Jacob 
Harman and his son were taken to Knoxvil l e ,  convicted of participation in 
the bridge burnings ,  and sentenced to be hung .  The son was hung first 
and the father forced to watch and then was hung himself . 100 
Leadbetter  was not so sure that this was the end of the matter .  
He wrote from Greenevil le :  " I  think that we have effected sanething--done 
some good ; but whenever a foreign force enters thi s  country be it soon or 
late three-fourths of these people wil l  rise in arms to j oin them , " 101 
Accordingly ,  he i ssued a proclamation which in essence warned al l  E ast 
Tennesseans that as long as they supported the Union cause in this fight , 
they could expect no mercy. On the other hand, those who took the oath 
102 to support the Confederacy would be pardoned .  
In late November, Brigadier-General w.  H .  Carro l l  replaced Wood at 
Knoxvi l le .  Keeping the city under strict mi l itary rule , he  went on the 
. h . b . d b  h 1 "  103 B t assumpt1on t at res 1stance was est conta1ne y a toug po 1cy. u 
his success could only be temporary. H .  c .  Young realized quite wel l  the 
9�fi l li gan , "Hemoi r," 94 . 
lOOibid . , 9 7-99 ; Dykeman , F rench Broad , 89.  
101Leadbetter to Cooper,  November 28,  186 1 , O . R . , Ser .  I I , Vol .  1 ,  
p .  849 . - -
102Proclamation to the "Citizens of East Tennessee ,"  �· • 851-52 . 
103carro1 1 to Benjamin, December 1 1 , 1 86 1 ,  �· • 759-60 , 
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flaw in such a policy. He and other leading c itizens protested the heavy-
handedness of the mi l itary authorities . Hi s argument was voiced in Rich-
mond by Colonel  H. R .  Austin and L andon c .  Haynes . To al l of them , as 
we l l -informed citizens of East Tennessee , it seemed best to end the 
. 1 . h h h t . ld d d " 1 1 104 repr1sa s 1n t e ope t a 1t wou put an en to 1s oya ty. 
However, these voices of moderation were ineffect ive . Leadbetter,  
who was placed in command of Knoxvi l le on January 7,  1 86 2 ,  was no fol -
lower of  a policy of  conciliation. Overawing the Unioni sts by force was 
to him the only answer, 105 The inhabitants of the region could not be 
trusted , and an underground resistance , though outwardly quiet, was sti l l  
very much a reality. 106 Legal manipulations were be ing carried out 
behind the scenes to rectify some of the unjust arrests , but it was 
107  already too late as  much of the damage had been done . Moreover, the 
hierarchy gave no indication of reversing its strongly mi litant stand ; 
the tense s ituation could not possibly be eased.  The Confederates real-
i zed that at least two-thirds of the people ,  if not openly host i le ,  were 
at least opposed to their policies . 108 The bridges were sti l l  in danger, 
104H .  R .  Austin to Davis (rec . )  December ,  1 86 1 ,  �· •  869 . 
105 Leadbetter to Cooper,  December 24 11 1 861 , �· , 859 .  
106Leadbetter to Cooper ,  January 21 , 186 2 ,  �· ·  877.  
107 Garrett , "Confederate Government in East Tennessee ,"  62-63.  
108J .  G .  M.  Ramsey to Davis , Feb .  10 1  1862 ; J .  w .  Garrett to w .  P .  
Chi lton, F .  s. Lyon, J .  L .  �1 . Curry, March 1 ,  1 862 , S!.·�· • Ser .  I ,  Vol . 
5 2 ,  P t .  2 ,  pp . 267-68 ; Vol . 1 0 ,  Pt .  2 ,  p .  315 . 
d . ' 1 1 h 1 '  109 an open aggress1on was st1 very muc a rea 1ty. 
The Confederates had two tasks �  to  keep civil  order and to stop 
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partisan activities . Both could have been done by conci l iat ion, but the 
Confederates elected to adopt the repressive program . The choice proved 
to be se lf-defeating because under a col lective punishment system , the 
innocent suffer and tend to become alienated , thereby increasing the 
prob lem of control . But ,  if severity against the guerril l as and the 
popu lation was not the answer , would not leniency create i ts own dangers ? 
Admittedly it would up to a point . Obviously,  the populat ion would be 
subj ect to the pressures of the partisans , but ,  even so, restraint on the 
part of government would have alienated the resistors , eventual ly i solat-
ing them as criminals . The Confederate pol icies forced many into the 
ranks of the partisans , thereby actual ly rejuvenat ing the unconventional 
warfare these pol icies were designed to forestal l .  
I t  i s  an over-simp l ification to argue that the bridge burnings 
were mi litari ly insignificant , ending in fai lure ,  and therefore caused 
the Confederates no harm . Simi larly, it is a mistake to conc lude that 
East Tennesseans were worse off after the act than they were or would 
109 have been had it not been carried out . It  i s  true that had the Union 
forces and the guerri l las carried out the plan as original ly conceived, 
the damage caused the Confederacy might have been devastat ing . Even so .  
the Confederates were temporari ly deprived of  a supply route and of 
109This argtunent i s  advanced both in Hiss Garrett ' s  thesi s ,  64 , 
and by Temp le ,  East  Tennessee � �  Civ i l �. 387 . 
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te legraphic communicat ion at a t ime when they great ly needed them to 
thwart the expected Federal attack . Both were v ital to  m i l i tary maneu­
ver. and both were unavailab le .  Whi le the bridges were repaired by 
December. 1 10  a significant psychological impediment endured. The real i­
zation of  the vulnerabil ity of  the area to unconventional attack forced 
the Confederates to keep as many as 10 ,000 men constantly in the area.  
an area within their own l ines . 1 1 1  Thi s  interior polic ing deprived com­
bat commanders of the m i l itary use of these soldiers . In addition. the 
numbers of East Tennesseans avai lab le as effective replacements for 
depleted combat ranks \�ere great ly  reduced . �tore important • even though 
men of this  area were distrusted as soldiers , they m ight have been forced 
to produce v ital ly needed food . Now , both men to fight and men to grow 
food were lost 1  a factor which would later contribute heavi ly to the 
decis ive defeat of the Confederates . Thi s  kind of contribution made by 
unconventional warfare is often ignored in assessing the mi l itary signif-
icance of particular operations because its effectiveness  is usual ly 
impossible to measure in conventional m i l i tary terms . Perhaps i t  may be 
more easi ly appreciated if v iewed in terms of how much more successful  an 
enemy m ight have been had i t  not ex isted to hamper his  war effort . There 
i s  no doubt that the res istance movement at this t ime was poorly organ-
ized . but to dismi ss  i t  as harm less i s  to dismiss the psychological • 
economic •  social . and even m i l itary factors bearing upon a region 
1 10� � Times . December 31 1 1 862 .  
1 1 1nykeman . French Broad • 80- 86 . 
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subj ected to total war, 
The reaction of the Confederate officials was probab ly natural ; 
but it  was disastrous , Actual ly ,  they were at least equal ly as respon­
sib le for the perpetuation of resistance as were the Unionists . Instead 
of weakening the partisans , Confederate pol icy guaranteed them a source 
of manpower, a base of operation ,  and the support of the local popula­
tion , whi le simultaneous ly depriving the Confederacy of the same 
advantage . 
O l iver Temple  has he ld that the suffering of the people of East  
Tennessee was magnified by  the incidents of  res istance and that they 
would  have been better off had they not become so engaged . This  would 
prompt the rhetorical question , by whose terms wou ld they have been 
better off? Certainly not in re lation to their  political tradition or 
ideological desire to remain associated with the Union . There is  nothing 
in the events of the war up to this  point which indicates that their 
position wou ld have done other than deteriorate as the war progressed . 
Voicing opposition as they had and demanding separate statehood when they 
did p laced East Tennessee in a pos ition of mi strust in the Confederacy. 
Certainly the area would not have been left alone in terms of manpower 
and economic considerations to decide its own future distinct from that 
of the whole Confederacy . Either voluntari ly or by force , these people 
wou ld have had to contribute to the war no matter which s ide they 
supported, and in this  sense they would not have been better off o 
I f  they had persisted in their  Union sympathies , yet had not per­
formed s ome overt act , perhaps a few hangings might have been avoided , 
5 7  
but other kinds o f  mistreatment would have occurred .  In any case , the 
politically active Unionists had no intention of accepting disunion , and 
they intended to do something about it . They certainly did not believe 
that they would have been better off not voicing their  discontent . They 
realized, it seems , that sacrifices would be required if they were to 
have the government they wanted .  They also  wanted their fe l low E ast  
Tennesseans , men normal ly apathetic , to  fee l  a simi lar indignation . The 
bridge burnings and the subsequent aid from Federal forces were the 
planned incidents to unify the res istance effort . l�en the failure of 
the whole plan became evident and the Confederate authorities resorted to 
terror to control the area , the partisan leaders saw their chance to fan 
the spark of resistance . Here was an opportunity to rebuild morale and 
make a determined stand against an enemy who had now openly dec lared its 
hostility to the peop le of the area .  The hardships of war could be off­
set if there was a reason and purpose for resisting .  I t  was to b e  a 
fight to remain one with the Union , The unity of purpose achieved by the 
events of November, 1 86 1 1  seems far more important than the fai lure t o  
burn the bridges and cannot b e  dismissed on the bas is of individual we l l­
being . There was now a reason to res ist , a goal to achieve , and an enemy 
to be driven out--a fact far more important to a people  than the personal 
discomfort or suffering they might have to endure to achieve it . Uncon­
ventional warfare had been declared by an act of the will  of the East  
Tennesseans . 
By thi s act , an underground was created which would harass the 
Confederacy within its very heart and which ran deeper than mere 
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polit ical fee ling o Now the wrongs that had been endured were worn as 
pers onal scars etched deeply on the hearts of the people  and burned into 
their minds o 1 1 2  They were embarking upon the l ife of citizens at war-- a  
war which had only just begun c 
1 1 2�0 , 9 1-95 ; Sheeler, "Unionism in East Tennessee •" 201-03 . 
CHAPTER I I I  
TilE APEX- -OPEN WARFARE BY INOH";ENOUS PErtSONNEL 
Through the length and breadth of what had been a united country,  
it  was plain to  a l l  in  1 862 that it would be  a long war. In East  Tennes -
see it seemed that no outs ide he lp would soon reach the Unionists and 
that Confederate forces were outward ly in firm control of the region. 1 
Since the abortive bridge-burning attempt and its aftermath , Union sympa-
thizers who had not escaped were forming into bands in the inaccessib le 
mountains and clandestinely beginning to fight their own unconventional 
warfare . Some would be fighting to preserve the Union , some for their  
l and, and others merely for themselves .  Some would be  wel l  l ed  and 
others would become mere bands of cutthroats masquerading behind a nob le 
purpose . 
Through the winter of 1 861-62 ,  these bands conducted raids against 
the Confederate troops , firing upon their pickets , burning their bui ld-
ings , harassing their ranks , and keeping them constantly on edge . When-
ever Federal raiders ventured into the area,  Union guerril las were always 
there to guide them , to b lock roads , and to cut te legraph wires . Few of 
these actions were of any official mi litary significance and rare ly 
appeared in the reports . The stories of these e xp loits have endured 
lE ,  Kirby Smith to s. Cooper, Harch 1 3 ,  1 862 ,  O . R . , Ser .  I ,  Vol . 
10 , Pt , 2 ,  pp . 320-2 1 ;  Smith to w .  w. Mackal l ,  March T4";' 1 862 ,  !!?.!!!• • 
325 ; Smith to Cooper,  March 15 , 1862 ,  �· • Pt . 1 0 pp . 20-2 1 .  
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mainly as fam ily lore among the residents of the mountains . 2 Probab ly 
many of these s tories are true . but certainly an equal  number are not 6 
Whi le  verificat ion i s  impos sible , enough ev idence exists to conclude that 
skirmi shes were regu l ar, disrtiptive , and cos t ly to the C onfederates both 
in men and equipment . 
The Confede rate force was incapab le of coping with the constant 
attacks and was unab le to revitalize  itself  by recruiting . Consequen t l y ,  
morale  in the ranks was l ow ,  and the confidence of Sou thern sympathizers 
was badly shaken . 3 Confederate authorit ies had pl eaded with Jefferson 
Dav i s  for months to send into East Tennessee an aggre s s ive commander who 
could s tem the t ide of the Unionist  rev o l t .  4 To meet this need , D avis 
ordered �taj or Genera l  E.  Kirby Smi th, cal led from winter quarters at 
Manassas • to report immediately to Richmond . After being bri efed on the 
precarious situat ion in E as t  Tennes see • he was sent immediately to Knox-
v i l le to assume command of the Department of E as t  Tennessee . Arriving on 
March 8 ,  186 2 ,  he formal ly as sumed his  duties the fol l owing day. Kirby 
Smith ' s  biographer has described the conditions which he found i n  his  new 
ass i gnment : 
Affairs in E ast  Tennessee were even worse than the new c ommander had 
expected .  The peop l e  were di s loya l ; the troops "a disorganized m ob 
2The his torical  collect ion of John w. Baker, Huntsvi l le ,  Tennes­
see , contains numerous such accounts which he has  gathered .  
3Joseph H .  Park s ,  General Edmund Kirby Smith , £·.2.·�· (Louisi ana 
State Univers ity Pre s s , Baton Rouge , second print1ng,  1962) , 156 . 
4Landon c . Haynes to Jeffers on Davi s , January 2 7 1  1 862 , �·�· •  Ser.  
I ,  Vol . 7,  p.  849 .  
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without head or discip line . "  The only bright ray o f  hope was the 
reasonab le assurance that the enemy , by direct ing a l l  its  avai l ab l e  
power toward West Tennessee • would g ive an opportunity for reorgani­
zation in the eas te rn  sect ion. s 
Kirby Smith began rapidly to put h i s  command i n  fight ing order.  
He had 8 , 000 men spread over East  Tennes see , guarding key points , the 
rai lroads , and Cumberland Gap .  To the north , poised to s trike , was a 
Federal Army vas t ly superior to h i s  own. To the west ,  w ith N ashv i l l e  in 
Federal hands , he would have to deal  with an o ld foe of the C onfederacy , 
Andrew Johnson , as �1i l itary Governor of Tennessee . 
From the beginning, Andrew Johns on had been a ra l lying point of 
the res i stance movement . 6 He had been one of those re spons ible for the 
firm stand taken by the mountaineers favoring the Union . A self-made man 
of the people , he had thei r  complete confidence . Now once again he was 
in a pos ition to as s i s t  the Federal cause . I t  i s  imposs ib l e  to s ay that 
he in any way directed the unconventional warfare activit ies , but , con-
s idering hi s unquestioned patriot i sm and the fact that Dan E l li s  and 
othe r pi lots made continual trips from E as t  Tennessee to N ashv i l le and 
back again, it is probable  that he p l ayed a s igni fic ant part in obs t ruct­
ing Confederate aims . 7 Even i f  he had taken no active part , his very 
SParks , Kirby Smith, 15 7 .  
6Ralph w .  Haskins , "Andrew .Johnson and the P reservation o f  the 
Uni on ,"  Eas t  Tennessee Historical Socie ty' s Pub l icat ions , No . 33 ( 196 1 )  • 
58-60 . See als o ,  c .  R .  Hal l ,  Andrew Johnson , Milit ary Governor of 
Tennes see (Princeton Univers ity Press , Princeton , 1916) ,  15 , 44;so , 5 2 ; 
Charles c .  Anderson, Fighting £! Southern Federals (Neale Pub l ishing C o . , 
New York , 1 9 1 2 ) , 196 . 
7scott and Ange l ,  Thirteenth Tennes see C aval ry ,  1 36 , 1 4 1 .  
6 2  
presence was enough t o  inspire the irregul ars and hamper K i rb y  Smith . 
Within h i s  command ,  Kirby Smith ' s  posit ion was untenab le .  As in 
the t ime of Zol licoffer,  wherever troops were not physica l ly present . 
there was to be found open defi ance , attack , and h aras sment . To his  
wife , the disgruntled Kirby Smith confide d :  "I  am overwhe lmed with cares 
& troub les , no one can conceive the actual conditions of East Tenn . dis-
loyal to the core , it  is  more dangerous and difficult  to operate in , than 
the country of an acknowl edged enemy. " 8 
E ast Tennes see was enemy terri tory. The popu lation opposed Kirby 
Smith ,  but then , so did large numbers of his  own soldiers .  Those who 
9 came from the local area were compl etely undependab le . They had j oined 
the Confederate Army usua lly to avoid suspic ion , and whenever they could , 
e i ther deserted or gave the enemy informat ion and aid . 1 0  The general 
reported ,  for examp l e , that without firing a shot , Union raiders had 
capture d  two of his local companies near the town of Jacksborough. K i rby 
Smi th insis ted that b oth officers and men of such units be shifted to a 
less sensitive are a ,  s ince they were not trus tworthy. 1 1  
The activ ity of the partisan was a l s o  seen in the trouble  Kirby 
8cite d  in P arks , Kirby Smi th , 158 .  
9Ibi d. : Arthur H.  Nal l ,  General Kirby Smi th (Univers ity of the 
South Pres5; Sewanee , 190 7) , 201 !!, passim ;�ditori a l , � .!2.!!, Times , 
February 16 , 1 86 2 .  
lOGeorgia Lee Tatum , Dis lolalt� In the Confederacy (Univers ity of 
North C arol ina Pres s ,  Chapel Rii • 1 34f,� . 
l iE . Kirby Smith to War Department , Harch 15 • 1 86 2 ,  £·�· , Ser. I • 
Vol .  10 , P t .  1 ,  pp . 20-2 1 .  
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Smith was having with the mi litia ,or home guard , as it  was commonly 
called.  These , too , he cons idered total ly unre liable due to the infi l -
tration into their  ranks of Unioni sts . Assessing the rel iability of the 
inhabitants in terms of counties , he observed that only s ix of the 
thirty-two counties of East Tennessee could be cons idered friendly. He 
estimated that this state of affairs gave the Union a potential of some 
20 ,000 recruits should they need them. 12  To counteract this res istance , 
he proposed to arrest al l the leaders and draft al l the e l igib le men ,  
sending them to  a more southern area for indoctrination and training. 1 3  
Al l  partisans , he  instructed Leadbetter,  should be  summarily dealt with, 
14  al l arms seized, and all  equipment and supplies destroyed .  Further, 
Kirby Smith decided that all  East Tennesseans should take the Confederate 
oath of al legiance . Secret ly ,  he deployed selected officers and men to 
designated locations to administer the oath. Those who refused to take 
it were to be sent as prisoners to Knoxvi l le . 15 
General R. E .  Lee was worried that Kirby Smith' s force of 8 ,000 
effective soldiers was insufficient to cope with the partisans . There-
fore , he ordered reinforcements to the area,  and at Kirby Smith' s request 
recommended that martial law be imposed and the East Tennessee 
1 2smith to Cooper, March 23 , 1862 ,  ib id . , Pt . 2 ,  p .  355 ; Smith to 
T. A .  Washington , Apri l 3, 1 86 2 ,  ibid . , Pt:-!; pp . 389-90 . 
-
1 3smith to Cooper,  Apri l 2 ,  1 86 2 ,  �· •  385 - 86 . 
14smi th to Leadbetter • \farch 2 7 • 1 862 , �· • 369 .  
15circular by Smith ,  Apri l 2 ,  1 862 , �· •  386 . 
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Confederates be ordered out of the region , 16  On Apri l 81 1 862 1  Jefferson 
Davis formally made the region of East Tennessee enemy territory, He 
suspended civil  jurisdiction except in civil l itigations , suspended the 
writ of habeas corpus , and ordered Kirby Smith to estab lish an effective 
" 1 " . 1 7  m1 1tary occupat1on. 
To add to his troubles , Kirby Smith was now instructed to enforce 
the first of three conscription l aws passed on April 16 1 1862 .  Thi s  act 
required that a l l  men between e ighteen and thirty-five serve in the 
Confederate Army. Partisan leaders made certain that al l  East Tennessee 
knew of thi s lates t  order, and suddenly there was a conspicuous absence 
of men in thi s category throughout the territory. 18  Kirby Smith was 
furious and ordered a crackdown upon these propagandists . 19  He did 
everything in his power to stop the partisan-inspired flow of men toward 
Kentucky , but to little avail . Thousands escaped. 20 Psychological ly, 
the conscription act guaranteed the fidel ity of East Tennesseans to the 
cause of the Union .  Actually,  the traditional ly independent mountain men 
on both sides found this piece of legis lation a bitter pil l . 2 1  For those 
16rndorsement by R .  E ,  Lee , March 2 1 ,  1 862 1  �· •  320-2l i Lee to 
Smith,  April 71 1 862 1  �· •  397-98 ,  
17General Orders No .  2 1 1 Apri l 8 1  1 86 2 1  �· •  402,  
1 8ratum 1 Disloyalty, 150 ; Parks , Kirby Smith , 17 1 . 
19H .  L .  C l ay to W ,  L .  E akin, Apri l 19 1 1 862 1  O . R . , Ser. ! 1  Vol . 
10 , P t .  2 ,  pp . 429-30 ; H .  L .  C lay to J .  c .  Vaughn , April 19 1 186 2 1  ibid • •  
429 ; H ,  L .  Clay to J .  �f . Rhett 1 Apri l 2 3 1  1 862 1  �· • Pt . 1 1  p .  64� 
20Ibid . , Pt .  2 1  p .  1 1 4 .  
2 1oykeman , French Broad , 9 1 .  
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about to j oin the Confederate Army, i t  was an insult . To the Unionist ,  
it  hurried him gut of  the area into a b lue uniform . To those who had no 
desire to fight from the beginning , there was now no choice but open 
resistance to what they deemed an unjust law, l�ile  the conscription net 
trapped many who were forced to take the oath against their wil l ,  they 
served with re luctance , only until  they could e ither desert or serve the 
underground. 
Force was not succeeding. General Kirby Smith changed his tactics 
and tried persuasion in a proclamation issued on April 18 , 2 2  He took the 
position that many of the people were resisting Confederate martial l aw 
because they had been mis led and as a result were ignorant of their 
duties and obli gations to the State of Tennessee . To those who were m is -
led, he offered forgiveness if ,  during the next thirty days , they would 
admit their error and take an oath to support the C onfederacy . Even 
those who had already fled the state or were hiding in the mountains were 
included in this offer. The property and rights of those who returned 
would be protected , the writ of habeas corpus would be  reinstated, and 
mi l itia draft would be suspended .  
The P rovost Marshal ,  Wi l liam Churchwel l ,  in  his lette r  "To the 
disaffected people of East Tennessee ,"  added further inducement to return 
by reminding those affected that their wives and children were involved . 23  
If  the men returned in  30  days on Kirby Smith ' s  terms , they could care 
882 . 
22�·�· • Ser. I ,  Vol . 10 , Pt . 2 ,  pp . 640- 4 1 ;  Ser. I I ,  Vol . 1 ,  p .  
23Ibid. , 884 ; Ser, I ,  Vol , 10 ,  Pt . 2 ,  pp . 640-4 1  • 
.......... 
for their fami lies at home , on their own l and , without fear of being 
molested .  If  they refused , their  families would be sent to Kentucky at 
their own expense . 
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Kirby Smith pleaded with President Davis to suspend the C onfeder-
ate conscription law.  He estimated that this  act had caused over 7 , 000 
men to flee north and j oin the Federal Army . 24  Realizing how precarious 
the situation was in East Tennessee , Davis re lented and agreed to suspend 
temporari ly the act in that region. 25 Confederate Secretary of War G .  w .  
Randolph was '"i l ling to go  further and exempt the area permanently as  a 
t f " 1 "  • 26 ges ure o conc1 1at1on. Manipulating the conscription act was a 
propaganda venture which Kirby Smith intended to exploit to the maximum. 
Here was an opportunity to win those who had not fled and to encourage 
many who had already gone to return home . On August 1 3 ,  he issued the 
fol l owing proclamation: 
To the East Tennesseans in the u . s. Army : 
You must al l  now be convinced that you have been grossly deceived 
by the misrepresentations of those under whom you are serving. I 
therefore announce to you that a final opportunity is offered you to 
return to your homes and your allegiance . I offer you a general 
amnesty for al l past offenses , the only condition being that you take 
the oath of al legiance to the Government and that you conduct your­
se lves as becomes good citizens , You wil l receive a fair price for 
any arms ,  ammunition and equipment you may bring with you . 2 7 
24� • •  45 3-54 . 
25�. ,  5 2 1 ; Vol .  16 ,  Pt . 2 ,  pp . 695 -96 . 
26� • •  703 . 
2 7Ibid . , 756 .  
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Three days later, Kirby Smith advanced into Kentucky and 1'1ajor 
General .1 .  P .  l'fcCown took command of the District of E ast Tennessee . 
McCown , a native of Carter County, Tennessee , was a West Point graduate 
who had had considerable mi litary experience on the frontier in the r-texi-
can War, fighting Indians in the Seminole War, and in putting down 
rebel l ion in the Utah Expedition. 28  In short , he came to his command 
with experience ; moreover, as he wrote to Confederate Secretary of War 
Randolph : " I  am one of these peop le and think I know them . "29 He was 
told upon his assumption of command that there were some 5 , 000 arms and 
large quantities of ammunition in the Knoxvil le-C l inton area and that he 
was to find and confiscate the lot . 30 There is no record to indicate 
that he succeeded .  I f  the Union General G .  W .  �forgan could be forced 
back from the Cumberland Gap and Kentucky border region, McCown was to 
attempt to enforce conscription which had been \vaived earlier. 31 The 
whole area was to be purged of Unionists . 
When �kCown attempted to enforce conscription on September 3 ,  E ast  
Tennesseans responded by j oining partisan bands and caus ing such destruc­
tion that he requested  additional troops to control them . 32 He tried to 
28Mark M .  Boatner, I I I ,  The Civi l � Dictionary (David McKay Co. , 
New York , 1959) , 5 29 .  
2 9  2.·�· . Ser. I ,  Vol .  16 , Pte  2 ,  p .  790 .  
30� • • 797.  
3 1� • • 776 . 
32 Ibid . ,  794-95 . 
-
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round them up and send them north after stripping them of the ir property. 
In both cases  he was ineffective , and once again , as had Kirby Smith 
before him , he suspended conscript ion. 
Meanwhile , Genera l Braxton Bragg ordered  cons cript ion for al l ab le 
bodied men in Tennesse e ,  thereby forc ing HcCown to reve rse his posi t ion.  
Once again,  the male popul at ion s ought refuge in the mountains and in 
Kentucky . The s ituation was more than 'fcCown could  cope with , and Bri ga-
dier  (;ene ral Samuel Jones was ordered into the area  to enforce conscrip-
tion .  Adopt ing a firm but fair pol icy from the start , he activel y  
attacked partisan bands whi l e  carefu l ly avoiding depredat ions against 
innocent citizens . 33 l ie meant to " . " • suppress  everything l ike open 
hos ti l ity or secret treachery , "  and intended to do it by driving a wedge 
between the partisans and the popu lat ion which supported them . 34 D iplo-
matically , he contacted the prominent local leade rs , hoping through them 
to influence the peop le to stop their res istance o He induced T .  A .  R .  
Nel s on to make a statement which was pub l ished in the Knoxvi l l e  Register 
on October 4 . 35 Attacking Lincoln , he pointed out that the Union was 
33General Orde r 2 11  September 2 7 ,  186 2 �  i b id . _ 884 = 85 ; Gene ral 
Orde r 6 ,  September 29 , 1 86 2 ,  890 , 85 8 ,  893 ,  89� 
34� • •  908- 0 9 .  
35copy in Ne l s on Papers , McC lung C o l lect ion,  L awson �fcr.hee L ibrary, 
Knoxvi l l e ,  Tennessee . Ne l s on had been a firm Unioni st up to the time o f  
h i s  capture and subsequent parole from Richmond . He was re l eased on 
condit ion that he support the C onfederate government . which he did . In  
fai rnes s ,  it mu st be pointed out that though he was crit icized as  a 
traitor, he acted in the best interest  of l aw and order as he saw i t ,  
once h e  was conv inced that the Uni on cause was lost . Thomas !3 .  Alexande r,  
Thomas A .  R .  Nel son of E ast Tennes see (Tennes see Hi storical Commi ss ion , 
Nashv i lTe ,-1956) 11 9-5:'97� 
broken and the Federal Anny had abandoned the area. He therefore urged 
al l East  Tennesseans to j oin the Confederate Army. General Jones had 
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thi s  piece of propaganda printed into handbi l ls and distributed through-
out East Tennessee . Newspapers were urged to reprint it and other 
leaders were asked to follow Nelson ' s  lead .  Editors were requested to 
forget their old party differences and j oin together in striving for 
peace . 36 Jones had high hopes of success on October 4 when he reported 
to Randolph that there was now in E ast  Tennessee " • • •  a better s tate of 
feeling toward the Government .  " 37 Union men,  however, failed to share 
Jones ' enthusiasm or his pol itical convict ions . They accepted Nelson ' s  
statement and public pos ition as obtained by coercion or as the price 
paid for the re lease of his son . 38 Jones denied thi s ,  but it did him 
little good . His whole propaganda effort fai led to move the Unionists to 
cooperation . This attempt , as had the others , neglected to take into 
cons ideration that these men be lieved in the Union cause and that they 
adamantly opposed conscription . 
Trying a di fferent approach , Jones wrote to Davis pointing out 
that to force these men to serve would only perpetuate a bad situation 
already experienced by previous commanders . Though they were undepend-
able as soldiers , they could s ti l l  be useful  to the cause by harvesting 
the corn crop before i t  was lost  and working in the mines to  produce 
36£·�· • Ser. I ,  Vo l .  1 6 ,  Pt . 2 ,  pp . 907-08 . 
37s .  Jones to G .  w .  Randolph , October 1 4 ,  1862 ,  �· · 945-47 .  
38� • • 957-58 ; Letters and clippings in the Nelson Papers .  
- -
vital minerals to sustain the war effort . To this suggestion . Governor 
Harris objected on the basis that it was bad politic s . 39 Randolph went 
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even further when he held that suspending conscription under Kirby Smith 
and McCown had done no good ; why would it succeed now? Furthermore . it  
would be a bad precedent ; no one would volunteer. Rando lph insisted that 
the issue should be faced squarely. Either East Tennesseans must  obey 
the l aw or be prepared to accept the consequences of their refusal to do 
so . 40 Davis agreed. Jones asked again for a temporary suspension. but 
by thi s time Davis was hard pressed for manpower. He realized the di lemma 
he faced: exempting the unwi l l ing placed a premium on disaffection . whi le 
not exempting the East Tennesseans guaranteed their continued res istance . 
Davis made his choice and again refused to suspend the conscription act .  
In October. when General E .  Kirby Smith returned to command in E ast  
Tennes see . he was ready to  use troops to  enforce conscription . and he  was 
given ful l authority to make the act work . 4 1  
S o  far, the cost to the Confederacy had been high .  Over 10 . 000 
men had been needed to keep order. desertion losses were prohibitive . 
and ,  on the average . tloJO soldiers were required to conscript one . I n  
addition. over 10 .000 Unionists had already crossed into Kentucky to j oin 
the Federal Army . crops were rotting in the fie lds . and the women and 
391 .  G.  Harris to J .  Davis • September 29 • 186 2 •  �·�· • Ser, IV  • 
Vol . 2 • p .  99 .  
40�. ,  1 38 ,  140-4 1 ;  Ser. I •  Vol , 16 •  Pt . 2 ,  pp . 954 ,  957 •  96 1 ,  
4 1 Ibid • •  9 73 ;  Vol . 20 •  Pt .  2 •  pp , 405-06 ; Ser, IV • Vol .  2 •  p ,  246 . 
A ful l account of the Unionists ' rebel lion and the Confederate efforts to 
suppress it is in �· •  Ser. I I •  Vol , 1 ,  pp . 829-9 1 2 .  
chi ldren left to p roduce the food were dai ly becoming pub lic  charges . 4 2 
Raids upon mi litary stores cont inued ,  and mi l itary movement was being 
hampered continual ly by sma l l  groups of guerri l l as who wou ld fire on 
patro ls and then mel t into the mountains .  
A s  the year ended,  another aspect of unconventional warfare fur-
ther l imited the Confederate control of the area .  P art isans we re now 
cooperat ing fu l l  t ime in parami l itary activit ies . Some had made the 
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trans i t ion into re gul ar units ; others remained in  the area to ferret out 
informat ion , act as guides ,  and h arass the enemy ; working togethe r ,  they 
cooperated to perfect the rai ding technique exemp l i fied by C arter' s Rai d ,  
Brigadier General Samue l  P ,  Carter and h i s  fel low E ast Tennesseans 
who had escaped to Camp Dick Rob inson had l ong been raiding al ong the 
C onfederate l ine . 43 Wi th the cooperation of those who remained hidden in 
the country, thei r  attacks we re carri ed out swiftly and effectively and 
a lways in are as where the enemy l e ast expec ted  them. Now it  was time to 
t ry a deepe r penetrat ion in an attempt to de stroy the rail road bridge s 
just s outh of Bristo l , Tennessee . 
42�. ,  Ser.  IV , Vol . 2 ,  pp . 26 7- 71 . 
43carter,  a Princeton and Naval Academy graduate , was put on 
det ached duty with the army specifical ly to t rain v olunteers and conduct 
parti san act ivities in E as t  Tennessee . Being a nat ive , he was we l l  known 
to the men there . He had led the firs t  important Union c avalry raid of 
the war at Ho ls ton , Carter' s Station , and Jonesv i l l e  to take pre s sure off 
Rosecrans at �1urfreesboro . Boatner, Dictionary, 130 ; Parks , Kirby Smith , 
16 2 ,  1 7 4 ,  et  pass im ;  Scott and Ange l , thirteenth Tennessee C avalry ,  66 et 
�; WiTTiam R .  Carter,  History of the First Tennes see C avalry (�·1·� 
Ogden Co . , Knoxvi l l e , 1902) , b! et �· � Humes , Loyal Mountaineers . 
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Carter departed from Lexington , Kentucky , on Friday ,  the 1 9th of 
December,  1 86 2 ,  intending to divide h i s  force and s t rike the East Tennes -
see and Virginia Rai l road at two separate l ocat ions a hundred mi les 
apart . 44 Then, working toward a junct ion of his  troops near the center ,  
h e  would withdraw , leaving the enemy disrupted and \'lith a huge repair 
prob lem. He gathe red his force as he moved eas tward, but unhappi l y  he 
discovered at the final rende zvous point that he had only 980 men . Keep-
ing to the dense forest and rugged terrain, by the 28th he reached the 
foot of the Cumberl and �fountains undetecte d .  H e  moved into the mountains 
and here changed his  p l ans , deciding not to d ivide his  forces in view of  
the s t rength of  the enemy , which was superior to hi s by  at  l east thre e  to 
one .  Moving into Virgini a,  then past Bri s to l  and Kingsport , Tennessee , 
he maneuvere d  against light resistance through �foccas in Gap and by the 
30th of December reached Bl ountvi l le .  
Six mi les s outh of  B l ountvi l l e ,  at Union , h i s  men des troyed the 
rai lroad bridge acros s the Hol ston River.  The town of Union was quickly 
capture d and the 150-man garrison surrendered without res istance . A l l  
usefu l  military equipment was des troyed and the p ri s oners paroled,  many 
of them promptl y  heading for home in North C arol ina. 45 
Colonel James P .  T .  Carter  then moved with 181 men toward C arte r ' s 
Depot , ten mi les  wes t  of Union . En route , they cap tured Co lone l J .  M. 
L ove , commande r  of the 6 2nd North Caro l ina , the unit which h ad just been 
44o . R . , Ser. 1 1  Vo l .  2 0 ,  P t .  1 ,  p .  8 8 .  
- -
45scott and Ange l ,  Thi rteenth Tennes see Caval ry, 1 0 7- 10 .  
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captured at Union o 46 Love was rac ing to his  men in a l ocomotive which 
was now reversed and added to Carter' s s trik e  forc e .  About 2 0 0  o f  Love ' s  
men mustered  to defend agains t the hard-charg ing Union forces . C apital -
i z ing upon surprise , Federal forces quickly routed the defenders . 
Carte r ' s men then fired  the bri dge across  the Watauga River and 
drove their newly acquired engine onto it , caus ing the whole  structure , 
engine and al l ,  to col l apse and fal l into the river .  A l l  enemy equipment 
was destroyed,  The raiders and the i r  mounts were now extrem e ly fatigued , 
but they were ob l iged to move toward Kingsport to avoid  contact with any 
enemy forces ,  Pass ing Kingsport afte r sunset on the 3 1 s t , they reached 
C l i nch Hountain and stopped for their first night ' s  res t  s ince the 2 7th 
of December. 
Heanwhi le • their pre sence had been detected on the 2 9th  whil e  
sti l l  4 5  mi les from Bristol .  4 7 General Humphrey �farshal l , the Confeder-
ate commander,  was unable to bring an e ffective force to bear against 
Carter at any time . He never had an accurate picture of  C arte r' s 
strength . The Federals we re s ai d  to h ave had as many as 4 , 000  men , armed 
with weapons superior in firepower to anything l-farshal l posses sed. F rom 
the be ginning , Marshal l fe l t  hims e l f  outnumbered ,  In  addi t ion ,  his  
communications were hampered  by J. C .  Duncan , a te l e grapher and Union i s t ,  
who refused t o  let  C aptain T, W ,  W ,  Dav i s  noti fy General Kirby Smith at 
Knox v i l le of C arter' s presence . Thi s  de l ay was sufficient to al low 
46�·�· •  Ser,  I ,  Vol ,  20 , P t ,  I ,  pp , 89-9 1 . 
47� • •  95 - 10 3 ,  
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Carter' s men time to cut the wire s .  The bridges were burne d •  and Car-
ter' s force had begun it s withdrawal before the C onfederates cou ld ful ly 
mob i l i ze the ir defense s .  They were als o  hampered b y  the question o f  who , 
s oldiers or c ivi l ians , had juri sdiction over  rai lroad di spatching. The 
end result  was that nothing moved unt i l  it was too l ate . 
Marshal l ,  newly ass igned and wel l  aware that he was in unfriendly 
c ountry, needed l ocal  he lp effectively to place his forces in order t o  
seal  Carter ' s  exi t .  He was ab l e  t o  find onl y  four men who would he lp 
h .  48 1m. 
To compound Marshal l ' s  problem, the inhabitants were fe l ling trees 
and b locking roads over which his men we re vainly trying to m ake  contact 
with Carter' s force . 49 The defense was operat ing in a vacuum . Lt . Colo-
nel E . F .  C l ay confirmed the maddening frustrat ion i n  his  official  
report . He spoke for al l ,  s aying: "I  must s ay ,  in conclus ion , that i t  i s  
s trange , but nevertheless true , that I did not receive any information 
whatever from citizens e xcept from the two al luded to in the firs t  part 
of my report . , .SO 
The only effective Confederate res i stance was mounted by C aptain 
Wil li am W. Baldwin ' s  partisan rangers , who alone seemed to understand the 
method of warfare be ing fought . He led the on ly Confederate force that 
48Their information was contradictory and of l imited value . �1ar­
shal l ' s  dependence upon these men c aused him to discount the reports from 
his  officers in the fie l d ,  which added to the confusion and further 
hampered  the defensive effort . ,  �· , 1 1 2 . 
49�. 1 1 16 o  
50Ibid • •  1 22 .  
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m ade contact with C arter ,  and kept Harshal l  we l l  advised of the enemy ' s  
m ovements . Harshal l ,  mi s l ed by his four l ocal hel pe rs , discounted Bald­
win ' s  reports . Baldwin ' s  haras sing b othered C arter sufficiently for him 
to cal l attention to it on two occas ions in his final report . He noted 
on December 3 1  that : "The Command has been annoyed during the day and 
night by bush\\'hackers o "S l  And again on the 2nd of January ,  he s tated :  
"Our march was much impeded  during the day b y  bushwhackers who constantly 
annoyed our front and rear o "52 
That Baldwin rea l i zed the e ffect iveness of his  tactics i s  evi -
denced by hi s tenac ity of attack , which never let up unt i l  C arter h ad 
withdrawn we l l  into Virgini a .  Hore important , he rea l i zed  the e ffect 
upon the inhabitants when he reported that : "Bes ides the great pub l i c  
damage done us b y  thi s rai d ,  an a lmost i rreparab le damage i s  done t o  
private circles  o • • • a lmost every servicab l e  [ s ic] horse on the road 
has been taken off • • • • s o  that there are not horses  left on thi s route 
to cul t ivate the fie lds . "5 3  
That the effect o f  the rai d was disastrous was further substan-
tiated by I s aac B o  Dunn , one of the Confederate S)'Mpath izers , who saw a 
more profound s i gnificance in C arter' s successfu l  param i l itary attack . 
Dunn observed that " the greatest injury i s  the confidence afforded to  the 
Union sentiment in East Tennessee , for already they have commenced 
5 1�0 . 1 23 .  
5 2!.£2i • •  9 L 
5 3� • • 124 .  
bushwhacking in Carter County and several persons have been k i l l e d . "54 
Significantly , the Union command seemed  to have no real  appreciat ion of 
what Carter had acc omp l ished ; his force was ordered disbanded  when it 
returned to Kentucky on the 5th of January, 1 86 3 . 55 
Another successfu l  raid was conducted in June when Wi l li am  P .  
Sanders led another group into East Tennessee , and on the twentieth 
76 
s t ruck Knoxvi l l e ,  ki l l ing one officer,  and then moved east and des troyed 
the rai lroad bridges  at Strawberry Plains and �fossy C reek , His men took 
with them a large amount of ConfederaLe s tore s  as they escaped,  unmo­
leste d ,  through Smi th ' s  Gap into Kentucky. S 6  These were the on ly ful l -
scale F e deral raids into E as t  Tennessee unti l  Burnside ' s  forces invaded 
in September ,  1 86 3 .  The partisan forces were now strong enough t o  carry 
on alone , control l ing , as they did , pract ically  the whole region . 5 7  
J .  A .  Campbe l l ,  the Confederate Ass istant Secre tary of War, 
54I saac B .  Dunn to J. R .  Tucke r ,  January S t  1 86 3 ,  �· • 1 3 0 .  
ss..!l!i· • 92 . 
56Humes • Loyal �1ountaineers , 201 -0 7 . 
5 7 Southern newspapers concede d  East Tennes see to Unionist control 
as early as February , 1 86 2 ,  New York Times , February , 1 86 2 ,  cited a 
report from the Richmond Di sfateh�ebruary 1 3 ,  1 86 2 , in which parti­
s ans were reported to be mov1ng unhampere d  over the whole  region . Addi­
t ional verification p l aces the t ime of part i s an control in  early 1 86 3 .  
T .  c .  D e  Leon , F our Years i n  Rebel Capital s :  An Ins ide V i ew o f  L ife In  
the Southern C oii're"derac;, lrom Birth to Deatht'Gossip Pnnting � ­
�iie ,  Aia . , i89o) , 18 - 8�ary Boykrn Chesnut , � Di ary from Dixie , 
e dited by Ben Ames  Wi l li am s  (Houghton Mi ffl in Co . ,  Boston;1949). ISS • 
25 2 .  Another author is  even more speci fic , conceding contro l to the sec­
ret organiz ation�. The Heroes  of America ,  but it  is  impos s ib l e  to verify 
the Official Record of the Rebe l li on reference .he l i s t s .  F rank Ows ley , 
"Defe atism in the Coil1ederacy ," North C arolina His torical  Review , IV 
(July ,  1926) , 455 . 
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observed that oppos ition in  the mountains was a menace as great to  the 
C onfederacy as that of e ither of the Union armies in the fie l d ,  and day 
by day it was getting worse , 5 8  "Repeated attempts were made to put down 
these bands but they met with indiffe rent success . The C onfederacy could 
not s pare enough troops for the task and the local home guards were 
abso lute ly unre l iab le . "5 9  
The spring o f  1 86 3  was tense and violent . The re was a growing 
defiance of the conscription l aws . Desert ions cont inued unchecked . Gen-
era!  s. B .  Buckner in Knoxvi l le noted the fut i l ity of trying to prevent 
them because "of the difficult count ry to which they can ret reat . "60  He 
had 24 ,000 E ast Tennesseans and western North Carol inians , but asserted 
that he would have traded the lot for a thousand from any other s t ate . 
Those who had not fled north to j oin the Fede ra l  Army remained hidden in 
the mountains , wood s , and coves .  From these sec luded secret bases , they 
would s trike , s teal ing , des troying s tores , and wayl aying conscript offi-
cers . "The civ i l  arm i s  paralyze d ;  the b itternes s of  fact ion is  intense . " '  
Buckner lamented. 6 1  The uprising , which many Confe derates be l i eved had 
been suppressed,  suddenly became a reality once more . Nmi ,  in l ate sum-
mer ,  order and discipline had broken down comp lete l y .  The authorit ies  
5 8�.�. ,  Ser.  I V ,  Vol . 2 ,  p .  786 ; Dykeman , F rench Broad , 78 . 
59Robert A .  Sel le n, "The Peace Movement in North C arolina , "  
Miss issippi V a ll ey Historica l  Review, X I  (Septembe r, 1 9 24 ) , 1 9 8 .  
60cooper to s. B .  Buckner, Apri l 2 7 , 1 86 3 ,  O . R . , Ser.  I ,  Vol . 2 3 ,  
P t .  2 ,  p .  731 ; Dykeman, French Broad , 98-99 . - -
6 l suckne r  to Cooper ,  May 2 1 ,  1 86 3 ,  9.•E.• , Ser.  IV , Vol . 2 ,  pp . 
563-64 . 
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had technical occupat ion , but control  bel onged to the part isans . In  
August , 1 86 3 ,  there were 106 men absent without leave from the 64th North 
C arolina Regiment . The commander refused to pursue them. He reas oned 
that he would probabl y  l ose more men as the cit izens openl y  encouraged  
and aided C onfederate de serters to leave the i r  units . 
To add further to the prob lem of civi l control , the cit izens were 
engaged in a psycho logical warfare which s truck at the heart of the army . 
Letters , notes , and word of mouth messages al l spoke of the comforts of 
home , of food , and of unfu l fi l led needs . Thi s  worked havoc on the morale  
of  the conscripted common soldier.  Hany more quit and went back to  the i r  
mountains . Each de serter, each troubled soldier decreased the wi l l  to 
fight of those who remained ; the Armies of the C onfederacy were being 
destroyed from within even as they confronted a growing enemy superiority, 
Unconventional warfare was taking its to1 1 . 62 
Buckner was no more successfu l  in handl ing East Tennessee than his 
predece s s ors . He was unab l e  to obtain any manpower from the region at 
a l l . But in the C onfederacy there were more pre s sing probl ems in the 
6 2oykeman , French Broad , 100-02 ; Ows ley,  "Defeatism , "  446 , 45 1 .  
Hany o f  the p le as rece 1ved by C onfederate s oldiers were as s imple and as 
dramat ic as the fo l l owing letter from Martha Revi s  to  her husband: 
"You s ai d  you hadn ' t  anything to eat .  I wish you was here to get 
s ome beans for dinner.  I have p l enty to eat as yet , I haven ' t  s aw any 
of your pap ' s  folks since you l eft home , The people i s  general ly we l l  
hereat , The peop l e  i s  al l turning Union here s ince the Yankees has got 
Vicksburg . I want you to come home as soon as you get thi s l etter • • • •  
The folks i s  leaving here and going North as fast as they can • • •  , " 
Quoted in Andrew Lyt l e ,  Bedford Forrest  and Hi s Critter Company (revised 
edition ; McDowe l l , Ob lensky, New York• Im)-;-Ts9 . 
southwest . Buckner and what men he had were sent west in  late August . 
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Federal forces had already advanced far into �iddle Tennessee . Rosecrans 
was moving into position once again to face Bragg ; this  time at Chatta-
nooga . In  early September 8  Burnside moved into East Tennessee . The long-
awaited re lief had finally come . Burnside ' s  reception on September 3 was 
overwhelming. People from miles around flocked to Knoxvi l le  to we lcome 
the Union forces . A Baptist minister even led a parade into town ; 63 
crowds lined the streets waving flags they had carefu l ly hidden away for 
such an occasion. 64 Burnside was instructed to secure East Tennessee and 
then consolidate his forces with Rosecrans in Chattanooga. I nstead , he 
dispersed his troops throughout East Tennessee , attacking small  g roups of 
isolated Confederate soldiers . 65 He was now determined to clear E ast  
Tennessee and , instead of rushing to  Rosecrans ' aid , he started his  own 
campaign in the opposite direction. 66 His Confederate counterpart was 
General W .  E .  "Grumble" Jones , who fought a bril liant de laying action, 
. 
63Report � � Contributors � the Pennsylvania Re lief Associa-
tlon for Eas t Tennessee li¥� a Commiss1on�nt frr the Execut1ve Comm1ttee 
TOV'i'Sit 'Miit Reg1on andt!'"orwara sultlieS"t"' !!!L'Oyai !.!!!!, suffer1ng 
!Tihabitan't"Sln . pUb . ,  1"1i.Tladelphia,  64) , T6'. 
64Knoxvi l le \11ig and Rebel Ventilator , January 30 ,  1 864 ; Temple , 
E ast  Tennessee and t e CIVil War, 475 ; Samuel Mayes Arne l l ,  "The Southern 
Onlonist11 (n.pu'b7;" n:p . •  n .  a:;-typed manuscript . Special Collect ions . 
University of Tennessee L ibrary, Knoxvil le) , 223 .  
65Franklin P .  Smith , "The Mi litary Hi story of East Tennessee , 
1 86 1- 1 865" (unpub lished Master ' s thesis , The Univers ity of Tennessee , 
Knoxvi l le ,  1936) , 80- 85 . 
66o , R . ,  Ser. I ,  Vol .  30 , Pt.  2 ,  p .  550 ; Humes , Loyal Mountaineers , 
221-26 , - -
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denying Burns ide access to the s alt  mines in s outhwestern Vi rgini a o  
Southern power gave way to Uni on dominat iono  In  a week Burns ide 
c leared the route to Cumberland Gap � over which the Unioni st mountaineers 
could now pass s afe ly to the training camps i n  Kentuckyo 
The decisive b l ow which the Confederate authorities had feared for 
years had fina l l y  been s truck o A Uni on counterinsurgency force � loyal ly 
supported by i rregu l ars and the res t  of the civi lian popu l ation � now h ad 
control of upper East Tennessee . and as one mode rn his torian has s aid : 
"These bands did al l they cou l d  as gueri l l as [sic ]  to harass the Confed­
eracy o They attacked and p lundered l oyal towns , drove out or ki l le d  
Confederate officers � ran off l ives tock and s laves of l oya l c i t i zens � and 
general ly terrori zed the countrys ide , They were so powerful that 
practical ly the who l e  mountain c ountry was lost to the C onfederacy o "6 7 
Meanwhi le � in July g the Army of the Cumberland under Rosecrans 
moved to the ne i ghborhood of Chattanooga o I t  was essent ial that the 
Confederates be expe l led from here if the Federal Army hoped to penetrate 
into the lower South . To pos sess Chattanooga was to as sure a point from 
which the Federal Army might swing around the Great Smoky Mountains and 
attack Atlanta g  Savannah � Charleston 5 and even Richmond o Rosecrans 
avoided  contact with Bragg  and 8 by out=maneuvering the Confe derate 
genera l �  occupied �hattanooga on September 9 D 1 86 3 o  L ongs treet brought 
10 » 000 men up from A t l anta to reinforce Bragg c who in turn att acked Rose= 
crans at Chi ckamauga on September 18o  A two= day battle ensued �  after 
6 7se l leni  "Peace t-1overnent D"  1 9 7 o 
which the Federal commander retreated and was shut up in Chattanooga by 
Bragg. 68  
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Bragg became distracted with Burnside at Knoxvi l le and the hostile 
population to his rear and sent Longstreet to crush him. 69 Douglas 
Southal l  Freeman observed that "Longstreet was as anxious to leave Bragg 
as the Commanding General was to be rid of him .  c • 0 " 70 Even so ,  Long-
street  was furious at Bragg and disappointed in the number of men he was 
given and the l imited supplies he was issued to carry out this task.  
Moreover, he fe lt that Bragg was persecuting him.  71  To make matters 
worse ,  guerri l las continual ly harassed him, and his every move was known 
clearly by the Union forces in the field , 72 I n  hostile country he penned 
a letter to General Buckner express ing his resentment of Bragg . He con-
eluded:  "Have you any maps that you can give or lend me ? I shall need  
everything of  the kind . Do you know any rel iable people , l iving near and 
east of Knoxvi l le ,  from whom I might get information of the condit ion, 
strength , etc . of the enemy?" 73 His inaccurate maps were to  cause him 
to make two serious mistakes , either of which could have cost him the 
6 8£·�· • Ser. IV , Vol . 2 1  p .  786 . 
69 Ibid . , Ser. I ,  Vo l .  31 1 Pt . 1 ,  p .  680 ; R . Ernest Dupuy and 
Trevor N ."1ruPuy, The Com�act History 2.!_ � Civil � (Hawthorn Books 
Inc . • New York , I'g7)l) • 2 7. 
70Douglas Southall Freeman , Lee ' s  Lieutenants , A s;B�y in Command 
(3 vols . ;  Charles Scribner' s  Sons , New York , 1944) , I IT, • --
71� • •  286-88 .  
72oykeman , French Broad , 104-0S . . 
73Quoted in �· 
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battle , both of which guaranteed his defeat . 
Meanwhile , General u. s . Grant assumed command of the Union forces 
in the Chattanooga area. Realizing that Burnside would be of litt le use 
to him except to keep Longstreet from rej oining Bragg , he instructed 
Burns ide to move south from Knoxvi l le in force and make contact with 
Longstreet . 74 Once contact was estab lished,  he was to draw Longstreet 
deeper into East Tennessee by success ive retrograde movements and thus 
deprive Bragg of Longstreet ' s  force , 75 
To the rear of Longstreet ' s  army, guerri l las were keeping his rear 
guard up close to the main body and severing his lines of communication 
with Bragg. In  effect , there were , then , two separate batt les shaping up 
in Eas t  Tennessee , and only the Federal commander and his forces knew 
what was happening in both at once . 76 
Burns ide met Longstreet and a series of skirmishes persuaded the 
Confederate leader to press his attack . Burns ide eventual ly withdrew to 
Knoxvil le to defend a strongly fortified position. 77  Longstreet advanced,  
certain that he had Burns ide contained within the Knoxvi l le  complex . He 
began hi s s iege using one of the oldest potent weapons with which to 
reduce a fortified enemy--starvation . Union rations were short , but 
74£·�· • Ser. I ,  Vol . 3 1 , Pt o 3 ,  pp . 145-46 , 
75Ful ler, Generalship of Grant , 242 ; Benj amin P .  Thomas and Harold 
M .  Hyman , Stanton, The Life aicr Times of L incoln ' s  Secretary of War 
(Alfred A .  Knopf • New-York, N2) • 292:- - -
76oupuy and Dupuy , Civi l War ,  25 7-59 .  ---- -
77Harold s .  Fink ,  "The E ast  Tennessee Campaign and the Battle of 
Knoxvi l le in 1 863 , "  East Tennessee Historical Society' s  Pub lications , 
No .  29 ( 1957) , 96-9 8 .  
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Longstreet , mistakenly re lying upon what proved to be an inaccurate 
chart , left the F rench Broad River route open to the besieged Federal s . 78 
Recent study has tended to discount the significance of the inaccurate 
map , seeking explanation in either inadequate scouting by Whee ler' s 
cavalry or Longstreet ' s  confidence that not enough food could possib ly 
get through to feed 20 ,000 men . Yet , even so ,  the map story sti l l  per-
s ists . Regardless of explanation , Longstreet very nearly succeeded in 
starving Burnsi de ' s  army. The four days before his attack on Fort 
Sanders , the Union forces were short of rations , and it was not unti l 
after this fight that the guerri l la forces succeeded in getting enough 
food down-river to meet al l the needs of the Union troops . 79 
From the moment that Burns ide occupied the city , and especial ly 
during the siege »  the Unionists had been press ing anything floatable into 
service to rush food to Knoxvi l le . 80 There had been an exceptional 
harvest  that year and food moved in in quantity. Confederate syrnpath-
izers saw the nightly train of boats and warned Longstreet , but unaccount� 
ably he took no actiono Realization that supplies were getting in 
prompted the Confederates to move upstream to Boyd' s Ferry and there 
78The map he used showed the French Broad joining with the Holston 
(now Tennessee) River below Knoxvi l le , rather than above . Little River 
was probab ly mistaken for the French Broad . With control of the north 
s ide of the Holston from Cherokee Heights , Longstreet thought he control­
led the water entrance to Knoxvi lle , but the whole French Broad was left 
open to navigation . 
79Temple � East  Tennessee and the Civil War, 498-502 ;  Nicolay and 
Hay, Abraham LincO'i'il7 VIII , 175 ;-owsley, "Defeat1sm," 15 7 .  
80nyKeman , French Broad , 106 o 
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construct a heavy raft des igned to cut the pontoon bridge linking Burn-
s ide ' s  forces , '�hich bridge also served as a gill  net to trap food- laden 
rafts from the up-river suppliers . 
The guerril las were not inactive ; an unidentified woman crossed 
the Confederate lines and warned Burns ide . 8 1  Hastily,  a large b oom was 
constructed and the huge raft was checked short of its ob j ective and the 
supplies continued to get through . 82 
On November 2 7th, Federal authorities took steps to see to it  that 
Longstreet would learn of Grant ' s  defeat of Bragg at Chattanooga. 83  Dis-
patching five separate messengers by five separate routes to reach Burn-
s ide with the news , Grant was certain that at least one would be 
intercepted. Longstreet was trapped between Knoxvil le and Sherman ' s  
forces which had been moving up from Chattanooga to re lieve Burns ide . 84 
The idea was to convince Longstreet that his situation was so desperate 
that he would not attempt to rej oin Bragg but would continue to attack 
Burnside and attempt a breakout into Virginia .  
81Knoxvi l le Whig ,  January 30 , 1 864 .  In December, 1962 ,  a dredging 
crew accidental ly d1scovered an old hand=forged chain in the river in 
Knoxvi l le .  I t  was in the position where Burns ide ' s  bridge was bel ieved 
to have been located .  It i s  believed that this chain was part of the 
boom des igned to prevent the destruction of the bridge . Knoxvi lle  News­
Sentinel , December 2 1 ,  1962 .  
820rlando M .  Poe • "The Defense of  Knoxvi l le ," Battles .!:!:!!! Leaders • 
I I I , 739 .  
83Wi l l  T .  Hale and Dixon L .  Merritt,  A History of Tennessee and 
' Tennesseans , The Leaders and Representative �en 1n Commerce , Industry'and 
MOdern Activities (8 vols:;-The Lewis Publishing�o . ,  Chicago ,  1913) , --­
I I I ,  671 ; Dykeman , French Broad , 107 ;  £·�· • Ser. I ,  Vol . 3 1 ,  Pt .  1 ,  p .  461 . 
84Grant to Sherman, November 29 1  1 86 3 ,  ib id . , Pt . 2 ,  p .  49 ; Dupuy 
and Dupuy , Civi l �. 262 .  ----
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Occasionally heroic efforts were made by the partisans to aid 
Burns ide . When one of Grant ' s  dispatch riders , attempting to  reach Knox-
vi l le with the news of Grant ' s  victory, was unable to  go any farther than 
Kingston, Mary Love volunteered to carry it  on . 85 Exhausted after 
trave l ling 35 mi les on horseback , she went to the home of a friend , Mrs . 
E lizabeth Brown , in  Louisvi lle , Tennessee . Mrs . Brown sent her son John 
T .  Brown, age thirteen , to get the message through to Knoxvi l le .  John 
reached General Burns ide and del ivered the message after a determined 
ride under extremely difficult circumstances .  Another instance of  
civilian ass is tance took place in  Maryvil le , Tennessee , where s ix  girls 
had organized themselves into the L oyal L adies Home Guard under Captain 
Cynthia Dunn. They had long operated as spies and were the first to make 
contact with Sherman when he was moving north to re lieve Burnside . I t  
was they who first  informed him of Longstreet ' s  defeat an d  withdrawal 
from Knoxvil l e . 86 
Longstreet ' s  attack on Fort Sanders was repulsed with h eavy l osses 
on the morning of November 29 . 87  While  recovering from this blow ,  he 
received word of Bragg ' s  defeat at Chattanooga.  He s aw the hopelessness 
85Hale and Merritt , History of Tennessee , I I I , 671- 73 ;  Temple , 
E ast  Tennessee and the Civil  War, 5�; David J. Harkness ( camp . ) ,  
�them Heroe'S;-Heroines an'd"Te gends ,"  University of Tennessee News­
letter • XLI (August ,  1 962) , 1 1 , and "Heroines of the B lue and Grar;rr­
XXXIX (August , 1960) , 1 4 .  
86Interview, July 2 1 ,  1962 ,  Bernard Se lf ,  Great Smoky Mountains 
National  .Park , Tennessee ; Harkness ,  "Heroines  of the Blue and Gray ," 1 8 .  
87Fink ,  " Battle o f  Knoxvil le ," 104-07. 
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of his chances of j oining Bragg because of the reported s trength of Union 
regular and partisan forces along the line of march he would have to 
take . 88  Grant ' s  captured courier had confirmed this . In  addition , 
reports of three Union columns converging upon him convinced Longstreet 
to disengage and move up the Holston River into the comparative safety of 
the mountains . 89 
Grant had sent Sherman rushing north partly because of constant 
pressure from Washington to re lieve the loyal ists of E ast Tennessee by 
driving Longstreet from the region and partly to keep the Confederate 
general from trying to relieve Bragg . 
Sherman8 it  wi l l  be remembered D had ordered Thomas back from his 
rel ief  mission to aid the bridge burners in 1 861 . He still  viewed E ast  
Tennessee as  virtual ly a death trap for regular forces 9 and told Grant 
as much in his firs t  field communication of December 1 :  "Recollect that 
E as t  Tennessee is my horror . That any mi l itary man should send a force 
into E as t  Tennessee puzzles me . I think , of course , its railroads should 
be absolutely destroyed,  its provis ions eaten up or carried away , and al l 
troops brought out . "90 Leaving his main b ody at Maryvil le , Sherman went 
on to i nspect Knoxvi l le on December 6 ,  1 86 2 .  Finding that al l was quiet ,  
88£.�. 9 Ser. I ,  Vol . 3 1 , Pt .  1 ,  p .  461 . 
89James Longstreet ,  From Manassas � Appomattox (J.  B .  L ipincott 
Co . , Phi l adelphia , 1 896) , Srrr:!I .  
90sherman to Grant , December 1 ,  1 863 ,  £·�· • Ser .  I ,  Vol .  3 1 ,  Pt . 
3 ,  p .  2 79 .  
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he detached one corps and returned to Chattanooga , 9 1  
General Foster took command of the area o n  December 1 1  and fought 
one battle at Bean' s Station against Longstreet . This  battle  closed the 
Knoxvi l le campaign .  Thereafter , Longstreet went into winter quarters at 
Greenevi lle . 92 
Two years of unconventional warfare had been grim but rewarding 
for the Unionists . Their strength and power had increased steadily with 
each act of Confederate mismanagement,  with each policy reversal , and 
with each unjust reprisal . The Confederates control led little but the 
actual ground upon which an armed soldier stood guard, and even this 
right of possession was constantly chal lenged by incessant guerri l la 
attacks . By the end of 1 863 , the Confederate sphere of influence was 
limited to the extreme northeast counties of East  Tennessee , where not 
even Longstreet ' s  army was master of the l and it occupied. Wherever e lse 
Confederate fortune might have seemed at its height , in E ast Tennessee 
its decline appeared to be almost complete . 
Even so , among the Unionists there was an uncertainty about the 
victory, as though perhaps something was not quite right , or that perhaps 
the price had been higher than they had e xpected.  But there was no time 
to worry ab out such things inasmuch as unattached bands of guerril las , 
untended farms , and degenerating family life posed immediately pressing 
prob lems . These would al l have to be worked out in time ; meanwhile , 
there was a war to be won. 
9lwi l li am T .  Sherman , Personal Memoirs (2  vols . ;  Charles L .  
Webster and Co . ,  New York , 1 891) , t ,  395-96 . 
92smith , "Mi litary Hi story of Eas t  Tennessee ," 100-02 .  
CHAPTER IV 
THE CLlM&.X 
Longstreet Q s  army found the abnormally cold winter in  East  Tennes� 
see no more palatab le than the Federal guns they had faced in the s ie ge 
of Knoxvil le o  After the humi liating defeat he suffered there D Longstreet 
busied himself in Richmond by charging his senior officers with dere lic= 
tion of duty. 1 His army bus ied itse lf with surviving � and Union 
guerril las busied themselves making life as unbearable as possib le for 
al l Confederates o  E o  P o  Alexanderv  one of Longstreet Q s  officers 0 
observed.: "We had some of our foraging wagons captured and men ki l led by  
the 9 bushwhackers o Q  The latter were supposed to  be guerri l la troops in  
the Federal service recruited among the people of  that section whose 
sympathies were anti=Confederate o They seldom fought � but they cut off 
smal l  parties and took no prisoners o " 2 
General Grant � heeding ShermanQ s warning against a campaign in  
this regionv decided  not to  force Longstreet out of  East Tennessee but 
rather to keep him there o 3 Here the Confederate general Q s  army would be 
no threatp yet it  could  be constantly harassed by guerri l las and s l owly 
s tarvedo  Food was scarce during January and Februaryo In Marchv some 
lFreeman v Lee 0 s  L ieutenants p  I I I D 284 !! Eass im o  
2E o Porter Alexander D 0 0Longstreet at Knoxvi l le v oo Battles and 
Leaders � I I  I 9 75 l o  
30 o R o v Sera I 0  Yol o 32 � Pt a 30  P o 420 � Yol o 38v Pt a  4 D Po  25 ; 
James p o-Jones D "The Yankee Q s Jeff Davis in Tennessee o'' Tennessee Histor­
!£!! Quarterly v XIX (June p 1960) p 1 70 o  
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small stores and equipment began to trickle in from Virginia� but hardly 
enough to sustain an army. In mid-March , when Longstreet returned from 
Richmond to rejoin his command, he was horrified at the condition of his 
army, His men were starving and so were his animals ,  and the guerril las 
were pressing him hard. 4 He was desperate . To Lee he wrote : "There is  
nothing between this [Greeneville]  and Knoxvil ie to feed man or horse . 
Our supplies are getting very short , too. Here nothing but extraordinary 
exertions wi ll  save us , and the sooner we get to work and make them the 
better it will be for us • . ,S Final ly , in Apri l ,  he moved his army north 
to join Lee . The force he took was only a pale shadow of the army he had 
brought into East Tennessee . The land they left behind was al l but 
destitute . While the people had suffered� they had in a sense won. 
Their s l im stock of food had been devoured by this 50 ,000-man force , but 
their continual harassment had kept Longstreet ' s  men on nerves ' edge . 
The old voice of Unionism,  "Parson" Brownlow • returning to Knox­
ville with the victorious Federal forces , resumed the publication of his 
newspaper, the Knoxvi l le Whig. This "Spelling Book and Bible of the East 
Tennessee Unionists" once again became the primary propaganda organ of 
the region. 6 But there was now a decided shift in his approach. No 
longer the underdog , the "Parson" began demanding that Confederate sympa·· 
thizers be made to suffer retribution for al l they had done to Unionists 
4�·�· • Ser. I ,  Vol . 32 , Pt. 3 ,  pp . 648 ,  655 , 
5quoted in Dykeman, French Broad , 1 16 .  
6 Arne l l ,  "Southern Unionist ,  .. 63-64 . 
over the past two years . Pol itical ly ,  there was a complete reversal of 
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authority. Andrew Johnson, the mil itary governor in  Nashvil le ,  used his 
authority to seek moderation and keep order. Brownlow' s writings 
encouraged the e xtremists who would have no part of this , intent as they 
were upon revenge , 
This  was by no means the only complication in the area.  Since the 
beginning of the war. deserters , l ater isolated Confederate cavalry 
soldiers , and the ever-present independent guerril la b ands had been 
active in the mountains . Longstreet ' s  wintering army had deprived these 
marauders of their  normal sources of food . Starvation forced them out of 
the mountains and now,  more brazenly than ever, like hungry wolves , they 
came into the val leys . raiding , pil laging, and stealing .  These unaligned 
bands swarmed over the area.  "The pistol in  the hand of the guerrel las 
[�] was al l that represented authority. The very foundations of 
society were loosed . "  7 As if  the raids of the "Outhers • " as they were 
called,  were not enough. the Confederate partisans , operating from 
secluded bases in the mountains . regularly conducted p aramilitary attacks 
upon i solated Federal outposts in E ast Tennessee . 
One e xample is sufficient to highlight the prob lems which were 
compounding the viciousness  of unconventional warfare in the mountains . 8 
General z .  B .  Vance of North Carolina had organized a force of Indians 
and mountainmen to guard against the encroachment of the East  Tennessee 
7Ibid. . 241 .  
8oykeman 1 French Broad , 1 13-14 . 
Unionists into North Carolina. Like most partisan leaders , Vance chose 
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to depend upon the enemy for his supplies and raided regularly across the 
border into Tennessee . On January 8 ,  1864 , he left his base outs ide of 
Ashevi l le to attack in the vicinity of Seviervil le ,  Tennessee . MOving 
through the mountains undetected, on the 1 2th of January he struck a 
Federal supply column near the town and made off with 1 8  to 24 wagonloads 
of supplies . Since his attack had met with no opposition, he made a 
leisurely withdrawal to conserve the strength of his animals for the hard 
pul l  over the mountains . He intended to rest hls command at Cosby Creek , 
about twenty-five miles from his point of attack . 
Meanwhi le , Colonel A.  L .  Palmer at the Federal post in Dandridge 
had been alerted shortly after Vance ' s  attack . He mounted an intercept 
party and moved swiftly toward Cosby Creek , hoping to overtake Vance when 
he stopped for water. Palmer' s  counterinsurgency force was in position 
as Vance approached,  and took him completely by surprise a Al l the stolen 
equipment was recovered as wel l  as the enemy' s  horses . Vance and fifty-
two of his men were taken prisoner. While this was a major b low to the 
Confederate effort , it  did not stop the raids altogether. Evidence that 
they were continuing is found in numerous atrocity stories . 9 
Men were taken from their homes at night and whipped , beaten, and 
kil led. 1° Food was stolen, citizens robbed, barns burned, cattle driven 
9Knoxvil le �ig, January 30 , February 6 ,  1864 ; New York Times � 
January 26 , 31 , Fe ruary 4 ,  1864 ; Arnell , "Southern uni'Oii'i st ," 338-39, 
10�. ,  264 ; John Reynolds to Nelson, May 8 » 1864 , Nelson Papers 
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off ,  and fie lds trampled by men on horseback . 1 1  Mrs . Adeline Deaderick, 
an East  Tennessean with Union sympathies , said  that in 1 863  and 1 864 
" • • •  our whole l and was fil led with bands of mauraders [s ic] not 
be longing to any army: But fol lowing in the wake of b oth ; savage men , who 
preferred to plunder and s teal to fighting at a1 1 ." 1 2  Mary Catherine 
Sproul of Overton County recorded the act ivities of these guerril las near 
her home . Her observations of their methods exemplify the terror and 
uncertainty they spread . In December, 1 864 ,  she wrote : 
The Guerri l las stil l b ore the Sway in Overton, they were C lad in  
Yankee-blue and b oasted that they were Jeff Davises [ sic] Guerril l as-­
These despicab le men went to  Charles Hensons a good Un1on Man took 
his Salt and other things by violence , Moved two of their wives 
almost in his yard and told  him [that] if he did not Support them 
they would k i l l  him. They also went to Mr. R. Johns ons a Loyal 
Citizen and took his horse a quantity of leather Some Salt and many 
little artic les useless to enumerate .  These vile beasts i n  human 
form went to Mr. Klizings and took Some 12 or fourteen Sides of 
leather--This fang of Guerri l las usual ly went by the name of 
Hammock • • • •  3 
I t  is  imposs ible  to attribute these activities sole ly to the Confederates 
since there were many independent guerril l a  bands . Nevertheless , the 
Confederates were b lamed. 
The Confederate irregulars in E as t  Tennessee were probab ly no more 
ruthless than those espousing the Union cause . Their methods of 
1 1Helen B. Bul lard and Joseph Marshall  Krechniak 0 Cumberland County' s  First Hundred Years (Centennial  Committee , Crossv1iie , Tennes­
see , 1 956) ; Hale and Merr1tt , History 2! Tennessee , I I I , 646 . 
1 2Anna Mary Moon (ed. ) ,  "Civil  War Memoirs of Mrs . Adel ine 
Deaderick,"  Tennessee Historical Quarterly, VII (March ,. 1948)  1 53 .  
1 3Albert w .  Schroeder (ed . ) ,. "Writings of  a Tennessee Unioni st ,." 
�O Q IX (December, 1950) 1 361 . 
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operation para lleled very close ly those of the Unionists . L ike them � the 
Confederates concentrated their main effort around the E ast Tennessee and 
Virginia Rai lroad . Hiding along the right=of�way 0 they took shots at 
personnel on passing trains , spiked the tracks . robbed the baggage cars t 
and tried to burn the bridges . 14 In an attempt to put a stop to this , 
the Federal authorities devised a plan which would provide more adequate 
protection for the trains . The right of way was to be cleared of trees 
and undergrowth for a half mile on e ither s ide . The fe l led timber would 
be used to bui ld s trong points and for fue l on the train s .  I n  some towns . 
like New Market . s tatements s igned "Old Soldier" were posted i n  conspic-
uous places warning that " .  • 0 
leave at once" or face death. 15 
all damned rebels  are hereby notified to 
Some of the Confederates were partisan raiders who had been sent 
to remain behind enemy lines for e xtended periods . They were experienced 
men , with a degree of reckless daring and dashing bravado that would make 
them the source of many colorful and romantic legends . There is perhaps 
no finer description of those operating in East Tennessee than that 
written by  Mary Noai l les Murfree , who wrote under the name of Charles 
E gbert Craddock . In  her fictional account of a guerril la  raid • she sai d  
this o f  the Confederate leader :  
He seemed endowed with the wings of  the wind ; today he was tearing up 
rai lroad tracks in  the lowlands to impede the reinforcements of an 
14o .  Whipple  to w .  J .  Stephens D A .  A .  Talmadge to J .  H .  Magi l l ,  
February 8 ,  1 865 8 Ne lson Papers . 
15Handbill • February 8 ,  1 865 , ibid .  
-
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army ; to-morrow the force sent with the express i ntention of p lacing 
a period to those mischievous activit ies heard of his feats in burn= 
ing bridges and cutt ing trestles in remote sections of the mountains . 
The probab ilities could keep no terms with him �  and he laffled at 
prophecy. He had a quick invention==a talent for e xpedients . He 
appeared suddenly when least  e xpected and where his presence seemed 
impossib le .  He had a gift of mi litary intuition. He seemed to know 
the enemy ' s  plans before they were matured ; and ere a move was made 
to put them into execution he was on the ground with troub lous 
obstacles to forestall the event in its very inception . He main� 
tained a discipline to many commanders impossible . His troops had a 
unity of spirit that might wel l animate an individual . They endured 
long fasts , made wonderful forced marches on occas ion==all day in the 
saddle and nodding to the pommel al l night ; it was even s aid they 
fought to such exhaustion that when dismounted the front rank 0 lying 
in l ine of battle prone upon the ground 0 would fal l as leep between 
vol leys , and that the second rank knee l ing to fire above them � had 
orders to stir  them with their carb ines to insure regularity of the 
musketry. He had the humbler yet even more necessary equipment for 
mi l itary success . He could forage his troops in barren opportunities ; 
they somehow kept clothed and armed at the minimum of expense o Did 
he l ack ammunition--he made shift to capture a supply for his litt le 
Parrott guns that barked like fierce dogs at the rear=guard of an 
enemy or protected his own retreat when it jumped with his plans to 
compass a speedy withdrawal himself .  His horses were wel l  groomed0  
wel l  fed ,  fine travel lers 9  and many showed the brand U . S . 9 for he 
could mount his troop when need  required from the corrals of an 
unsuspecting encampment . He was the ideal gueri l la &  of infinite 
service to his faction in smal l ,  s ignificant operations of dispropor­
tioned importance . 16 
No matter how romantic fiction might paint the guerril la or the 
i rregular ,  "Parson" Brownlow was interested in  no distinction beyond the 
fact that they were Confederate and therefore the obj ect of his wrath. 
Two years in e xi le had only intensified his hatred and his determination 
to seek revenge . He had made his position quite c lear earlier when he 
s aid, .. So far as I am concerned I have done the infernal Confederacy all  
16charles E gbert Craddock . pseud.  Mary Noail les Murfree 9 The Raid  
of  the Gueri l l a  and Other Stories (J . B .  Lippincott Co. D Phi ladelPhia;-= 
IT!!},' 37-39. 
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the damage I could and I shal l continue to fight it to the bitter end ."  1 7  
On this basis 0 h e  used h i s  almost unlimited power as a Federal Treasury 
Department special agent and as a newspaper editor to ruin economical ly 
anyone who had not remained unconditional ly loyal to the Union . 1 8  
Accordingly � he demanded that the Confederate guerril l as be made t o  p ay 
for destroying Union property. I f  they had no money9  then the livestock 
and property of their rel atives should be seized as compensation. 19  As 
for the guerril las themselves 9 Brownlow would later suggest that they be 
disposed of quickly and without the expense of impris onment. 20 In the 
rural areas D such feelings e xpressed by Brownlow were interpreted as 
orders to do away with anything and anyone Confederate . Natural ly D this 
was taken in its widest context 9 and a near state of law lessness prevai led .  
Now the Confederate sympathizers were in j eopardy o f  being driven from 
their  hanes . 
A l l  of these prob lems superimposed one on the other made mi litary 
control an impossibility. Brigadier General s. P .  Carterp provost 
marshal at Knoxvi l le D made the first  move a year earlier to restore order 
by demanding that the partisans stop punishing Confederates on their own 
1 7clipping 0  Apri l 26 D 1 863 9  in Hal l�Stokely Papers (McClung Room b 
Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxvi l le 0  Tennessee ) . 
18James B .  Campbel 1 0  "East Tennessee During the Federal Occupation. 
1 86 3� 1 865 0"  East  Tennessee Historical Society ' s Publications e No. 19 
( 1947) D 73= 75 D 80 . 
19Knoxvi l le l�igD September 3 0  1 864 . 
20�. 9 September 3 P 1 865 . 
authority . 2 1  He had made it plain that fai lure to comply with his  
directives would result in arrest . S lowly� Carter regained control and 
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began to organize the partisans into home guard units which were to prove 
fairly effective against  the numerous Confederate guerril la b ands . 
At the same time 9 Colone l George Kirk had been working throughout 
the summer with his partisans 0 attempting to contain the North Carolina 
Confederate raiders . 22  One of the most feared and high ly respected of 
al l East  Tennessee raiders � he ranged widely from his headquarters at 
Greenevi l le 0  Tennessee 9 into North Carol ina � fighting a continual guer-
ri l la war with the Confederates there , In February9 1 864 •  he organized 
his units composed of mountaineers , Confederate deserters 9 and bush­
whackers . 23 By late June he was ready to invade North Carolina and 
attack Camp Vance 0 an important Confederate supply base and training 
center where the Confederates were training their junior reserves : seven-
teen and eighteen-year olds cal led to service under the 1 864 Conscript 
Act .  
I n  July0 Kirk and 130 of his men surprised the garrison at C amp 
Vance in  a l ightning= l ike raid .  He des troyed the base and a large stock 
2 l rbid . 0 January 16 9 1 864 .  The Johnson Papers point out how 
desperate-rh:rngs were : a • • •  our fields have been desolated 9  our horses 
and grain al l taken from us 9 our fami lies insulted and impoverished and a 
few rebe l gouri l las [sic]  are allowed to occupy our whole country from 
Strawberry Plains up �the Virginia line .  • • • Send• and do it without 
de l ay11  enough force here to rel ieve us • • • •  " J .  Netherland to Gov .  
Johnson ,  July S D  1 864 0 Johnson Papers . 
22oykeman9 French Broad 0 1 17- 1 8 ;  £·�· •  Ser. 1 0  Vol . 3 1 , Pt . 1 8  
pp . 73- 76 .  
23�. , Vol .  49 ,  Pt . 1 8  p .  810 . 
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of  suppl ies 0 and D " . • • like an eagle snatching its prey v • • e carried 
its [Camp Vance 0 s ] one hundred reserves [ away] in its talons . " 24 Kirk ' s  
men were from these mountains and on every raid they meant to make the 
Confederates pay dearly for every minute the Unionists had suffered over 
the past three years . In  these mountains e irregular tactics were the 
accepted norm of battle . The objective was to shatter the enemy' s wi l l  
t o  continue fighting 0  and the means were brutal � fierce 0 and uncompromis-
ing .  
From these comb ined efforts 0 some order was res tored and the enemy 
guerri l las 0 if not yet totally defeated D were at least located and to 
some degree contained .  25 By control ling the Union irregul ars and directr 
ing their  activities D a unity of action was achieveda  enabling Federal 
authorities to concentrate a more highly organi zed force against the Con-
federates .  The leaders were capab le ,  and were old hands at this type 
warfare . Because they were natives they knew the land and they knew the 
people . 
Probab ly one of the most important activities that took place 
after Longstreet v s  defeat was the beginning of a civi l  actions program . 
These people who had remained  faithful to the Union through years of 
hardships had been left practically des titute by the l ast  months of the 
24shepherd �f . Duggerp  The War Trai ls of the B lue Ridge (Banner E lk 
Publishers , Banner E lk ,  N .  c :;"T9!Tf, 126 � Ina W7'"Van"1:foppen 1 "TI-te 
Significance of Stoneman ' s  Last  Raid," North Carolina Historical Review • 
XXXV I I I  (January , 1961 ) ,  40 . This  study 1s  continued in  the April � July 1 
and October i ssues . 
25General Order No . 6 0  January 15 , 1 864 9  O . R . a Ser. I I , Vol . 6 •  
p .  842 ;  Ser. I 9  Vol .  33 ,  pp . 383 , 806 ; Vol . 40 , Vt7 3 ,  p .  325 . 
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campaign. The important thing now was to get them back on their feet as 
quickly as possib le . 26 The program had a humanitarian aspect , but it was 
more than that . If  Grant intended to keep Longstreet isolated ,  partisan 
guerrillas would have to do it .  They could only succeed with the support 
of the population. Such support could only be assured if the people were 
relieved of some of their hardships or if they had faith that help was 
coming. It might stil l  be a long war D and the need for food was always 
an important consideration. The sooner the fields were cultivated the 
better, because it would guarantee Grant a nearby source . To Grant , and 
later Sherman, there was always the ever-present danger of an attack from 
the rear which would be nullified if the rear was solidly Unionist . 
The plan of rejuvenation for East Tennessee was a twofold program. 
First ,  supplies had to reach the area in sufficient quantity to prevent 
economic disaster. They were few at first ,  but , after Thomas took Nash-
ville in December, 1864 , enough food, c lothing, and equipment arrived to 
assure a gradual recovery. Quartermaster officers were sent into the 
area to authorize the use of military equipment and animals for farm 
work . 27 They issued seeds , tools , guns , and ammunition, helping in any 
way possible to increase civilian morale .  The second aspect of the pro-
gram was the work of volunteer organizations like the East Tennessee 
Relief Association, which rushed in supplies and medicine and kept it 
coming as long as necessary, and the Western Sanitary Commission , which 
26tbid , , Vol . 34 ,  Pt.  2 ,  p .  134 .  
· -
27Knoxville :;�� April 16 and April 23, 1864 • Campbel l ,  "East 
Tennessee During Fe 1 Occupation ," 73- 75 , 80 . 
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assisted in planting and seed distribution. 28  It would take several 
years of this type of relief work before East Tennessee would recover 
completely, but the timing was perfect. 29 This activity gave the Federal 
forces another distinct advantage in that they never lost the support or 
control of the population. 
Thus by blending military force , political power, and an awareness 
of civilian needs , the Federal authorities were able to make an asset of 
the region which had been a liability to the Confederates .  Moreover, 
with the cooperation of a friendly popul ation, they were able to blunt 
the threat of a Confederate counterguerrilla  offensive . To be sure 0 the 
Confederate raiders and independent guerri llas had a certain nuisance 
value , but, because these attacks were sporadic and rarely co-ordinated , 
they were never a real threat to Federal authority. 
Confederate raids continued . On August 1 ,  such a raid against 
Athens , Tennessee , was successfully repel led. Quickly a counterinsur-
gency team was sent in pursuit,  overtaking them at a base near Murphy, 
North Carolina,  where they were surprised and defeated.  Here was a guer-
ril la textbook situation in which counterguerrilla technique demoralized 
and overwhelmed the enemy. After this victory0 and with Kirk securing 
the line to the left along the border,  the southern part of East Tennes-
see was relatively free of Confederates . 
28Pennsylvania Rel ief Report, 34-36 ; Knoxville Whig, February 13 1 
1864 ; Humes ,  Loyal Mounta1neers , 309-10 ,  316-1 7 ,  393. 
29Knoxville �;�• May 231 1866 ; Campbe l l 1  "East Tennessee During 
Federal Occupation, -79 . 
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Meanwhi le , General A .  c .  Gi llem,  Acting State Adjutant General ,  
was ordered by Governor Andrew Johnson to  take the Thirteenth Tennessee 
Cavalry into East Tennessee . 30 The orders directed them to act as a 
counterinsurgency force to clear the upper part of the region of enemy 
guerri llas and to restore civil order. Gil lem ' s force left Nashville on 
August 1 ,  and sixteen days later reached Knoxville,  the area behind them 
clear of the enemy. A day later they moved toward Morristown together 
with two other units p all under Gi llem' s command.  These state troops 
were the only Union force in upper East Tennessee D as every other unit 
had been sent south to join Sherman. 31 
Their first contact with the enemy was near Morristown. Here they 
captured Confederate Senator Joseph B .  Heiskell and a number of Confed­
erate partisans of General John Hunt Morgan' s  command .32 Hearing that 
General Joseph Wheeler' s cavalry was in the Maryvil le vicinity, Gil lem 
turned southwest to meet him. Wheeler was moving north toward Knoxvi l le 
when partisan scouts of each command met in probing skirmishes p after 
which contact was lost . For the next s ix days Gi llem marched and counter-
marched between Knoxville and Greeneville in an attempt to locate either 
Wheeler or John Morganp whom he believed to be somewhere near Greeneville .  
I f  the Confederates closed i n  on him from both directions he would be 
30scott and Angel , Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry, 152-53. 
31�o p  153-56 . 
32Ibid . , 158 . For conditions in the Morristown-Greeneville area$  
see M .  s .  Temple to o .  P .  Temple , August 1 8 ,  1864, Oliver P .  Temple 
Papers (Special Collections , University of Tennessee Library, Knoxvil le) ; 
�·�· • Ser. I ,  Vol . 39 , Pt . 2 ,  p .  31 1 .  
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trapped and cut off from Knoxville and his line of supply . 33 Fortunately, 
Wheeler moved past Strawberry Plains and then turned west and headed into 
Middle Tennessee . 34 It is doubtful if either he or Morgan knew how close 
they were to Gil lem or how close they were to regaining control of upper 
East  Tennessee . 
Gill·em took Bul l 1  s Gap on August 31 , and on September 4 ,  along 
with a Federal relief coltm1n from Knoxvi lle11  moved on Greeneville .  In  
the early morning hours of September 4 , a town citizen slipped into the 
Federal lines and informed the commander of the Thirteenth Tennessee 
Cavalry that the Confederate guerrilla  John Hunt Morgan was in town. 
Companies G and I were sent along a back road under cover of a heavy 
storm to sweep into town and attempt to get Morgan. The raid was a com-
plete surprise , and Morgan was shot by Private Andrew Campbel l during the 
skimish. 35 
33smith8 "Military History of East  Tennessee 11" 1 13- 14 ;  O.R. 1 Ser .  
I ,  Vol . 39 ,  Pt .  3 ,  pp . 95 1-61 . 
- -
34J. c. Wil l iamson (ed. ) ,  "The Civil War Diary of John Coffee 
Wil liamson," Tennessee Historical  Quarterly, XV (March, 1956) , 63-64 ; w.  c. Dodson, Cam�aiB!!s of Wheeler ana His Cavalry, 1 862- · 1 865 , From 
Material Furnishe fu"_ t'reii7 �IU. • • • {liu3gins Pu'61iS'IUi\g Co. , 
Atlanta, 1899) , 144�2:-148 .  
35scott and Angel , Thirteenth Tennesse! CavalryJ 162-89 , Contro­
versy still rages concerning MOrgan' s  death, ana virtual ly every histor­
ian who has written on the subject has his own pet theory.  See Howard 
Swiggett ,  The Rebel Raider, A Life of John Hunt Morgan (Bobbs-Merril Co. , 
Indianapol!s, 1934) , 271-95 ;-Cecll FTetcher-noTland, Morgan and His 
Raiders , A Biograph\ of the Confederate Genera l  (Macmillan C077 New York� 
1942) , 34lr-48; Basi lluk�alry (Miami Publishing Co. , 
Cincinnati, 1906) ; w.  A .  Smith and Wallace Mi lam, "The Death of John lhlnt 
Morgan,  A Memoir of James M. Fry," Tennessee Historic!-1. Quarter}.!• X IX 
(March, 1960) , 54-63. There is still sUfficient dou6t a�out wtat happened 
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For the remainder of the month and wel l  into October , Gil lem ' s  men 
fought a running guerri l la  battle with the Confederates under Vaughn and 
Basil Duke . 36 Control of the val ley entrance into Virginia was at s take ,  
and the fighting ranged from Morristown to Jonesboro with the Union 
forces final ly withdrawing to New Market . Gil lem attacked again on the 
2 7th of October near Panther Springs p five miles south of Morristown . 
The Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry, accompanied by the Eighth Infantry-
routed the Confederates with heavy l osses and pursued them as far as 
Russel lvil le before breaking contact . 
Now it seemed that a reasonable amount of progress toward a return 
to normal conditions was being made . There were , however ,  still  isolated 
bands of guerril las who had moved deep into the mountains , and it was 
toward these that Governor Johnson now directed his attention. He felt  
that he could turn to  the people as  he had always done in  the past . He 
issued a proclamation on September 8 ,  1 864 ,  in  which he said: 
in these l ast  hours of Morgan ' s  life to leave many questions unanswered o  
However� the most plausible explanation sti l l  seems to be  that advanced 
by Scott and Angel in Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry. They hold that 
Morgan was a "target of opportunity" so to speak .  When the Federal 
forces moved to attack Greenevi l le ,  they had no idea Morgan was there . 
The two companies which stormed the town were dispersed only after they 
were in attack formation. A guide got them into town unnoticed,  and as 
they charged down the main street to the house where Morgan was supposed 
to be � fighting broke out .  None of the men in either company had ever 
seen Morgan before . "A man" ran from a house pul ling on his pants and 
firing as he ran . He was shot after a short chase . Later he was 
identified as General Morgan. 
36Ibid. D 190-209 ; Smith, "Mi litary History of East Tennessee ,"  
1 1 7- 19 .  After Morgan ' s death ,  his brother-in- law,  Basi l  Duke , assumed 
command of "Morganv s men. "  
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Whereas the rebel lion has inaugurated a guerril l a  mode of warfare 
throughout the country,  degenerating into the C ommission of every 
species of crime know� to and punishable  by the l aws of the l and 0 i t  
i s  the duty of  al l good citizens , therefore , to  unite in  one common 
effort to sustain the c iv i l  authority throughout the state 0 and the 
suppression of these marauding bands , which are preying upon the 
innocent and defenceless [ s ic ]  throughout the l and . 37 
He went on to authorize the call ing of a l l  men 1 8=45 to militia duty . 
Refusal to serve would mean punishment by l aw .  Here was the test ; this 
was exactly the same procedure the Confederates had attempted early in  
the war and had failed . Under Johnson, however, there was no exodus to 
the hi l l s .  The population was not hostile but rather ral l ied t o  the 
Governor' s  cal l . The temper of the E ast  Tennesseans was such that those 
who would oppose Johnsonv s  cal l were in peri l of their  l ives ; in fact , 
the noose was s lowly tightening around the necks of the few remaining 
i ndependent bands 0 the most notorious of which was led by Champ Ferguson .  
Champ Ferguson was probably the most effective independent Confed­
erate guerril la  to operate in Middle and E ast  Tennessee . 3 8  The reputa-
tion of his men and their tactics was almost legendary. Wherever he was 
active . he terrorized the country and was despised by civilians on both 
s ides with equal intensity. 39 The only Confederate guerril la who was 
3 7ori gina l  in the Tennessee State Archives D Nashv i l le 0  Tennessee . 
Copy with Johnson Papers , University of Tennessee . Appeared also in the 
New York Time s 0  September 1 8 0  1 864 . The best account of Johnson ij s 
accomplishments as mi l itary governor combating guerril l as is Hal l 0  Andrew 
Johnson, IS , 44 11 50=5 2 .  
38The most  complete work about this famous guerril la i s  Thurman 
Sens ing , Champ Ferguson (Vanderbilt  Univers ity Press , Nashvil le p  1942) . 
39wil liamson11  "Diary of J .  C .  Wi l li amson,"  63-64 . 
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refused amnesty 9  he was hung following a sensational trial in Nashville 
after the war .40 He usual ly operated in Fentress County against his 
Union counterpart , Tinker Dave Beattie . 41  He was a brutal , vindictive 
man with a kil ler instinct , selfish ,  cunning0 and probab ly a little 
mental ly unbalanced . Ferguson and his men ventured into East Tennessee 
only twice on raids . The first of these was of no consequence 0 but on 
the second the raiders made off with 500 Federal mounts . 42 Major Thomas 
H. Reeves , the Federal commander at Kingston, pursued the raiders , but 
after several days ' chase he gave up , having recovered only 25 horses . 
Champ escapedp  but he never returned to E as t  Tennessee . 
y By no stretch of the imagination could this type of fighting be 
considered ended. Men of the same caliber as Ferguson would continue to 
roam the hil ls and harass the local population for years to come . In 
letters , diaries 9  and memoirs that have survived ,  the stories of the 
atrocities and outrages committed by these bands is repeated over and 
over again. 43 Long after he succeeded Lincoln as President , Andrew John-
son continued to receive letters concerning the activities of these men. 
For e xample 9 H.  T .  Cox wrote from Lynchburg , Virginia, in 1 865 that 
40o .R . , Ser.  I P Vol . 49 , Pt . 2 ,  p .  843 . Ful l  details of the trial 
may be found in the Nashville Dispatch , Dai ly Union , Daily Press and 
Times 9 March-June 9 1865) . 
41Hale and Merritt , History � Tennessee , I I I ,  650-58 .  
42£.�. 9  Ser. I ,  Vol . 39 , Pt . 1 ,  pp . 35 1 ,  354 , 367=69.  
43For example 9 see Moon, "Adeline Deaderick Memoirs 11 " 52�65 ; 
Shrader Webb to Captain George Webb , April 30 , 1 865 8 in Ruth Webb 0 8De l l 0 
� the �Jst� Blue Hills , � Story .2! C ocke County, Tennessee (n.pub . 9 
n. p 0 p 1§"5 • 3.,-;-
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" • • •  a reign of terror sti l l  exists in East Tenn . --that persecutions in 
allmost [sic) every conceivab le manner are prosecuted against men of 
property • • • •  " G. w. Deaderick of Bristol pleaded that something be 
done to restore quiet in the country, while a group of citizens writing 
from Washington County pointed the finger of guilt at Federal troops . 
They said that : 
• • •  a system was inaugurated by which the Union soldiers � taking 
the law in their own hands , avenged the wrongs they had suffered in 
the rebel lion by beating and in some instances Ki l ling the men who 
had wronged them . Like al l similar movements , i t  soon became 
progressive and in short culminated in Rape . Robbery and Murders 
Extending to citizens indiscriminately without re gard to party. 4! 
Neither Confederate nor Unionist may be blame d  per se for the results of 
unconventional warfare ; both sides must share the guilt which led to its 
degenerating into common outlawry and banditry. On the other hand, there 
was probably little that could be done once unconventional warfare became 
an accepted practice . Unsavory characters always swarm like flies to 
honey to such activities , and the society which resorts to this method 
must also accept the people it attracts .  But outwardly E ast Tennessee 
seemed secure � and the talk that Johnson might be considered for the 
vice-presidency was buttressed by the good j ob he had done in bringing 
Tennessee back into the Union. 45 
The Confederates , though , considered the story far from finished. 
In  October 9 1 864D  General John c. Breckinridge was placed in command of 
44H. T.  Cox to Johnson, June 17• 1 865 ; G. w. Deaderick to D .  T .  
Patterson ,  April 28 8 1866 ; Shel ly G .  Shipley , !! !!• t o  Johnson, April 
21 , 1 866 9 Johnson Papers . 
45Hal l , Andrew Johnson, 54 . 
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that part of the Southwest Virginia--East Tennessee territory which 
remained to the Confederates . 46 In early November � he l aunched a counter-
attack . His rag= tag partisan fighters blended into a strong fighting 
unit==a  unit strong enough to force Gil lem back to Bul l ' s  Gap , where he 
estab lished a strong defensive perimeter on November 1 1 . 47  
Breckinridge drove hard into Gi l lem' s lines .  Gi l lem fel l  back and 
tried to hold Morristown but was routed in disorder . Judge John B o  
Shields p then a lieutenant in the Confederate 39th Tennessee , describ ing 
the rout later in an article in a Jasper9 Alabama0 paper said :  "We 
pursued the Federals as far as Strawberry Plains D capturing 300 prisoners . 
We thus cleared upper East  Tennessee of al l Federal Troops , they going to 
Knoxvi l le • •  " • We did a great deal of scouting as bushwhackers were 
doing cons iderable mischief all  over E ast  Tennessee • . , 43 Breckinridge then 
spread his forces thinly over the territory he had just taken , concen-
trating them along the railroad line , burning the bridges , and tearing up 
the track .  Duke covered the Rogersvi l le area9  whi le Vaughn he ld Greene­
vi l le .  49 
46Q.�• p Ser o I p  Vol . 39 , Pt o 2 »  887 .  
47Ibi d . D Pt o  l p  889 » 892 ; J .  B .  Camp to J . P .  Graves � November  1 2 j  
1 864 D WorkSJProjects Administration, Tennessee Historical Records Survey,  
History of MorristownD 1 787= 1936 (typed ;  Tennessee State Library,  Nash­
vh le D 19'40) D 35 " 
48Ibid . v  36 . This  figure may be about a hundred high ,  but the 
fact that=rrrflemQ s force retreated in disorder to Knoxvi l le is true . 
O . R . 0 Sero I D  Vo l .  39 p Pt . 1 9  p .  89 1 ;  Scott and Ange l 8  Thirteenth Tennes­
:F.=,e f.avalryD 208 .  
49rbid . 0 21 1 ;  2,,·�· P Ser. I D VoL 45 0 Pt .  l D p .  825 . 
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In  mid-December the Federal forces ,  under Stoneman6 Gil lem, and 
Burbridge , launched a counteroffensive from Bean ' s Station. 50  Duke was 
routed by Gil lem in a classical combined frontal assault and flanking 
attack . Gil lem then pressed forward to link up with Burbridge at Bristol . 
Together they pushed the last Confederate forces from East Tennessee . 5 1  
The few stragglers who remained were cut off and it  became the task of 
Union guerrillas quickly to round them up . 
Union forces stationed at Athens p Tennessee , were again attacked 
by Confederate guerrillas on January 28,  1 865 . 52  The Confederates lost 
about fifteen men, but withdrew only after capturing as many prisoners . 
I t  now became evident that East Tennessee could never be secured from 
such attacks unless these Confederates were attacked and their bases des-
troyed. Without bases they would be at the mercy of the Federal counter-
guerri lla forces who could isolate and destroy them . The Confederates 
50Ibid . , 808- 10 ; Scott and Ange l ,  Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry0 
219-20.  -
5 1o . R. , Ser .  I ,  Vol . 45 , Pt . 1 ,  pp . 81 7-20 . This unit  moved into 
Virginia under Gen. G .  S .  Stoneman' s  leadership and helped destroy the 
King ' s  Saltworks , destroy the railroad , and burn the bridges as far north 
as Wythevil le . Va . While  in this town, members of the Thirteenth blew up 
a church ful l  of ammunition as wel l  as a lead mine . Stoneman also cap­
tured 560 Confederate soldiers in a clever ruse at Bristol . The Confed­
erate commander te legraphed Bristol for an al l clear to send in reinforce­
ments . Stoneman forced the telegrapher to send back an O . K .  Two miles 
east of town, a group of men waited for the train to pass . When it  did, 
they pul led up the track . The same was done just past the Bristol sta­
tion. As the train pul led in, every Federal gun in the area was trained 
on it . As the Confederate commander stepped off the train, Stoneman was 
there to accept his surrender.  Scott and Ange l ,  Thirteenth Tennessee 
Cavalry, 220-29 .  See also Duke, Morgan ' s  Cavalry, 537 !! Passim .  
52�·�· • Ser.  I ,  Vol .  49 , Pt . I,  pp . 1 3- 14 . 
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were wel l  aware of the vulnerability of their bases and took great care 
to l ocate them 1n the mountains of North Carolina as i naccessible  as 
possible o 
Raids under the direction of Colonel Kirk had l ong had these bases 
as their obj ective . but no maximum effort to destroy them completely had 
ever had ful l Federal sanctiono Regular commanders were loath to admit 
the danger of such forces . and not unt1l this  late stage of the war could 
they be conv inced of the necessity of clearing the mountains of this  
potential danger . 53  Probably the most convincing argument was the recent 
e xperiences in East Tennessee and the knowledge that Lee , facing defeat 
in Virginiap  could march to these mountains and prolong the war indefin� 
ite ly o  To those who understood the ful l  implications of unconventional 
warfare � it  was imperative that thi s  course of action be denied the 
Confederate commander as quickly as possible .  
Accordingly p in  March, 1 865 , a force was gathered i n  Knoxvi l le 
composed of the veteran Fifteenth Pennsylvania Volunteer C avalry Regi� 
ment p the Tenth Michigan0 the Twelfth Ohio 0  and three Tennessee regiments : 
the E ighth p N1nth p and Thirteenth . 54 All  were ordered to prepare to 
trave l light � all  were experienced mountain fighters ; and a l l  e xpected to 
participate in their specialty--unconventional warfare . They were 0 in 
the modern use of the term .  a Special Forces Group whose training fitted 
them for paramilitary operations in enemy territoryp isolated for long 
5 3�o o  232 9 Van Noppen, "Stoneman' s  Last Raid •"  28 . 
54£o�o p  Ser. I P Vol . 39 , Pt .  1 0  p .  325 . 
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periods of time with no contact with friendly forces o  They represented 
the ultimate in sophistication of guerri l l a=partisan warfare o Combining 0 
as they did 0 regular organization and discipline with the tactics and 
techniques of the partisan 0  they constituted a formidab le weapon directed 
toward the last  stronghold in the Confederacy capable of sustaining a 
protracted guerril la  war o 
They were further armed with a new psychological weapon which gave 
tac1t approval to their type of warfare for the first time o Sherman had 
clearly defined their  mission as one des igned to deprive the enemy of his 
ab ility to wage war in their zone of responsibility o  The general intended 
that they paralyze the economy D destroy supplies D scatter families 0 and 
do anything else that would undermine enemy morale o He further increased 
their latitude of operation by holding that every man 0  woman .  and child 
of the South was armed and at waro A definition we would come to call 
"total war" in the 20th century was thus b orn o  55 Before such an 
onsl aught 0 the wil l to resist would cease in the South from the Missis= 
sippi River to the At lantic Ocean o 56 
General George Ho Thomas gave orders for the e xpedition with 
instructions "to destroy but not to fight battles o "  No order could more 
explicitly suggest  unconventional warfare o No campaign could be said  to 
conform more nearly to Francis Lieber' s position concerning a rebel l ion. 
55 John Bennett Walters 0 "General Wi lliam T o  Sherman and Total 
War � "  :!,ournal o� Southern Histor�0 X IV (November 0 1948) 8 148-64 ; Van 
Noppen p ""��StonemanlT s Last RaidD" S o  
56Shennan to Thomas 0 £o�o p Sero 1 0  Vol a 45 0 Pt . 2 0  P o  622 a 
Paragraph 156 of General Order 100 admonished the commander to " •  • • 
throw the burden of the war, as much as lies within his power, on the 
disloyal citizens of the revolted portion or province • • • •  "5 7 
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General George Stoneman was placed in command of the newly desig-
nated District of East Tennessee in February. 1 865 , and with his combined 
command launched the offensive from Knoxvil le on March 2 1 ,  1865 . 58 
General Alvan Gi l lem p commanding nine regiments , moved out immediately to 
seal the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad escape route which Lee 
might want to use . 59 They reached Morristown on the 23rd amid cheers 
from the local population. 6° Here they split and moved on, sweeping al l 
before them . Perhaps it could best be described as a mountain version of 
Sherman ' s  march to the sea .  No Confederate soldier was safe ; no Confed-
erate sympathizer was shown any quarter if he resisted. The Tennessee 
regiments were particularly brutal , for they had been at this type of 
warfare a long time , and old personal memories stirred them to indiscre­
tions they might otherwise not have committed.61  The destruction and 
military success of the raid has been admirab ly reconstructed by Profes-
sor Van Noppen . who concluded that : 
5 7rbid " » Ser .  I I I ,  Vol . 3 ,  p .  153 .  
5 B�. ,  Ser. I ,  Vol . 39 , Pt . 1 ,  p .  325 . 
59van Noppen, "Stoneman' s  Last Raid, "  25 , 21 . 
60H. K .  Weand, "Our Last C ampaign and Pursuit of Jeff Davis ," 
History of the Fifteenth Pennstlvania Volunteer Cavalry, Charles H .  Kirk ,  
editor (Hlstarical Committee o the Society of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania 
Cavalry,  Philadelphia ,  1906) , 4 93 .  
6 1van Noppen, "Stoneman' s  Last Raid," 526 . 
This was a splendidly conceived• ably executed attack upon the war 
potential and the civilian population of the South as wel l  as upon 
1 1 1  
its military resources ,  I t  was one of  the early e xamples of total 
war. Stoneman ' s  raid not only did incalculab le military damage , but 
it destroyed the war making capacity of a whole region. Most signifi­
cantly as Stoneman and his raiders passed through eastern Tennessee , 
• • •  we obtain revealing gl impses of how the war had been felt and 
interpreted by the people of these regions who were its innocent 
victims , 62 
It  is clear by implication that this raid exemplified the culmination of 
training , applying fully the methods , means , and policies of unconven-
tiona! warfare in its most advanced state . The military consequences to 
the enemy were staggering .  Conversely , the completeness of  the victory 
by the Union force was unquestionab le . 
The best and worst of this method of warfare were readi ly revealed 
in its mi litary implications as wel l  as its social impact . Militarily , 
it broke the wil l  to fight of the Southerners , 63 I t  completely deprived 
Lee ' s  armies of their food supply by severing the rail lines through East  
Tennessee . �forale was shattered as  completely as  was the war potential . 
In addition , Stoneman narrowly missed freeing the Union prisoners at 
Salisbury Prison ; they were evacuated prior to his arrival .  "The vast 
quantities of military stores destroyed • • •  were sufficient to have 
enab led the South to continue the war for some time , "64 
The social and political devastation was even more complete ; the 
possibility of cooperating to achieve a peaceful post-war settlement was 
62rbid. , 19 .  
63Ibid. , 525 . 
64Ibid • 
........... 
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now impossib le o Professor Van Noppen has observed that : "The Pennsyl ­
vania troops behaved with discipline and decorum . On the other hand• 
many of the ' home Yankees '  of the Tennessee regiments were undisciplined • 
were motivated by revenge . and committed many depredations . They robbed .  
pil laged and wantonly destroyed furniture , clothing , and even food that 
people needed for subsistence . . . 6S 
Such behavior could not but have its las ting effect . The Tennes­
seans seem to have been incapable of behaving so as to win over the 
population. The motive of revenge probab ly cost them a chance of total 
victoryo Had they acted to convince rather than force , the subsequent 
story might have been different . With this raid • the mil itary possibi l­
ities of unconventional warfare had been c learly indicated,  On the other 
hand � the danger to the social order inherent i n  such a course of action 
had quite as vividly been revealed .  Though the war officially ended 
whi le this raid was in progress , the i l l  feelings , hatreds . and political 
differences endured and divided the peop le . 
Stoneman received the news that Grant had accepted Lee ' s  surrender.  
But the fighting had not ended for his forces . They moved in  to occupy 
Ashevi l le ,  and there the word reached them that Jeff Davis had escaped 
from the Confederate capitol .  He was making his way toward Georgia with 
a large cache of gold with which to continue the fight . unaware that his 
mi litary commanders had already decided against prolonging the war by 
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unconventional means . 66 Though Stoneman and his men combed the mountains 
for the Confederate President , he was not to be found , having come to the 
end of the road in Washington, Georgia, where on May 4 he and his asso-
ciates decided to give up the fight and scattered each to  his own hiding 
6 7  p lace . 
The end was inglorious . So was the war in E ast Tennessee . 68 The 
combat had been vicious and personal 9 and in a military sense unconven-
tional . The price of victory was high in terms of l oss of l ife and 
property, but higher stil l i n  terms of the state of mind of the sufferers 
as they faced the task of reconstructing their  society . There was l ittle 
understanding , less chari ty, and no mercy as vengeful ly the social order 
was rebuilt . Payment is still  being made a hundred years later,  in no 
smal l measure a result of the social degeneration brought on by unconven-
tional warfare . 
66scott and Angel , Thirteenth Tennessee C avalry, 25 7; "Editorial , "  
� � Times , May 1 1 ,  1 865 , 
6 7E liza  Frances Andrews recorded thi s day for history by comment­
ing in her diary: 
" • • •  there was a private meeting in hi s room • • •  , and again 
early in the morning there were other confabulations before they al l  
scattered and went their ways--and this , I suppose , is  the end of  the 
Confederacy • • • •  " Quoted in Katherine M .  Jones , Heroines of Dixie , 
Confederate Women Tel l  Their Story of the War ( Bobbs-Merrll � • •  New 
York, 1955), 469. - - - -
68" It was fought by men in s ingle combat ,  in squads , in  companies , 
in  regiments p in the fie lds , in fortified towns and in ambush,  under the 
stars and stripes p  under the stars and bars and under the black flag .  
The arch fiend himself seems to have been on the fie ld in person, inspir­
ing , directing, commanding . "  An excerpt from a speech in New York by 
Champ Clark of �Ussouri , Apri l 25 , 1 892 , referring to the war in Missouri , 
is equal ly appl icab le to the one fought in East Tennessee , 186 1- 1 865 . 
ORGANIZED ESCAPE 
When the State of Tennessee decided to separate from the Union. 
the East  Tennessee Unionists were confronted with the problem of Confed-
erate vindictiveness . Many Unionists were forced to seek asylum in  a 
more sympathetic region. From thi s  need evolved the final aspect of 
unconventional warfare--evas ion and escape . 1 Confederate authorities 
opposed the mass exodus of capab le manpower.  As their opposition inten-
sified , the means used to evade and escape became more sophisticated.  As  
conventional warfare increased in  the state , unconventional warfare was 
expanding to include assisting key people to l eave , opening escape routes 
for Union soldiers returning to their units , and helping Confederates to 
desert. From a Union point of view, thi s  phase of the unconventional war 
in E ast  Tennessee was of immeasurab le value in that it depleted the man-
power avai lable to support the Southern cause . 
To understand what took place , i t  i s  first necessary to understand 
more about evas ion and escape . As an integral part of unconventional 
warfare , it i s  frequently undertaken by the same people  who are engaged 
in guerril la activities and subversion . I t  i s  here being treated 
!The distinction between evadee and escapee is important in the 
international rules of war but is not essential to thi s thesis .  An 
evadee i s  defined as anyone behind enemy lines who succeeds in eluding 
physical detention by the enemy, An escapee is any person who .  having 
been physical ly captured, successfully frees himsel f, Both actions may 
be accomplished with or without aid. For the purpose of this study, this 
distinction wi l l  not be used. 
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separately for the purpose of clarity. Evas ion and escape techniques 
represent a more subtle form of res istance than either guerril la or sub­
vers ive exploits . Another distinctive characteristic is an indirectness 
of attack against  the enemy' s  authority. Violence is avoided,  the 
primary ob jective being to get important people ,  soldiers , and other 
selected individuals out of enemy-held territory. 
From the viewpoint of an oppressed people or of prisoners in 
captivity, the most important reason for escape may wel l  be to leave 
behind the intolerable life which b oth conditions suggest .  But we must 
not overlook the effect upon morale . The people in an occupied area get 
a psychological boost by aiding an escapee . Conversely, the enemy is 
j olted into the realization that his efforts to exercise control over the 
area are being undermined by successful  escapes from his control . Fur­
thermore , escapees serve as an example to others , proving that it i s  
pos s ib le and thus reducing the fear usual ly associated with such situa­
tions . In addition� every escapee is a vital source of information, 
providing friendly commanders with a useful  source of intel l igence . In  
an effort to confine this  security breech , an enemy is forced to  under­
take drastic measure s .  I f  the methods used are overly severe , their use 
wi l l  encourage additional escapes ; if too lenient , they wil l be inter­
preted as a sign of weakness and the res istance movement wi l l  become 
bolder in its activities . Regardless of the course pursued , escape 
practices wil l  force the enemy to use v ital ly needed combat forces to 
control unauthorized people and activities behind his l ines . Obviously,  
every man who escapes from enemy control adds to the ranks of the 
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friend ly forces  anci is  one more man whom the enemy may not exp loit e ither 
to fight for him or to produce needed supplies  for h i s  armies . 
When Governor Harris took Tennessee out of the Union in 1 86 1 • he 
immediate ly dispatched l oyal Confederate troops to East Tennessee to 
que l l  an expected Union uprising there . 2 The Unioni sts for their part 
resented thi s intimidation and were determined to res i st despite the 
conci l iatory policy adopted by General Zoll icoffer c the C onfederate 
3 commander . They had demonstrated their resolve in the 1 86 1  e lect ions by 
voting for representation i n  the United States Congress  rather than in 
the Confederate .  The Confederate authorities had no intent ion of a l l ow-
ing the e lected E ast Tennesseans to reach Washington, and took steps to 
prevent the i r  departure by b locking a l l  routes north . 
The representatives , though , had pl ans of their own- -to escape . 
T .  A .  R .  Ne lson attempted to reach the North in early Augu s t ,  but he was 
captured by the Home Guard in Lee County, V irginia,  and sent to Richmond 
as a prisoner . 4 Horace Maynard awaited the e l ection returns in Scott 
County . When i t  was clear that he had been e lected , he fled into Ken-
tucky , and on December 2 �  1 86 1 ,  took his  seat in the United  States 
Congres s . 5 Andrew J .  C lements made good his escape and j oined Haynard in 
2£·�· � Ser .  I � Vol . 4 �  pp . 369= 70 .  
3
�• D 377 0 4 74� 75 . 
4Knoxvi l le Whi g 0  Augus t ,  1 86 1 , c l ipping in Ne lson Scrapbook , X I I I ,  
5congressional !. lob e ,  37 Cong . ,  2 Sess . ,  p . 2 .  
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Congress on January 1 3 ,  1862. 6 George w. Bridges � Union candidate from 
lower East Tennessee , also got away, but was obliged to return when his 
family was detained at the Tennessee border by Confederate guards . 
Receiving word that his wife was i ll ,  he returned to see about her and 
was arrested and sent to Knoxvil le as a prisoner. One week before the 
end of the term , he was re leased and took hi s seat in the United States 
House of Representatives . 7 
The escapes of these prominent men did not go unnoticed either in  
East Tennessee or in Governor Harris ' office . The Governor decided to 
follow a stricter policy of border security in order to prevent the 
flight of any additional notable men. 8 Harris asked Richmond for more 
soldiers to implement this policy. 9 Meanwhile , General Zol licoffer tried 
to tone down the governor ' s  harsh stand , hoping to avoid antagoniz ing the 
population. On August 1 8 ,  1861 D he promised the people that the men 
under his command would in no way provoke an incident which would 
threaten the peace of the communities under his jurisdiction. He even 
encouraged those who had already fled to return home , promising them that 
no charges would be brought against them. Political differences were 
over, he said , and it  was time now " 
6.!.!?.!!!.. • 2 9 7 0 
• 0 0 to maintain the independence it 
7Humes ,  Lgyg� Mountaineers , 35 ; Congressional G lobe , 3 7  Cong . , 
3 Sess . ,  pp . 1 29 - • 
8o .R . , Ser .  I I ,  Vol .  1 ,  pp . 830 , 837 ;  Humes , �- Mountaineers , 
158-59 ; Temple ,  � Tennessee !!!!!. .!!!! Civil !!:.!.• 36..,-;-
9�·!· •  Ser. I ,  Vol .  4 ,  p .  389. 
[ the state and presumab ly the Confederacy] has asserted by the united 
feeling and action of al l its citizens o" lO For a t ime concil iation 
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seemed to b e  gaining a measure o f  success o  Open defiance o f  Confederate 
authority subsided�  but the fl ight north to Federal training camps con= 
tinued o 1 1  A contemporary historian recorded the fact that : 
Gradually the disposition to l eave spread through all  the counties of 
East  Tennessee o So D there came to be a constant stream of refugees 
constantly working their  way by night � through the wide expanse of 
mountains separating East Tennessee from the thickly settled parts of 
Kentuckyo o o o They fled from what they regarded as a present and 
terrible  danger o  o o o Soon there were thousands of  these wanderers 
in Kentucky o l 2  
During the autumn o f  1 86l p these loyal men were organized into six 
regiments of the Federal Army o In the meantime 0 Confederate forces 
redoub led their efforts to stop the flow by guarding every pass 0 but 
still  the exodus continueda 13  Though some sti l l  made their  way independ-
ently across the mountains � more and more refugees became dependent upon 
local citizens for aida The refugees knew little ab out the passes and 
routes and even less of the tightening security measures being imposed by 
Confederate authorities a 
Their only chance of success depended upon men who knew the coun-
try and were apprized of Confederate activities P men l ike William C l ift •  
lOGeneral Orders No a 3 0  August 1 8 0  1 86 1 � �o o  Sera I I � Vol o 1 0  
P o 83 l o  
1 1Temple 0 East Tennessee � � C ivil �P 368 o  
1 2�o j  369 o 
13ratum 0 Disloyalty0 144 o  
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mentioned earl ier i n  connection with the C l ift Wars o l4 Thi s  s ixty�seven= 
year old Unionist began his career of Confederate defi ance by providing a 
haven for refugees going to the North o They carne from as far away as 
Alabarnag Mississipp i �  and Georgia� and in such numbers that C l ift organ-
i zed them into companies o After Cl ift s igned the Crossroads Treaty in 
which he agreed to disband hi s force 0 his  men escaped to Kentucky where 
they j oined the Federal Armyo 
To make matters worse �  the Confederate Congress 0 on August 30 P 
authorized the sequestration of enemy estates 0 property D and effects 0  and 
Landon C o  Haynes was appointed to dispose of al l property in this cate� 
goryo 15 Haynes interpreted this act as pertaining to anyone who had 
escaped ,  who might escape in the future � or who aided the United States 
in any way a 16 Not only were their possessions in j eopardy 0 but the Union 
sympathizers themselves were arrested on one pretext or anothero 1 7  L ife 
was made miserable for the E ast Tennessee Unionists 0 and there was among 
them an ever=increasing des ire to get awayo 
Almost immediately the Confederate Congress i ssued another vindic-
tive piece of legislationo This time it was a procl amation made the more 
ob j ectionab le by four amendments which gave those not in  sympathy with 
l4Jo  So Hurlburt 0 History � �  Rebel lion � Bradley County (no 
pub q Indianapoli s �  1 866L 66= 71 �  Temple �>  Notable Men0 45=46 • .,.,;..,..;,;., _ _  
15�o�o l>  Sera IV 0 Yol o 1 1>  PP o 586 9  592 a  
16Knoxvi l le  Weekly Registe��> October 1 7 0  186 l o 
1 7Garrett0  "Confederate Government in E ast Tennessee �>"  27-29o 
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the Confederate cause forty days to get out of the South or be he ld as 
enemy aliens . A l l  their property was to be forfeite d 0  al l rights annul -
led � and D i f  they were in  the area after the e l apsed t ime , they faced 
detention as spies  or pri s oners of war. 1 8  Though thi s was the official 
pol icy of Davis ' government , Governor Harris , who sti l l  had technical 
contro l of the Tennessee troops guarding the routes north , continued to 
' G  arre s t  anyone trying to cross the b orde r . ��  Thi s  confus ing s tate of 
affai rs continued unti l  September 18 when General Zol licoffer and his  men 
moved into Kentucky » leav ing the b order unguarded .  
A l l  this time Union men were subj ected to unl awful search of the ir 
homes p seizure of their arms , and viol at ion of their c iv i l  rights . The ir 
response to these i ndignit ies was exemp l i fied by the November bridge 
burnings . The Confederates responded by introducing a pol icy of retal ia-
tion which was more coercive than those already imposed .  E ach time the 
Confede rates stiffened their policy , men went north in droves .  By the 
time they passed a conscription l aw in Apri l , 1 86 2 ,  the escape routes 
were already we l l  def ined .  o .  P .  Templ e  has e s t imated that as many as 
fifteen or twenty thous and secretly  crossed int o  Kentucky to j oin  the 
Federal Army during the firs t two years of the war. 20 
As escaping Unionists i ncreased i n  number,  the Federal troops 
stat ioned  in Kentucky came to their ass istance . A Federal company based 
1 8£·�· D Ser.  I I ,  Vol .  2 ,  pp . 1368- 70 . 
19 Ibid . v Ser .  I ,  Vol . 5 2 �  Pt . 2 ,  1 80 ;  Temple � East Tennessee and 
� �}v i l�a�g 369= 70 . 
20�. � 4 2 8 ,  
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at A lbany g Kentucky, commanded by  Captain Jim Ferguson , was entrusted 
with the mission of estab lish ing a "safe line" along the state boundary, 2 1  
The operation was s imple . After traveling for days over the rugged moun-
tain terrain9 few of those escaping had any idea exactly when they 
crossed the border .  I f  they re laxed their  vigilance too quick ly • they 
ran the risk of being captured by one of the Confederate cavalry patrols .  
To preclude thi s chance , all  were instructed to continue to evade unti l  
they had made definite contact with Ferguson ' s  forces .  
Those who for one reason or another could not escape immediately 
took refuge with the mountaineers , hiding in the inaccessible hi l ls and 
coves . "Parson" Brownlow, for e xample , hid out in Tuckaleechee Cove 
(Townsend) in October ,  1 86 1 . 2 2  Some , like Robert Johnson, the son of 
Andrew JohnsonD made it out of Tennessee on their  own. After hiding for 
two months in the mountains and walking mostly at night , he crossed i nto 
Kentucky in early February, 186 2 . 2 3  His success  was an e xception : most 
of those unfami liar with the mountains were captured.  I f  escapes were to 
continue , professionals would be needed .  In thi s  situation , the new 
21  . . ·· . .  Tatum 9 01s loyalty, 145 : �·�· • Ser .  I ,  Vol . 52 , Pt . 2 ,  pp . 178-80 .  
A "safe l ine" is an area near the b order which i s  patrol led b y  friendly 
forces and beyond which an escapee may expect to receive aid . When 
friendly contact is  made a long a safe l ine .  i t  may be assumed that in  
most cases the escapee is s afely beyond enemy-he ld territory . 
22Inez  Burns , "Settlement and Early History of the Coves of B lount 
County, Tennessee 1,'' E ast Tennessee Historical Society' s Pub lications , No . 
24 ( 1952) D 56 . 
2�ew � Times , March 2 • 1 862 .  
heroes of the mountains�=the pi lots= =gained importance o 24 These men 9 
e ither for pay or out of patriotic dedication� arranged to lead others 
through the mountains to Federal camps 0 like Camp Dick Robinson near 
Lexingtonp Kentuckyo 25 
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These pi lots were a special breed of men o Their  knowl edge of the 
country==its unused passes and back roads 0 river cross ings D and secluded 
resting spots= =equipped them for this task " Expert woodsmen p daring 9 
resourceful 0 and cool under pressure 0 these men loom as heroes in the 
local legends of East Tennessee 9 and none is more famous than Dan E l lis • 
the nold Red Fox o " 26 He was a bridge=burner in the early res istance 
movement o  Later� hiding in the mountains 9 he was almost captured by 
Confederates o  He eventually escaped and from April 0 186 2 v  to the end of 
the war was responsible for helping thousands of men into Kentucky to 
24remple 9 East Tennessee and the Civi l War9 4 26= 2 7 �  Humes 9  Lokal 
Mountaineers , 364":"66'7 There we rea number of these men other than t ose 
who wil l  be discussed in thi s thesi s o  Some of the more important were : 
Spencer Deaton0 Seth Lea �  and Frank Hodge of Knox County ;  I saac Bol inger 
of C ampbel l � Washington Van and Wi l liam B o Reynolds of Anderson C ounty ;  
and James Lane o f  Greene o Tatum 9 Disloyal!ro IS l a  Chapter  XXIX in  Scott 
and Ange l 0  Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry0 deals primari ly with Dan E l lis , 
but also records the names of many other pi l ots o Dan E l l i s 9 in his own 
book 9 Thri l ling Adventures 9 also li sts many of these men throughout his 
discussiono Others were : Keith Blalock and Harrison Church of North 
Carolina9  and Ruben Rogers 0 A lexander Heatherly 9 Joseph CooperD Daniel  A o  
Carpenter9 John Heatherly and his wife Kate Summers , al l of Campbel l  
Countyo Wi l liam McLain taught Dan E l l i s  the trade 0 and Emanuel Headen 
guided escapees from Georgia into Kentucky o 
25Dykeman 9 French Broad 9 1 2l o 
26A shorter p  less scholarly 0 but useful  account o f  D an  E l lis w  
exploits than those already mentioned is  Emmett Gowen 0 "Dan E l lis  and the 
Mountain Trai l /' True Civil  War Stories 0 Joseph Mi l lard 0 editor (Fawcett 
Publications 9 Greenwfch9 Conn7; 196i) D 1 85=200 o 
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j oin  the Federal Army. Not one to waste his talent � he always acted as a 
courier on his return trip , bringing in the latest news and instructions . 
Through the efforts of men l ike E l lis D the lines of communication with 
the North were kept open to the extent that Union papers were able , 
throughout the war, to report regularly on the situation in East Tennes­
see . 2 7  
Richard F lynn o f  Cumberland County was another famous pi lot who 
led parties of escapees from Georgia and A labama safely into Kentucky . 28 
His story is an example of the care and p lanning that went into establish-
ing an escape route . His route began with an initial contact made in  the 
vicinity of Chattanooga at a "safe house" run by Peter Thundergudgeon on 
Walden ' s  Ridge . Peter provided guidance , passwords , and food enough to 
get the travelers to Y .  c .  Sniprip ' s  house in Sequatchie Val ley. After 
food and rest ,  Sniprip guided the group to F lynn ' s pick-up point on Big 
Laure l Creek . F lynn then guided hi s charges along a mountain trai l to 
Possum C reek � Kentucky. Flynn is perhaps most famous for his role fo l low-
ing the i l l-fated attempt of James T. Andrews and his party to capture 
the Confederate locomotive "The General" in what is commonly cal led the 
"Great Locomotive Chase . "29 After Andrews and his raiders fai led and 
were capturedp  e ight of the party were executed9  but later eight others 
escaped from prison in Atlanta. They were quickly shuttled into the 
2 7Temple , E ast Tennessee and the Civi l War0 465 , 467 .  
-- - - -
28Bullard and Krechniak , Cumberland County� 55 . 
29soatner9 Civi l War Dictionary, 16 ; Govan and Livingood , The 
Chattanooga Country, 193�. 
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escape net and into the hands of Richard F lynn0 who del ivered  them safely 
into Kentucky. 30 Like E l l is D on his return trips F lynn was both scout 
and courier. 
Captain R. A .  Ragan of Cocke County had experience as escapee 9 
evadee p and pilot o 31  Soon after the enactment of conscriptionD Ragan 9 a 
school teacher5 was picked up and taken to Knoxvi l le o  Here he was 
imprisoned with some 300 other Unioni sts a Through the influence of 
Ragan ' s father8 who was a postmasterp General Leadbetter  was instructed 
to re lease the young mano No sooner had he arrived home than word came 
that he was to be arrested againo Seeking refuge in the mountains , for 
weeks he moved and hid p always just ahead of conscript parties searching 
for others like himsel f .  He missed several opportunities t o  rendezvous 
with groups being led out 9 first because of an inj ury and l ater because 
the pilot he was to meet was captured . After several months in the moun-
tains 8 he returned to the vicinity of his home and hid for a while  with 
re latives ,  which was extremely dangerous as the searches were continual 
and always unannounced .  I t  was not unt i l  July p 1 86 3 9  that Ragan . hearing 
that George Kirk was leading a group out in  a few days G j oined about a 
hundred other men at the appointed meeting place . Together they crossed 
Walden Ridge 9 the Watauga� Cumberland 9 Holston0 and Powe l l  rivers 8 and 
final ly reached Camp Dick Rob insono Many E ast Tennesseans were already 
30su llard and Krechniak p  Cumberland C ountyD 56=5 7 .  
3 1From R .  A .  Ragan 8 Esca�e From Eas t  Tennessee To the Federal 
Lines P published privately in 1 10;-owned1by �1rs . C linton-r7 Dooley. 
Knoxvi l le 9  cited i n  o vDe l l i  Misty Blu� Hi l l s 9  3 30=35 . 
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there preparing to join Burnside ' s  army in an assau lt on the Confederates . 
But more men were needed. Ragan volunteered to return home , raise a 
force D and bring them north before the attack . 
He safe ly recrossed into East  Tennessee without incident. Those 
wanting to escape were to meet him at a specific time on a remote farm 
owned by Benjamin F .  Nease .  At  the appointed time , the men began to  
arrive by  twos and threes ,  quietly waiting because of the ever-present 
danger of attracting the attention of Confederate scouting parties . 
After a hundred or so had arrived, Ragan fe lt it safe to identify himse lf  
as  the pi lot . To have done so sooner without adequate precaution could 
have meant certain death if  the Confederates had infiltrated the net . On 
Ragan ' s signal , they started out in single file , maintaining strict 
s i lence 8 over the unfamiliar route . They picked up fifteen more men at 
the Chucky Knobs " safe area," and by daylight had reached the Holston 
River D where they res ted. 32 
At eight that night they began the river crossing ,  which took 
until midnight � consequently they only made fifteen mi les that day . 33 
32A " safe area" is a remote part of the country where the enemy 
rarely patrols . Men wanting to escape were sent to these areas to be 
contacted by a pilot for evacuation. A pi lot usual ly had several of 
these areas estab lished along his route . As he approached them , he would 
halt his column some distance away and e ither he or an assistant would go 
forward and contact any men there according to prearranged s ignals . Such 
a technique prevented the compromise of the whole net in the event that 
the Confederates had succeeded in compromising or infi ltrat ing it  at any 
point . 
33An interesting s ide light to this trip at the Hol ston River 
crossing was the prayer offered for the success of the men by an old 
Negro preacher called Old Uncle David de livered just before R agan crossed:  
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Continuing on v now over two hundred strong0 they crossed Bays Mountain 
and then Clinch Mountain, and f inal ly the dangerous C linch River. Only 
then did they dare rest .  The next leg took them over Powe l l ' s  Mountain,  
Walden Ridge �  and Wi ld Cat Mountain.  The nights were dark , the trai ls 
narrow and dangerous P and the strain of the trip with litt le food and 
inadequate c lothing was beginning to tel l  on the men ; sti l l  they kept on . 
Dawn on the fifth day found Ragan' s men hidden in the woods bes ide the 
Powe l l  River. The most dangerous part of the trip l ay just ahead- -
Powe l l 9 s  Val ley. This area was heavi ly patrol led ; from here to the bor-
der any s lip could mean death or capture . The pressure was intense . An 
old man named Walker was the "contact" in the area,  and by two the next 
"0\) Lord God A ' mighty ! We is yo ' Chi ! ' n  and ' spects you to hea ' 
us without de lay, cayse we all  is  in a right smart hurry. Dese yer 
gemmen has run ' d  away from de Seceshers and dere ' omes and wants to get 
to de Norf. Dey hasn ' t got any time to wait . Ef  it  i s  ' cordin to de 
des tination of great Hebben to help ' em it ' l l be ' bout necessary fo de 
he lp to come right soon. De hounds and de rebels  is  on dere track . Take 
de sme l l  out ov de dog ' s  noses , 0 Lawd l and let Gypshum darkness come 
ober de eyes ights ob de rebels . Confound ' em 0 Lawd l De is  crue l ,  and 
makes has te to shed blood . De long has pressed de b l ack man and groun ' 
him in  de dust 0  and now I reck ' n  dey spects dat dey am a gwin to serve de 
loyal men de same way. Hep dese gemmen in  time ob troubl e  and lead ' em 
through all danger on to de udder s ide of Jo ' dan dry shod ! An raise de 
radiance ob you face on al l de loyal men what ' s  shut up in  de Souf ! Send 
some Moses p 0 Lawd to gui de ' em fru de Red Sea of Flickshum into de 
Promis ' Land i Send some great Gen ' ral ob de Norf wid his cmp 'ny sweepin' 
down fru dese parts to scare de rebels t i l l  dey flee like Midians and 
s lew dereselves to sabe dere lives ! 0 L awd , b less de r�n ' rals of de 
Norf ! 0 Lawd P b less de Kunnels , 0 Lawd , b less de Capt ' ins ! 0 Lawd , 
b less  der loyal men makin' dere way to de Promis ' Land i 0 Lawd� Ever­
lastin. Amen . "  
Ragan cmmented :  "This prayer,  offered i n  a ful l  and fervent voice ,  
seemed to cover our case e xactly and we could j oin in  the ' Amen. ' We 
then crossed the Holston River, but not dry shod . "  Quoted in O ' Del l ,  
Misty � Hi lls p 335 . 
afternoon he had the men fed and in position to cross the "dead line" 
that night . 34 Everyone tried to get some rest except two who were 
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detai led to keep the others from snoring or talking in  their s leep . I t  
took until  three in the morning for everyone to  get across the open val-
ley. I t  was s low and nerve-racking work avoiding the constant patrols and 
moving in smal l groups e sometimes only a few yards at a time . This  four-
hundred-yard crossing was , as the participants put i t ,  like crossing the 
val ley of death . 
The "dead line" behind them, Ragan v s men crossed Cumberland Moun-
tain and into another "safe area" known as Bai les Meadow. A l l  the men 
were hungry and many were almost naked ,  most were without shoes after the 
rugged night marches e but al l were free and al l  were b itter,  ready to 
fight . This  particular group became Company K of the Eighth Tennessee 
Infantry Regiment under Colonel Felix A. Reeve . 
34Thi s  term originated from the line or fence beyond which pris­
oners of  war were not allowed to  cross in the compound .  Anyone crossing 
would be shot . The same term endures today and carries with it the same 
connotation. Wi lliam Best  Hesseltine ,  Civil  War Prisons , A Stgyy in War 
Psychology (Ohio State Univers ity Press , Columbus , 1936) , 57, , 143 !! 'assim. The "dead line" in this case was the narrow stretch through 
owell 9 s  Val ley which the Confederates patro l led very heavily.  G .  w .  
Morgan to o.  D .  Green , April 19 ,  1 862 ,  O .R . , Ser.  I ,  Vol .  10 1 Pt . 2 1  p .  
1 14 .  This  area proved t o  b e  an ideal spot to trap escape parties . Many 
successful  apprehensions were made here . Only ten days before Ragan ' s 
party arrivedD another group had been captured in the e xact location 
where they were making their crossing attempt . The usual procedure on 
such occasions was to hang the pilot on the spot . This point where 
success was so close was usual ly the most dangerous because of the nat­
ural tendency of the escapees to  relax their  vigi lance and become noisy 
and care less . Pi lots were always most apprehensive at these points . 
Escape from this position , once the crossing had begun 8 was impossib le . 
The risk to the escapees was only capture , but to the pilot it was 
instant death . Ibid . , 336 . w .  w .  Glazier, The Calture , the Prison � 
� ..!.!!! Escape (R.lf. Ferguson and Co . ,  New YOrk ,  87o) " 'm-�9. 
The pilots developed a criss-cross network of escape routes al l 
across East Tennessee , and , wherever they were estab li shed ,  the l oyal 
population showed its approval in whatever way it could . Farmers , for 
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example , began to  leave caches of food at fence corners every few mi les 
a long the routes where men would be moving swiftly and s i lently to the 
North . 35 Ever conscious of the increasing nocturnal traffic ,  residents 
along the way undertook to act as sentine l s ,  protecting and warning . 
Through thi s  cooperative effort, the number of successful escapes mu lti-
plied .  Sti l l ,  the nagging problem of a l ack of organization pointed up 
many remaining dangers . E scape parties were often forced to spend as 
much time hiding from each other as from the Confederates . Incompetent 
or care less guides , attracted by what seemed to them to be easy money, 
blundered their  way across the hi l ls ,  exposing themse lves and their 
charges to certain capture . Sometimes Confederates ,  posing as Union 
guides , succeeded in gaining the confidence of a group seeking to escape , 
whereupon they led their unsuspecting companions into the waiting arms of 
Confederate patrols . 36 
35sul lard and Krechniak , Cumberland Count�, ss . The techniques of 
cooperation were as varied  as were the routes an were as modern as if  
they were those of  World War I I  or  the Korean War. Probab ly the two most 
s ignificant points revealed by these stories of escapes were , first , that 
the cooperation of the population and their subsequent organizing made 
the internal escape net a success and , second , research to this writing 
has not uncovered a single case of a net ' s  being compromised from within . 
Thi s  is  a record of which the participants could be justly proud. I t  is  
ref lective of  their  dedication to the Union , and as yet it has not been 
excel led in modern times . 
36oan E l l i s ,  Thril l ing Adventures ,  99  !! pass im ,  133. 
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The need for organization became increasingly obv ious as Confed-
erate security tightened .  There is evidence that groups for this purpose 
had been forming from the very beginning under the name of the Heroes of 
America. 37 Like al l such clandestine organizations , its origin is 
unknown as was its connection with s imi lar structures e lsewhere in the 
Confederacy. 38 Operating in North Carolina, southwestern Virginia ,  and 
eastern Tennessee , the Heroes of America was Union inspired,  and its 
headquarters was somewhere within Federal lines . 39 C onfederate author-
ities in East Tennessee had long suspected the existence of such a move­
ment but had been unab le to destroy it , 40 Union officers , if  not 
directly involved in its operations , were certainly wel l  aware of its 
activities and al lowed its operators to pass freely through Federal 
line s . 4 1  Participation among the mountaineers was encouraged by granting 
them exemption from conscription. 4 2  Weight was added to the importance 
of thi s work by the testimony of Daniel R .  Goodl oe to the Senate that 
b oth Grant and Lincoln were members of the Heroes of America . 43 Each 
370wsley,  "Defeatism ,"  452-56 , 
3�atum , Dis loyalty,  32 . 
39 Q.�. , Ser. IV , Vol . 3 1  PP • 803 ,  814 . 
40G. H . Carrol to A .  J .  Johnston, December 7 ,  1 861 1 ibid. , Ser. I ,  
Vol . 5 2 ,  Pt . 2 ,  p .  232 ; Ti lghman Haws Scrapbook contains the-original 
letter.  
41Tatum, Disloyalty, 33 .  
42  Q•�• D Ser .  IV,  Vol . 3 1  pp . 814- 15 . 
43Daniel R .  Goodloe was a former u.s. Marshal from Warren County. 
His statement is in the Senate Report , 42 Cong . , 1 Sess . ,  Ser. 146 8 ,  
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local segment had its own grips , passwords , signs , oaths , and obligations 
to bind the members . 44 The following observation by one historian is an 
example of the degree of commitment to the Union cause expected of mem-
bers : 
The duties required were to encourage and facilitate desertion from 
the Confederate army, to protect and pass all  deserters , escaped 
prisoners , or spies ; to report the positions , movements , numbers , and 
condition of the Confederate troops ; in short , to contribute in every 
way possible to the success of the Federals and the defeat of the 
Confederacy. 45 
For protection, members held no meetings , kept no records , and often, 
through a system of "cut-outs" and safe houses or areas , knew only a few 
other members of the organization. Their operations were conducted more 
as a loose confederation than as a highly centralized and directed unit .  
Each group acted " .  , • as an independent , dissevered link i n  a perfect 
chain. "46 Probab ly there was a c lose association between key leaders and 
the United States Secret Service , though there is insufficient evidence 
to prove such an association ever existed. The movement of escapees from 
p .  227 .  Membership in such a society seems incongruous to the characters 
of Lincoln and Grant . In  his overzealousness , it is possible that Goodloe 
overstated the participation of both these leaders . Maybe he meant that 
they were heroes in America only in the broadest sense , though his state­
ment explicitly implicates both men in the organi zation. It is quite 
possible also that their names were used for their propaganda value , 
Even though there might be reservations in accepting this testimony at 
face value , the effect desired was attained, Loyal Unionists of the area 
formed into an organization, 
44o ,R. , Ser.  IV , Vol . 3 , pp, 806 , 809,  8 1 1 ; Tatum, Disloyalty, 
33-34 ; DyKeman, French Broad , 121 .  
45Tatum, Disloyalty, 34 ;  �·�· • Ser. IV , Vol . 3 ,  pp, 803 ,  807,  814 . 
46oykeman, French Broad , 121 .  
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one group to another was done so wel l  and with such apparent profession-
alism that it i s  safe to speculate that sufficient cooperation existed to 
classify the effort as an organization. 
Membership in the Heroes of America was not l imited to avowed 
Unionists , as evidence of their activity was found within the Confederate 
Army itself. Kirby Smith was aware of thi s  even to the extent that he 
suspected individual so ldiers , officers , and in some cases entire units 
of disloyalty. 4 7  His suspicions were not without foundation, for later 
it was discovered that Confederate Captain Robert w. Boone , a great-
grandson of Daniel Boone , was a secret Union agent , spy , pi lot ,  and scout 
who used the name Charlie Davis . 48  Under this name he led hundreds of 
men safe ly through Confederate lines . 49 The problem was so acute that 
Confederate officials began reporting to Richmond the existence of such 
secret organizations , particularly the fact that their soldiers were mem­
bers . 50 As Confederate losses increased in 1 863 1  the societies gained 
strength unti l ,  as General Gideon J. Pil low reported to General Samuel 
Cooper, their influence was so widespread that it was impossible to 
47E .  K .  Smith to s.  Cooper,  March 15 , 1 86 2 ,  O .R . , Ser. I ,  Vol . 1 0 ,  
P t .  1 � p .  21 ; Frank Owsley ,  "Local Defense and the Overthrow of the Con­
federacy," MVHR , IX (March , 1925 ) , 490-525 ; Owsley, "Defeatism," 456 ; 
Humes , Loya�untaineers , 161 . 
48w. G .  Brownlow, Sketches of the Rise , Pro�ress and Decline of 
Secession (sometimes cal led Parson-wrownlOWTS Book (Applegate and c07, 
cincinnati ,  1 862) , 219 ; Tatum , Disloyalty, l�l:---
49�o p  15 2 .  
50£·�· 8 Ser. I ,  Vol , 26 , P t .  2, pp . 555-56 . 
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obtain men in Tennessee . 5 1  
He might have added that i t  was almost impossib le to keep the men 
he had . By the fal l  of 1 863 the desertion programs of Union secret 
societies were in ful l  operation .  General Rosecrans reported in Septem-
ber that he was able to fi ll  hi s ranks by enlisting many of these men who 
had left Confederate ranks . 52  It  was from the ranks of the deserters 
that Colone l George Kirk also recruited many of his irregulars . \fore over �  
there was great dissatisfaction among the Confederates in Tennessee units . 
I t  was so easy to contact someone who could he lp them get away that it is  
not surprising to find that when the men received letters from home beg-
ging them to return, many could not res ist the temptation to desert . 
By 1 864 the secret societies expanded their escape nets into the 
newly constructed prisons in the Carolinas . They modified and enlarged 
the underground rai lroad system used earlier to smuggle s laves out of the 
South. 5 3  During the long political struggle that preceded the war, the 
Negroes had perfected a re lay system of passing runaway slaves from one 
point to another until  they could reach the safety of the North. The 
effectiveness of thi s  system has long been a matter of debate � but there 
is  little doubt that the slaves south of the mountains were wel l  
S l�• D Ser .  IV , Vol . 2 ,  pp . 670 ,  775 . 
5 2� • •  Ser .  I .  Vol . 30,  Pt.  3 ,  p .  529 .  
5 3wu liam A .  Breyfogle , Make Free , The StJ
ry 2!. the Underground 
Rai lroad (Lippincott , Phi ladelphri; � ,-z7o ; ames J�eer , Beyond � 
Lines or a Yankee Loose in  Dixie (J . w .  Doughoday, Phi lade lphia,  1863) , 
1 28 ;  Larry Garat The L iberty L1ne ,  The Legend of the Underground Rai lroad 
(Univers ity of Keiit'Ucky Press-;-te'xington, 1961), 205 .  
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acquainted with isolated routes in sparse ly sett led areas which they used 
constant ly in communicating with each other"  When the war came , they 
p laced themse lves at the disposal  of the Uniono Spies , prisoners , and 
deserting Confederates , all  were accepted,  aided , and moved on into the 
mountains . The Negroe s '  knowledge of the movements of southern patrols 6 
roadb locks � and army dispositions was uncanny . They handled their 
charges until  they reached the base of the mountains , an area re latively 
safe from Confederate patrols .  F rom this point on was the province of 
the mountain men . The link from prison escape to sanctuary was complete . 
"Here for the first time all  the elements necessary for a successful  
escape were present : the guard-force was inadequate , the prison wal ls 
were non-existent , and on the outs ide there was a large portion of the 
population ready and wi l ling to render ass istance . "54 
Many of the Confederate prison camps , such as the one at Camp 
Sorghum near Columbia,  South Carolina ,  had been hastily constructed and 
were l ittle more than cleared areas surrounded by guards . Some had 
fences ,  but these were eas i ly breached by s lipping an unauthori zed man 
54Hesse 1 tine �  "Underground Rai l road ,"  6 0 .  "The Union Army had 
been making good use of the little  known mountain passes where only 
experienced guides could find their way . These mountains sheltered 
fugitives from the Confederate Army who hid by day and foraged by night , 
often moving in bands of as many as twenty men for protection . Through 
both northern and southern portions of the North Carolina mountains were 
paths fol lowed by those who had escaped from Confederate prisons in mak­
ing their way to Union lines in Tennessee . Those fleeing from Salisbury 
fol lowed the Yadkin River to Wi lkes County , said to be probab ly the 
strongest Union County in North Carolina ; • • • •  The Unionists fed and 
shel tered escapees and guided them across the Blue Ridge to Banner Elk , 
where the second re lay of guides he lped them to Tennessee . "  Van Noppen , 
"Stoneman ' s Last Raid ," 33 .  
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or so into a work party as it departed .  Quite often the assistance of a 
guard who was a member of a secret Union organization could be obtained. 
At this particular camp , holding twelve hundred officers , three hundred 
and seventy-three are known to have successful ly escaped . 55 The pattern 
seemed to be to get beyond the wire by stealth or with assistance and 
into the hands of nearby Negro or whi te Union sympathizers . 56 "Union 
soldiers escaping from prisons at Columb ia usual ly made their way across 
South Carolina and through Saluda Gap to Hendersonvil le , North Carolina ,  
where they were re layed to Ashevi l le • . ,S 7 From this point , pi lots gui ded 
the escaped prisoners through East  Tennessee safe ly into Federal l ines . 
Lieutenant Charles G .  Davis fol lowed a different route after his  
escape from Camp Sorghum on  Friday, November 4 ,  1 864 . 5 8  Two days l ater 
55o .R . , Ser .  I I ,  Vol . 7, pp . 1 196 , 930 , 9 75 .  This  prison was so 
named because of the vast  quantity of sorghum molasses i ssued as rations 
to the prisoners . 
56Albert D .  Richardson, The Secret  Service , the Field ,  the Dungeon 
and the Esca�e (American Publishing Co. , Hartford, Tm5s) ,  428 ;-nessel­
tlne-;-C'ivil ar Prisons , 249 ; Hesseltine ,  "Underground Rai lroad ,"  6 2 ; 
G lazier, Capt'ii'Fe ,  Pen ,  !.!!2, Escape ,. 192 . 
5 7Dugger, � Trails , 1 1 1-33 .  
5 8charles G .  Davis • a lieutenant in the First Mass . Cavalry , was 
wounded and captured at A ldie ,. Virginia ,  June 7 1  1863 1  and taken to L ibby 
Prison at Richmond . From there he was at Camp Oglethorpe , Georgia ,  and 
then sent to Charleston, South Carolina , with other officer prisoners to . 
be kept in the city whi le it  was under fire from the Union siege guns , 
especially the "Swamp Angel" on Morris I s land. In September of 1 864 
ye l low fever broke out ,. and the local home guard was so depleted that 
there were not enough men to guard the prisoners . Lt . Davis was sent to 
Camp Sorghum at Columb ia,. South Carolina , from which p lace he escaped on 
November 4 ,  1 864 , reaching Knoxvi l le by way of the Smokies and Cades Cove 
on December s ,  1864 .  In the Official Records , Davis is l isted as an aide 
to General Hooker, but this is an error as there were two Davises in  the 
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he and three companions made contact with an elderly Negro who directed 
them to the route north . Monday morning � two Negroes found them and from 
thi s point on they were in the hands of the underground � which moved them 
steadi ly north until on November 30th they found themse lves in the care 
of Henry B .  Grant . In an excerpt from his diary0 D avis re lates his 
subsequent trip to Knoxvi lle �  
November 30 . We went into bush P Hr. Grant going with us . We had a 
good n1ght 1 s  rest .  We trave l led about 5 miles to  the Tuckasuge [ sic] 
River which we had to wade . The water was very colde deep and rap1d. 
It was also very wide , having three channel s ,  there being two i slands 
at the ford , giving us 3 streams to cross before we reached the 
opposite bank . Capt . Hart had a mishap in the trip across this 
river. He tripped his toe against a rock and down he fe l l ,  thoroughly 
wetting his clothes . He reached the shore al l right , but had the 
pleasure of putting on his clothes wet .  We traveled about half a 
mile and reached the home of A .  B .  We lch , he being the next gentleman 
to whom we had been referred.  I t  was now about 1 1  o 9 c lock at night . 
We awakened Mr. We lch . He got up and built  a large fire and we soon 
got warm and had our clothes dried . Mrs . We lch arose and cooked us 
some supper, which p leased us very much . We remained by the fire 
until  after 2 o ' c lock and went to the bushes to rest .  We had intended 
to travel the balance of the night . Mr. We lch to ld us it  was not 
safe for us to continue on the road we were trave ling any further on 
account of Bushwackers who had recently passed . He told us of a 
trail over the mountains which he would take us over early in the 
morning that would be perfectly safe D and we could travel by daylight 
and reach a Union settlement within 25 miles . So we concluded to 
remain until  morning . 
1st Mass .  Cav .  and the names became confused. The correction was not 
al lowed to be made under the rules of publ ication of the Official Records . 
Davis went on to become a �fajor 0 and after the war was pres1dent of the 
Union Prisoners of War Association . E li ot Davis (grandson) to author ,  
July 3 1 ,  1962 .  E xcerpt from typed manuscript of  Maj or Charles G .  Davis . 
The original i s  the property of his grandson11 �1r o E liot Davis , Grand 
Marais , Minnesota. With his permission p  a copy has been made and is  in  
the Special Collections of  the University of  Tennessee Library, Knoxv i l le ,  
Tennessee . The route fol lowed by the Davis party i s  a particularly 
rugged trai 1 which is today part of the Smoky Mountain National Park . 
The old trai l from Welches Ridge to the Spencer cab in and . into Cades Cove 
is a hard two-day hike . 
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December 1st �  We had a good night g s  rest o Mr o We lch awoke us 
directly after daylight D bringing out a good breakfast "  We were soon 
on our way againo � fro We lch piloted us over the mountains for about 
10  mi les and then directed us so we could not lose our way. We ate a 
lunch of cornbread and molasses o ,_fr o  We lch gave us a good drink of 
apple brandy before eatingo We trave led about 3 miles after b idding 
�1r. We lch good=bye and camped on the top of Smoky Mountain in  a 
cabin [Spencer] o We had a hard day ' s march o Some of the mountains 
we had to climb were very steep D be ing a mi le high from base to top . 
December 2nd : We arose ab out daybreak and again started on our trip e 
We had some hard cl imb ing for an hour or soD but the descent soon 
commenced and continued unti l  we reached Cades Cove c We entered the 
Cove about 3 P orn o  and very unexpectedly caused quite an alarm o A 
girl was on duty as a sentineL She gave the alarm with a horn . 
When she blew the horn we were looking down the Cove . In an instant 
it was alive o The men were driving their cattle before them , and 
every man had a gun over his shouldero We asked the girl to point 
out the home of ''fro Rowan (after te l ling her who we we re) � as suring 
her that we were friends o We marched in and went to 'frs o Rowan ' s  
home o She was very much frightened when she saw us � but we soon 
satisfied her that we were friends o She informed us that they were 
looking for the Rebe ls every moment a  Rather pleasant news for us e 
We had not more than got seated when a wcman came running up the road 
to '1rs o R o  � and informed her that the Rebs were coming o  We jumped up 
ready to run , but we soon found out that the woman had taken us for 
the Rebels � and that it was a false alarm o  Hrs o Rowan said she could 
not keep al l of us , so five of us started over to the home of � fr .  
Sparks to whom she directed us o We soon found out that our entrance 
had alarmed al l  of the inhab itants of the Cove o The men left the 
fie lds and fled to the mountains o I t  soon beca�e known who we were o 
They commenced to col lect around us o We were resting very comfort� 
ab ly at �1r o Spark v s te l ling our story when a horseman came riding up 
from the lower end of the Cove and said  "the Rebels  are coming sure ;• 
that one of the citi zens had seen them o A l l was confusion for s ome 
moments o The men picked up their guns and we our b lankets and 
started for the mountains o We reached a safe place o After wai ting 
for an hour, we found out that it was another false alarmo The 
report had gone down one s ide of the Cove and up the otherc  l'le a l l 
returned to Mro Spark 9 s  house and ate a hearty suppero  We found a l l  
good Union men here o They a l l  have to s leep i n  the bushes eve ry 
night , and have for the past two years o They l ive in continued 
terror of being kil led"  At dark we went to the bushes for our night 1 s  
rest . 
December4, 1 864 : Breakfasted with �fr o Haslet , Raining by spe l ls 
all day o 1tizens are trying to get horses to carry us to Knoxvi l le 
tomorrow. Four of our party not being very foot sore � took the road 
for Tuckauge [sic] Cove D the balance went in search of horses o When 
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we reached the top of  the mountain, we s at down to  wait for the rest 
of the party. Whi le waiting we had a lunch of bear meat and corn 
b read . Getting wet and cold ,  concluded not to wait any longer .  Left 
word on a tree that we had gone on to Tuckasuge [sic ]  Cove , where we 
arrived at 4 o ' c lock . We stopped at the house of-a-good Union man , 
Mr. McCampbel l ,  the balance of the party arriving about dark without 
horses . Three of the party went to the home of �fr. Snyder and 
stopped for the night . Mr. Welch and Mr. Gregory are out this even­
ing after our horses .  Thi s  Cove i s  " a  true b lue settlement , "  I t  
gave 146 votes for Lincoln [ in  1 864] . McLel lan [sic]  did not receive 
a vote . We had a very fine supper, plenty of good apples , spent a 
p leasant evening with old Grandfather �1cCampbel l ,  74 years of age , 
who kept us talking al l the time . He was fu l l  of old Revolutionary 
s tories . We are beginning to feel as i f  we were getting near home . 
C leared up about sunset . Had a beautiful  night , moon as bright as a 
new dol l ar .  S lept in a corn crib and were very comfortable . 
December 4 :  Our friends wOke us at daybreak with the s alutation 
11Breakfast is ready . "  We s oon got ready and sat down to a well 
fil led table  and ate to our heart ' s  content . �1essrs .  Grant and We lch 
were unab le to get horses for the whole trip , but got horses to carry 
us  across the Little River,  which we had to cross three time s ,  got 
started about 10 a .m .  forming quite a cavalcade . Messrs . We lch and 
Gregory are going to Knoxvi l le with us to get ammunition for the 
citizens of Cades Cove . About one o ' c lock we reached the A llegahney 
[sic]  River [Little River] . After cross ing we s at down and had a 
lunch , sweet bread ,  pies and apples . Marched over thirty miles 
today. The road is in good condition. Passed an I ndian sett lement 
on the banks of Litt le River, Four of our party stopped at the house 
of Mr. John Brown ( 3  1/2  mi les to Knoxvi l le) , the balance of the 
party continued on to find another house to stop in for the night . 
After a great deal of trouble found one , the residence of �1r. Harmon 
who lived within 1 1/2 miles of our picket lines . We had a beautiful  
day. The whole party is fee l ing very gay. 
December 5 :  Happy Day .  Moved into the City o f  Knoxvi l le .  • • • 
Captain Wi l lard w. Glazier escaped from Camp Sorghum on the 26th 
of November and related much the same kind of e xperience . 59  Once in the 
mountains of North Carol ina, the Union gui des , members of the Heroes of 
America, guided him safely to Federal line s .  A lbert D .  Richardson w ith 
59Gi azier, Capture , �. !!!2_ Escape , 204 .:! passim. 
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Junius Henni Browne , New York Tribune reporters , immortalized the work of 
these escape organizations in the narration of their escape from Salis­
bury Prison in North Carolina .60 On December 1 8 1  1 864 1  officers on duty 
as guards there helped them escape . 6 1  Richardson and Browne were always 
expected at their next stop ,  as the "grapevine" communications system 
spread the word of their coming l ong before they arrived .  Once into the 
mountains , they were met by Dan E l l is who ,  s ix days later, on January 
13 ,  brought them safely into Knoxvi l le . 62  
w.  H.  Shelton and two others escaped from Camp Sorghum in November  
of  1863 and by mid-December had reached the mountains where they met a 
Baptist minister who brought them to the home of a col league , Quince 
Edmonston. 63 From here Shelton' s party was led from the home of one lay-
man to another, l iving off the fat of the land.  On March 4 he was picked 
up by a Federal patrol near Loudon, Tennessee . 
Everyone traveling the net was a potential source of mi litary 
inte l ligence in his own right , As he passed from one point to another he 
obtained more data which could be passed on to the authorities for evalu-
ation . Couriers or pilots returning along the line brought back 
60Hesseltine ,  "Underground Rai lroad,"  63 .  
6 1The officer of the guard was a member of the Heroes of America.  
Shortly after he helped Richardson escape , he personal ly l ed thirty 
prisoners safely to Knoxvil le .  Richardson, The Secret Service , 438 ,  447 , 
449-5 0 .  ---
6 2E l lis , Thril ling Adventures , 38-4 1 ,  
63w . H .  Shelton, "A Hard Road To Travel Out o f  Dixie , "  Century, 
XVI I I  (October,  1890) , 931-49 ,  
instructions for the whole underground , Thus , the Union was provided 
with an organized means of getting information out of and into East 
Tennessee on a regular basis . 
139 
Many different methods were used . In s ome places there were regu-
lar message drops such as the one run by Mrs . Jeannette L ,  Mabry, the 
wife of George w. Mabry, a Confederate co lone 1 . 64 No guide considered 
his mission complete unl ess he stopped going and coming to trade inte l l i-
gence with Mrs , Mabry.  Many a Federal soldier was astounded  at the 
amount of information she gave them to re lay to the first headquarters 
they reached in free territory. 
Judge Samuel Mi l ligan managed to get information from Greenevi l le 
to Knoxvi l le ,  even though he was under close house arrest by Longstreet ' s  
staff quartered i n  his home . 65 A trusted man would be sent to see the 
judge , ostensibly on private business .  As they shook hands upon parting, 
the judge pressed a note , with vital information on it ,  into his  visi-
tor ' s hand . The contact passed the information to an escaping prisoner 
who took it to Knoxvi l l e .  
S . h d . 66 omet1mes t e escape net was use 1n reverse . General Grenvil le 
M. Dodge , who in 1 86 2  headed a l l  Federal c landestine activities in 
Tennessee , used it to get his  operators into East  Tennessee . Pauline 
64Temple , East  Tennessee � �  Civil  War, 427-28 ; Tatum, 
Disloyalty, 15 1 .  
65Mi l ligan, "Memoir,"  103 .  
66Harnett Kane , Spies � !h!_ !.!.!!! � Gray (Doubleday and Co . , 
New York , 1954) , 1 27-38. 
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Cushman , his famous and provocative Creole spy , was quite fami liar with 
the underground route into Confederate lines . In 18631 working under 
Colonel Wi l liam Truesdail , she was ass igned the task of infi ltrating 
enemy lines and visiting as many of Bragg ' s  camps as possib le , She 
entered the net at Columbia and was pi loted to a location which would 
match her cover s tory .  From there she worked alone , employing the 
"direct contact" methods to which she owed her fame . The j ob of the 
underground pi lots was s imply to be near enough to receive her messages 
and get them to Colonel Truesdai l .  
No one wi l l  ever know how many escapes can be attributed to the 
organized secret societies commonly designated as the Heroes of America. 
Nor wil l an absolute figure of the per cent of Confederate deserters who 
were aided by them ever be ful ly ascertained.  It  seems certain that in 
the 90,000 to 136 ,000 Confederate desertions during the last  two years of 
the war, the underground groups figured importantly , 
The very fact that such groups e xisted in East Tennessee was a 
maj or contribution of unconventional warfare in the region . Confederate 
authorities were unab le to stern the tide of escapes through E ast Tennes­
see . As the war progressed and until  it ended,  the work of the pilots 
and the secret organizations combined to make E ast  Tennessee an important 
link in the escape to freedom , The men who escaped and those who helped 
them went to great lengths to obtain liberty even to the e xtent of risk­
ing their lives . The human ingenuity, daring , patience , and endurance 
displayed was a tribute to the independent spirit of these people and 
their determination to escape and fight . 
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Escape and evas ion may have been the most useful , the most endur­
ing , and perhaps the most popul arly acceptable aspect of unconventional 
warfare . There seems little doubt that the organi zed escape effort 
proved to be a formidable weapon in depriving the Confederacy of manpower 
in East Tennessee . As the system became more highly organized, it 
reached far out of the local region to provide a haven for prisoners , 
Confederate deserters , and others disil lusioned with the Confederacy. As 
the organization became more sophisticated and techniques became per­
fected, more were able to escape . Everyone--men , women , and chi ldren-­
were found working in this struggle , yet aside from pilot� who were hung 
immediately when caught , little punishment was meted out to others escap­
ing or aiding esc�pes except to j ai l  them . There was a tacit acceptance 
of the fact that it was the duty of a soldier to escape and of his 
counterpart to detain him .  As there is no evidence that abnormal brutal­
ity was practiced upon captured escapees ,  it  would appear that this phase 
of warfare remained on a fairly high plane of human interaction. Since 
the advent of modern warfare , this phase of act ivity, even before the 
Civil  War� was a formal part of every soldier' s training. There is  some­
thing about spiri t ,  determination , wil l power, and dedication which is  
universal ly attractive to  all  people . Perhaps this accounts for the 
wi l lingness to participate in evasion and escape activit ies . Certainly a 
contributing factor was the fact that the evadee intended mere ly to get 
away and not to fight in or destroy the area he passed through . There is 
little here which is  disruptive to society because when the war is ended 
there is  no further need for an escape net .  The charitab le and 
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humanitarian traits which prompted a person to aid an escaping prisoner 
were easily redirected into worthy community pursuits in rebui lding after 
the fi ght , Of all  the facets of unconventional warfare . that involving 
escapes from enemy territory was the most productive i in terms of 
investment . cos t ,  returnD and long-range results , No greater contribu­
tion was made during the war toward laying the foundation for reunion o 
CHAPTER VI  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The irregular raids conducted b oth by partisans and by e lements of 
the regular army� together with the work of c landestine organizations , 
constituted unconventional warfare in East Tennessee . In  the early days 
of the Civil War,  effective armed resistance was sporadic , poorly led, 
and in the main futi le . Little was gained by the Greenevi l le Convention 
in 1 861  e xcept to express the position of the Unionist leaders in oppos­
ing the actions of a Confederate maj ority in  the state . When President 
Lincoln cal led for troops to put down the rebel l ion, the position which 
East  Tennessee wou ld take was stil l quest ionab le . Confederate propaganda 
was adroit ly directed at exploiting this indecis ion, just as Union 
propaganda was intent upon estab lishing an i s land of Unionism within the 
heart of the Confederacy. 
Union sympathy , or at least indifference to the Southern cause , 
was wel l  known o Efforts of Union zealots to arm the E ast Tennesseans 
prompted the Confederates to take the initiat ive and occupy the uncertain 
and unre liab le uplands of East  Tennessee . The Confederate purpose was 
twofold : to prevent an uprising in  this critical bott leneck , an uprising 
which would hamper their war effort , and to win the sympathy of the 
people for the Confederate cause ,  thereby assuring a solid wal l of 
resistance against the invas ion of Unionists into Confederate territory , 
I nitially ,  the plan showed s igns of success . By al l accounts ,  asi de from 
formal occupation. during the first few months of the war these troops 
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did little which might be cal led offensive o Qui te the contrary, they 
were admonished time and again not to antagonize the people but to treat 
them fairly and with extreme care o Any act which might be considered 
offensive to human dignity was scrupulous ly avoided o In  fact , the 
occupying forces seem to have gone out of their way to avoid trouble . 
They seem to have been so convinced of the righteousness of their cause 
that they apparently believed their mere presence would ral ly the recal­
citrant Tennesseans to the Confederate banner.  Consequently , little of a 
positive nature was done to assure the uncompromising support of the 
people o Confederate authorities mis judged the population with whom they 
were dealing � and herein lay the fatal flaw in their planning . 
These East Tennesseans were unsuited both by tradition and desire 
to have someone else determine how they were to act in this national  
cri s is o The ir traditional independence and dedication to the Union 
resulted ·in res istance o Assured of Federal he lp (which fai led to mater­
ialize) D the leaders undertook the bridge�burning mission which was only 
part ly successful o In  the end it was little more than a gesture , but an 
important one in that it deprived the Confederates of a vital transporta­
tion system at a critical time , and it was a psychological b low which 
prompted the Confederates to adopt an unsound policy in dealing with the 
Unionists o The Confederate authorities answered defiance with a reign of 
terror designed to force the Unionists into sub jugation , but instead the 
partisans gained more fol lowers and solidified the determination of the 
people to resist the Confederacy and to adhere to the Union. 
The terrain both phys ical ly and political ly was conducive to 
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unconventional warfare . The Confederates control led the cities and key 
points � but the Unionists won the minds of the mountain men through 
successful  political indoctrination and thus controlled the key element-­
the people �  who remained pro-Union. Principle became the ral lying point 
and the cause the only thing worthwhile because these people had become 
convinced that their  future wel l -being was dependent upon a Union victory. 
The Unionists learned quickly the art of insurgency. Tedious ly 
and skil lful ly they prepared their organization and rooted it solidly in 
the people .  They adopted the tactics of strike and flee Q wait , watch , 
then strike again p g iving no rest to the enemy .  The ir intel l igence net­
work was superb � their communication lines were effective , their escape 
system successful . Throughout the first two years of the war they struck 
at the enemy re lentlessly. They depleted his effective force by direct 
attack v by aiding desertion, discouraging enlistments . resisting arrest ,  
and spreading literature subvers ive to the Confederacy . Simultaneous ly 
they recruited forces for the Union and successful ly gui ded them to 
training camps in Kentucky p distributed arms and ammunition, and harassed 
the Confederate rear to such an extent that every stockpi le ,  every 
ammunition dump v and every skirmish line had to be heavi ly guarded .  The 
more vulnerable the rear becarne 0 the more men the Confederates were 
forced to detai l to police duties . With their e xtreme shortage of man­
powerp  this ineffective use of soldiers could wel l  have been a decisive 
factor contributing to defeat .  Even more troublesome was the fact that 
the Unionists had learned the secret  of self-perpetuation . I n  many cases 
they were totally dependent upon the enemy for al l of their  supplies . 
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Wherever this source was temporari ly denied them , there was always the 
friendly popu lation ready and wi l ling to assist them , The ir organization 
was flexib le , their movements swift , and their activities disheartening 
to the Confederate authorities who tried in vain to break the back of the 
Union resistance .  
Lincoln had long sought to come to the aid of the East  Tennesseans 
for both personal and political reasons , but mi litari ly it was not feas-
ible until the fal l  of 1863,  Then Rosecrans moved from Murfreesboro into 
position at Chattanooga whi le Burnside moved on Knoxvil le ,  Burnside was 
guided into E ast Tennessee by the very men who had long been the hard 
1 core of guerri l las and partisans opposing Confederate authority. From 
these men he obtained invaluab le assistance in determining where the 
enemy should be attacked,  and whi le he pul led L ongstreet further away 
from Bragg at Chattanooga , these partisans severed the C onfederate com-
mander' s lines of communication and prevented his return to the south . 
I t  was these same men who saw to it  that Burns ide ' s  soldiers ate whi le 
Longstreet laid siege to Knoxvi l le ,  and i t  was they who were given the 
task of haras sing the defeated Confederate forces after the battle . 
Through the long winter of 1863 ,  Longstreet ' s  force wintered in a food­
less wasteland , unhelped by the population, and under constant guerril la 
attack , whi le his veteran force turned into ragged,  i l l  fed ,  morale� 
shattered bodies of small  forage parties , When at last they moved 
!Esther s. Sanderson, Count� Scott and I ts Mountain Folk (Esther 
s. Sanderson , Huntsvi l le , Tenn. , I 58) , 19� --- -----
through the val ley into Virginia to j oin Lee , the guerri l l as ,  together 
with the geography of East  Tennessee , had e xacted their tol l upon this 
once formidab le force . 
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Meanwhi le , even before Carter' s Raid, the partisan guerril las had 
matured into a more sophisticated brand of fighter. Now they openly con­
ducted warfare in cooperation with regular Federal forces against the 
Confederates .  Whole groups of them were integrated into the regular 
army , and they alternated between convent ional assaults and partisan 
raids , whichever promised to  be mos t effect ive . This abi lity to engage 
in combined act ion was carried a step further as these units were called 
upon to rid East Tennessee of the vast number of marauding bands of inde­
pendent guerri l l as and Confederate raiders which remained after the main 
Confederate armies had evacuated. The Union irregulars had the mission 
of prevention, suppression, or defeat of these insurgent bands , an action 
calling for a comb ination of mi litary and non-mi litary actions . With 
outs ide aid from the army and from relief societies who provided food • 
seeds � and equipment ,  the social i l ls of the area and the sufferings of 
the loyal civilian population were kept to a minimum , thereby depriving 
the Confederate guerril las of the necessary local sympathy and support 
they so desperately needed to survive . The Confederates were slowly 
forced to move the ir bases to A labama, western North Carolina, and 
Virginia e  from which they continued the ir raids into East Tennessee . 
A maximum effort by the Union counterinsurgency forces was 
launched against these sec luded Confederate bases . The purpose was 
threefold : first .  to destroy enemy raiders and their bases of operation ; 
148 
second 0 to cripple the war potential of the area by attacking the wi l l  of 
the people  to continue to resist--a brutal and destructive work ; and 
finally»  to prevent the Confederate forces from retreating to the moun­
tains and turning the war into a protracted conflict . To achieve this 
last 9  it was necessary to be there firs t and in contro l .  A l l  the whi le 
that thi s  cyc le of unconventional warfare was developing , the less 
obvious yet vital work of returning men to combat units was quietly being 
carried on by the secret societies charged with this responsib ility. 
Thus , as the war progressed,  a pattern of development revealed 
itse lf .  There was no  indication that e ither s ide official ly condoned 
unconventional warfare . Quite the contrary, notable men on both s ides 
openly manifested their disdain for it . Some tried to limit it , yet al l 
practiced it if  i t  was to their advantage . Conversely , they condemned it  
if it  was not . The people of the mountains of East Tennessee accepted it  
as their mode of  expression of  resistance and developed it to  a high 
state of art , yet ,  like the generals � they neither ful ly understood it 
nor were they prepared to face the consequences to their society of over­
zealousness in its application . The story of Reconstruction in Eas t  
Tennessee , the enduring hatred i t  generated and the vengeful practices i t  
gave rise to , is  another story, but it  stands as mute testimony t o  the 
residue of a war waged by unconventional means . It  i s  impossible to 
gauge to what extent unconventional warfare undermined society, stifled 
moral values 9 and fostered the hertofore unacceptable  ethical principle 
that the end justifies the means . But from numerous diaries ,  papers , and 
contemporary statements , and from interviews with surviving descendants 
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of the mountain folk of East Tennessee � this is  the picture that emerges . 
In some fami lies , deeds committed by neighboring fami lies during the 
Civi l War sti l l  remain unforgiven and are the source of many enduring 
regiona l  disputes . The social consequences of unconventional warfare are 
insidious 0 persistent , and debi l itating . 
The damage inflicted upon the Confederacy by Union irregulars in  
East Tennessee was cons iderable  and important= �though often intangib le . 2 
The results were complex,  neither b lack nor white � and therefore debat-
ab le . As to the question, was it worth it? the best answer is no, but 
then what war is?  Could the Unioni sts have done anything e lse?  Cer� 
tainly0 but perhaps at a cost  much greater than they paid. They cun-
ningly employed their most effective weapon to preserve what they 
believed in. It is appropriate that their  story be known and thus their 
actions be better understood . Without question, unconvent ional warfare 
in East  Tennessee , 1861- 1865 , was in every sense modern .  
From a military point of view, there were severa l important 
results which were even then recognized as advances in the field of 
unconventional warfare but which were lost to the mi litary generations 
which fol lowed.  I t  was not unti l  total war became an international con-
cern in the twentieth century that these lessons were revived.  In 1865 , 
the New York Times carried an article entitled "Guerril la War, I ts 
History and Principles" which revealed the e xtent of the knowledge of 
2Tatum p Dis loyalty, 154 . 
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this type warfare at that time . 3 It is  interesting to note how ful ly the 
principles of unconventional warfare were understood a The major emphasis 
was on the requirements for success . Notab ly � the most important obser-
vation was that " to succeed • o o the hostilit ies , however part ial 9 must 
be the expression of the wil l�-not of a mere faction, but of the majority 
of the population a "  The moral force t o  fight must be deeply entrenched 
in  the people . Their fight , the article went on to say:  
• • •  may remain partial in its  physical action� but to t riumph it  
must be  general in  its  influences , and national [ re gional] in its 
b ase and support--the good wil l  or approbation of the action at 
l arge ,  particularly in the middle and lower classes • • • •  Nothing 
like lukewarmness in guerri l la warfare has a chance . And it is  the 
very fact that the peop le seem to go mad in a real guerri l la war and 
become fanatical in their resolutions , that makes i t  so dangerous to 
regularly organized powers . I t  violates the very rules by which 
regular armies and admini strations move and operate . 4 
By al l standards , the mi l itary s ituation in East  Tennessee com-
p lied with the contemporary conditions for success and afforded ample 
evidence that unconventional warfare had matured ,  at least to a point of 
professional consideration, both in organizat ion and operations . By the 
end of the Civi l War it had acquired its own special strategic and tacti-
cal s igni ficance . As the units participating became more highly organ-
ized ,  they adopted the numbered designations of regu lar forces p  though 
they continued to empl oy their irregular methods . 
The widespread practice of thi s type of fighting9 its successes 
and its fai lures p apparently warranted serious consideration» at least in  
3� �  Times , February 5 9  1865 . 
4Ibid.  
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some quarters . Even as early as 1 863 there were serious editorials 
written concerning unconventional methods . 5 It was argued by some ,  for 
example p  that the best way to combat guerri l las was with an anti-guerri l la 
force . On the other hand, some held that guerril las were best put down 
by sound defeats administered by conventional forces . Though the problem 
was never serious ly confronted as to an estab lished policy by either 
side p one fact was clear. It was no longer valid to view unconventional 
warfare as a side show in war ; modern mi litary men would have to consider 
it as an integral part of the theory and practice of warfare . Evident 
also was the fact that discontent and patriotism were two mainsprings of 
partisan movements which would be of considerab le importance in modern 
war. But with al l  the experience and al l the study, when it became 
evident that Generals Lee and Johnson did not intend to continue the war 
in this medium , the lessons learned were promptly ignored by the profes­
s ional soldier. 6 By default , the field was left complete ly to the law-
less e lement of society who soon would employ it as a means to obstruct 
the reconstruction of the social order. I ts mi litary importance was thus 
obscured by the depressing social derangement which resulted. That 
unconventional warfare was truly a harassing and therefore potential ly 
valuab le species of war-making had been proven beyond a doubt in East 
Tennessee during the Civil  War. 
SEditorial , New York Times , January 26 , 1863. 
- - ---
6�. D May 1 1 , 1865 . 
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APPENDIX  
APPENDIX I 
GLOSSARY 
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TERMS 
Civic Action=�The use of military forces on projects usefu l  to the popu­
l ace at all  levels in such fields as education . training. publ ic works . 
agriculture , transportation , communications a health .  sanitation. and 
others helpful to economic and social development . 
C landestine Operations--Activities to accomp lish intel ligence . counter­
inte l l igence i and similar actions in secret . Differs from covert opera­
tions in the attempt to conceal the operation rather than the identity of  
the sponsor. 
Covert Operations=-Those p lanned and executed to conceal the identity of 
or permit plausible denial of the sponsor. 
Economic Action--P l anned use of economic measures to influence the 
pol icies or actions of another s tate a for example a to impair warmaking 
potential of an enemy or generate economic stabi l ity in a friendly power. 
Economic Warfare- -Aggressive use of economic me ans to achieve national 
ob jectives , 
Irregular Forces--Armed individuals or groups who are not members of  
regular armed forces .  
Mi litary Civic Action--Use of largely native forces on projects i n  educa­
tion ,  training � pub lic works , agriculture . transportation . etc . to 
improve economic and social devel opment and improve the standing of the 
mi l itary forces with the popul at iono 
Paramil itary Forces--Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed 
forces of any country but resemb ling them in organization , equipment . 
training or missiono 
Parami litary Operation==An operation undertaken by  a paramilit ary force 
which either by its tactics or its requirements in mil itary-type person­
nel � equipment . or training approximates a conventional military opera­
tion . I t  may be undertaken in support of an existing friendly government 
or in support of a group seeking to overthrow a government , Such an 
operation may be overt or covert or a combination of b oth . 
Pol itical Warfare--Aggressive use of political means to achieve national 
ob jectives . 
1 70 
1 7 1  
P ropaganda= =Any informat ion � i de as � doct rines o r  spe c i al appeals to 
support national ob j ectives by influen c ing opinions � emot ions p att i tudes 
and behav ior of a spe c i fi c  group o B l ack p ropaganda purport s  to eminate 
from a s ource othe r than the true one o r.re y propaganda doe s not i dent i fy 
any source , Nhi te p ropaganda i s  acknow le dge d  by the spons orc 
P s ychological Activit ies = �Those activi t ie s  conducte d  in peacetime 9  or in 
are as outs ide of act i ve m i l itary theate rs of war � which are p l anned and 
conducted to influence the emot ions D at t itudes D or behav i or of fore i gn 
group s i n  ways favorab le to the achievement of n at ional ob j ec t ives . 
Psycho l og ical Operations = =Th i s term inc lude s  psycho l og ic al act ivit ies and 
p sycho l og ical warfare � and encompas ses tho se po l i t ic a l p m i l i t ary 9 eco� 
nom i c , and ideo logical act ions p l anne d  and conducted to c re ate in enemy . 
hos t i le 9 neutra l 9  or friendly fore i gn groups the emot ions , att itude s � or 
behav ior favorab l e  t o  the achi evement of nat ional obj e c t ives , 
P sycho l og i cal Warfare = = P  l anne d use of prop aganda and othe r act ions to 
inf luence opinions r emot ions 9 att i tude s and beh avior of h o s t i l e  fore ign 
groups o 
Subvers ive P o l i t ical Act ion==A p l anned series of act iv i t ies de s igne d to 
acc omp l i sh po l i t ical ob j e c t ive s by influenc ing . dominat ing , or disp l ac i ng 
indivi dual s  or g roups who are s o  p l aced as to affect the dec i s ions and 
act ions o f  anothe r government o  
Unconvent ional Warfare = = lnc ludes guerri l l a  warfare , evas ion and e s c ap e . 
and subvers ion o C onducted i n  enemy or enemy c ontrol l e d  te rri tory by 
p redom inantly i nd i gen ous force s 9  usua l l y  supporte d  and d i rected by an 
e xterna l s ource o 
Evas ion and E s c ape (E&E) = �Th e proce dure s  and operat ions whereby mi l i =  
t ary pers onne l  and othe r s e l ected indivi du a l s  are enab l e d  to emerge 
from an enemy=he l d  or host i le are a to are as under friend ly contro l o 
Guerri l l a  Warfare (GW) = =Mi l i t ary and p aram i l itary ope rat ions i n  enemy= 
he l d  or hos t i le terri tory by i rre gul ar �  pre dom i nant ly indigenous 
( native )  forces o 
Subvers ion � =Action to undermine the mi l it ary � econom i c p p sychol og i c a l � 
moral or po l i t ical s t rength of a regime o 
APPENDI X I I  
r.UERRILLA S �  THE I R  DOCTR I NE AND TACTICS 
Unconventiona l warfare is a suffic ient l y  speci a l i ze d  means o f  
fight ing t o  warrant m ore detai led attent ion than was poss ib l e  i n  t h e  b ody 
of the preceding s tudy . Within the past decade a who l e  army of e xpert s  
h ave wri tten ab out the sub j ec t � and the armie s  o f  many nat ions have put 
the principles de rived into prac t ice with v arying de gre e s  of s ucce s s .  I t  
i s  true that there i s  l i t t l e  that i s  new i n  the concept that a dis s at i s ­
fied peop le w i l l re s i s t  even the most powe rfu l army i f  they are suffi., 
c ient l y  provoked . What i s  re l at ive ly new i s  the fac t that a rebel l i on �  
or a peop le ' s  war as we h ave c ome t o  regard such act iv i t ies , i s  not 
guaranteed succe s s  mere l y  because i t  expre s se s  the wi l l  of the peop l e  but 
rather because it i s  a we l l -p l anne d  and we l l = e xecuted m i l i t ary operat ion . 
The fol l owing d i s cu s s i on wi l l  c oncent rate on l y  on guerri l l a act ivi t ie s � 
though p ract ical l y  a l l  the concepts di s cu s s e d  c ou l d  be app l i e d  to any 
aspect of unconven tional warfare . 
The most fundamental concept to be remembere d  i s  that thi s i s  not 
warfare without ru l e s . I ts brut a l it y �  viol ence � and total i ty have 
c re ated thi s mis conception . To be used succe s s fu l ly �  the ru l e s  mu st be 
more rigi d ly adhere d  t o  than in any othe r method of warfare . 1 It offe rs 
l e s s  marg in for e rror than many more conventional methods . The p ri ce of 
a m i s t ake or a s l i ght mi s calcu l a t ion i s  usual ly swi ft annihi l at ion . Yet 8 
1Ney�  Gue rri l l a �- vi . 
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despite i ts final i t y �  unconvent iona l  warfare i s  n ot m i l i t ar i ly dec i s ive 
against an enemy . nor is it intende d t o  be , 2 
Samuel B ,  Gri ffith � l ong a s tudent of unconvent iona l method s , has 
said that : 
I t  i s  one asp ect o f  the ent ire war� which a lthough al one incap ab le o f  
p roducing the dec i s ion,  attacks the enemy i n  every quarte r ,  dimin­
i shes the extent of area under his c ontro l ,  i ncreases our national 
s trength , and as s i sts our re gul ar arm ies , [Unconvent ional warfare 
i s ]  , , , mi l it ary s trength org an i z e d  by the act ive peop l e  and i nsep­
arab l e  from them , 3 
D i s t inct ive l y ,  the unconvent ion a l  warfare method m ay begin as a 
l oo s e l y  organ i ze d  g roup o f  c iv i l i ans of from ten to twent y  raide rs , 
Other s imi l ar uni t s  may form . intent upon haras s ing the enemy in the i r  
l ocal are a ,  The k ey i s  t o  h ave them c oordinate the ir efforts first w i th 
each other and then with spe c i a l  convent iona l ly organ i z e d  forces sent to 
the are a ,  The cap ab i l ity of thes e  uni t s  is l im i t l e s s . The un it may 
cont inue to act on i t s  own or with regu l ar force s .  or u l t imat e ly be 
inc orporated within the regu lar force , Among the leaders of such a move-
ment there mus t be a re a l i z at ion that for such a force to ev o lve i nt o  a 
s trategical l y  usefu l  fight ing uni t , the i ndi gen ou s  peop l e  upon whom 
succe s s  depends mus t be led gradual ly to th e pos i t ion t o  be re ady t o  t ake 
up arms and fight , I n  othe r words , there mu s t  firs t be a c ond it ioning 
process through which they pas s ,  They mu s t  be conv inced of the c aus e , 
2Thi s  i s  c ommonly accepted by al l guerri l l a warfare theori st s ,  By 
i t s  very nature (hi t  and run) � no s ingle guerri l l a  act ion ag ains t an 
enemy c ou ld re su l t  in a s trategic v ictory, On the other hand , numerous 
act ions of thi s type cou l d  mate ri a l l y  i nf luence the strategic outcome , 
3sarnue l B ,  Griffith (ed , ) ,  Mao Tse-tung On Gue rri l l a  Warfare 
(Frederick A ,  Prae ger ,  New York , 1 96 2 ) , SO. -
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P ropaganda i s  usu a l ly the firs t  and mos t  important weapon u s e d . 4 I t  i s  
used b oth against the enemy and among friendly force s . I t s ob j ec t  i s  to 
bui ld the i de o l og i c a l  factor into a princ ip le worth protect i ng ,  worth 
f i ght ing for ag ainst an enemy who is pre sented always as de s i ring to t ake 
i t  away from the p e op l e  invo lve d .  Thi s i s  the war of words which be gins 
before open confl i c t , and whi ch cont inues th roughout the war and we l l  
i nto the postwar period unt i l  i t  i s  no longe r of any v alue o 
Unconvent iona l warfare d i ffe rs pro found ly from warfare i n  which re gu­
l ar armie s  are openl y  engag e d  in c ombat . The obj ect ive of such 
c onventiona l comb at is to win c ontro l  of a s t ate by de fe at i ng the 
enemy 1 s  m i l i tary forces in the fie l d .  I n  c ontras t .  the s t rategy o f  
unconvent ional forces mu st b e  t o  win contro l o f  the s tate by firs t 
w inning control of the civi l popu l at ion . F or without the d i s c ip l i ne d  
support of the c ivi l i an popu l at ion � m i l itari l y  infe rior guerri l l a 
forces c an h ave no hope of succe s s e S 
I ndi genous personne l work ing within enemy-he l d  terri tory i s  the 
key e lement of unconventional warfare " They mus t be supporte d in v arying 
degrees by external s ource s .  Ope rat ions arc p l anned and executed t o  
comp lement res is t ance movements against t h e  government in c ontrol . Such 
a m ovement i s  an organ i z e d  effort by s ome port ion of the c iv i l  popu l at i on 
of a c ountry to re s i s t  the leg a l l y  e s t ab li shed gove rnment or an occupying 
p owero I n  its ear ly s tage s , re s i s t ance m ay take the form of subvers ive 
p o l i t ical activit ies to arouse the popu l ace and enc ourage d i s trus t c hos = 
ti l it y ,  and l o ss o f  confi dence in the legal gove rnment . I f  the government 
4Ney, l.uerri l l a  �� 2 !S pas s im .  
5Frank l i n  A .  L ind s ay ,  "Unconven t ional Warfare • " Hi L  Rev . _ U . s . , 
XL I I  (June , 1 9 6 2 ) , 5 3 .  The s ame art i c l e  f i rs t  appe are d-rn Foreign- ­
Affai rs � XL ( January , 1 96 2) , 264- 74 ; Wi l l i am P o  Yarborough e "Unconven ­
t iona l  Warfare : One Mi li t ary V i ew , "  !!.;,! Annal s ,  CCCXL I (Hay . 1962) , 2 .  
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fai l s  t o  re act immediatel y  and the movement i s  not suppre s sed , i nsurgency 
by i rre gular force s  may re sul t .  Thi s  i s  a c ond i t ion of subvers ive po l i t -
i c a l  act ivity , civi l rebe l l ion, rev o l t  o r  insurre ct ion against the 
governmen t  in powe r .  I rre gu l ar forces are formed that are des igne d t o  
we aken and overthrow cons ti tuted authori ty. 6 
The m i s s ion o f  guerri l l a forces i s  to reduce the c omb at effect ive -
nes s ,  war potent i a l  ( indu s t ri a l • e c onom i c � p o l i t ical , and m i l i tary) , and 
morale o f  the enemy t o  such a s tate that h i s  w i l l  to re s i s t i s  de s troyed 
or serious ly impaire d .  7 P aram i l it ary uni t s , e x i s t ing a l ongs ide the armed 
forces , are pro fe s s e d ly nonmi l i t ary , but they are organ i z e d  on an under-
lying m i l i t ary pattern as a poten t ial aux i l i ary or divers ionary m i l i t ary 
force . 
Evasion and e s c ape i s  a v i t a l  aspect of unconvent ional warfare . 
I t  includes the procedures and operat ions nece s s ary to p rov i de exit 
routes from enemy-he l d  terri tory for friend ly m i l it ary force s  and othe r 
s e l ected ind ividua l s  to re turn to friend ly contro l .  E sc ape nets , c on-
tact s , s afe areas , and gui des a l l  come w ithin the scope of the ir ope ra-
t ions . 
6A ques t ion of semant ics h as been rai s e d  conce rning the use o f  the 
term " i n surgency . "  In some part s of the wor l d  i t  has an h onorab l e  conno ­
tation of fighting f o r  freedom b y  ab o l i shing tyranny , To s ome countries 
thi s may be taken to mean that the Uni ted State s oppose s  i n  princ ip l e  the 
very rights i t  tends t o  upho l d .  Thi s  is an intere s t ing point which 
shou ld not be ignore d ,  with the re su l t  that mere words may s t and as a 
b arri e r  to that freedom we support in p ract ice . J .  K .  Zawodny , u cue r= 
ri l la and Sabotage , "  � Anna l s , CCCXL I (�1ay , 1 96 2) , 1 8 .  
7These are i rre gu l ar force s and i n  a b ro ad s ense refer to al l 
typ e s  of insurgents - -part i s an s , subve rs ioni s t s � terro ri s t s , revo lut ion­
ari e s , and guerri l l as . u . s .  Army , Spe c i a l  Warfare D 8 .  
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Irregular activities include the use of every means at the dispo-
sal of the people of an occupied country to hamper, harass , and destroy 
the enemy ' s  ab ility to control the area and the people in i t .  If  the 
enemy is employing irregu lar forces in an area which he technical ly 
occupies but does not completely contro l �  the resisting forces may find 
it necessary to deve lop counter forces whose aim it is to neutralize the 
enemy ' s  irregular forces . The specific rules of unconventional warfare 
are as broad as the entire study of military strategy and tactics . I t  
comes as no revelation t o  the reader that the magnitude o f  the sub j ect is 
beyond the narrow scope of this study , Yet a basic understanding of 
these concepts is essential if this mode of warfare is to be understood 
in re lation to the general concept of war and warfare . 
Strategical ly , social and political discontent provides a frus­
trated population from which an i rregular force is recruited , 8 This 
local populat ion is basic to engaging in or combating unconventional war­
fare . I n  it is found the key to success or fai lure , 9 
8zawodny, "\.uerri lla and Sabotage . "  8 ,  Kutger terms guerri l la 
strategy the ne gative offens ive , by which he means that open combat with 
maj or enemy forces is always avoided as are decisive battles of any sort . 
Kutger, " I rregular Warfare , "  1 16 ,  
9This point i s  estab lished i n  virtually every artic le and manual 
on irregular and guerri lla  activity in print today, It is  so bas ic that 
it i s  often overlooked in b oth study and applicat ion of the principles 
herein being discussed . For a more detai led treatment of this principle 
see Ney, r.uerri lla  Warfare , 16 , 1 82 ;  r.riffith , � Tse-tung � Guerri l la  
Warfare , 1 et passim. A summary of the main points made by �1ao Tse-tung 
in this bool<'may also be found in "Hao ' s Primer On Guerri l la  Warfare ,"  
The New York Times Ma�azine , June 4 ,  196 1 ,  pp . 1 3 ,  7 1 - 73 .  Thi s  article 
rs-reprinted in the 0 AF Counterinsurgency Course Selected Readings ,  I ,  
1 - 7 ;  Heilbrunn , Partisan Warfare , 32-40 . 
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Fol lowing the standard Principles of War are • of course • funda­
mental . 10 There are , in addition , specific principles which are partie-
u larly app licable to irregular activities . One expert lists them as the 
principles of: The Environment , Community Security , Community Support , 
Propaganda, Proximity, De liberate Delay ,  Personal Security, Part-time 
Function , Ful l-time Function , Modus Operandi , and Organizat ion. l l  He 
also points out that : "No other form of warfare demands such a precise 
as sessment of capabilities in strategic p lanning as does guerri l la activ­
ity, and in no other form of warfare is  this princip le so often broken . " 12 
Guerril l a  strategy is  concerned with four maj or obj ect ives : pre-
serving itse lf,  undermining the strength of the enemy , preparing for a 
general upris ing , and gaining control of the territory by force of arms .  
The tactics employed may be compressed to one sentence : " If ,  during a 
guerri l la  attack , the enemy has a chance to re load his weapons , the 
act ion should be cons idered unsuccessful and abandoned , " 13 
lOThe Principles of War as laid down by Von C lausewit z are the 
Obj ective , Offensive , Mass of force , Economy of force , Mobi lity, Surprise , 
Security , Communications , and Coordinat ion . 
l lNey, Guerri l la Warfare , 1 - 2 .  
1 2� • •  1 1 .  
13 Ibid . , 1 2- 1 3 . Heilbrunn sees a threefold tactical aim : draw 
enemy forces from the front,  weaken his infrastructure , the framework of 
material things that provi de the means of mounting and sustaining an 
operation or campaign , and win support of the people . Hei lbrunn , Parti­
san Warfare , 9 8 .  Also see "Guerri l la  selon 1 '  ecole Communiste , "  Bul letin 
MITitaire (June , August , 1 955 ) , n .p .  [Etat-Major de la  Force Pub lique , 
Leopoldville , trans lating agency] . This is  trans lated from the French 
and quoted extens ively in Heilbrunn , Partisan Warfare , 78- 106 .  This  work 
is  the Viet-minh Manual on partisan warfare which was trans l ated into 
English and made publ ic by the organization mentioned above , It  was a 
major contribution to the study of the sub ject of unconventional warfare . 
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Successful  guerri l la  operations inevitab ly hinge upon simplicity . 
A l l  operations must be essentially offensive in nature and executed only 
when a favorable  e lement of surprise can assure success . Mobi lity is 
vital and must never be lost . Imaginative thinking, devising new methods 
of attack and new targets to destroy ,  should be encouraged among al l the 
fighters . Yet no activity should be undertaken unless it makes a speci­
fic contribut ion to the overal l strategy and i s  coordinated with other 
plans before it  i s  carried out .  A l l  necessary equipment should be stored 
as near to the enemy as possible  and be in posit ion we l l  before any 
anticipated attack . This serves the doub le purpose of allowing the 
attackers to proceed safe ly to the assemb ly points without fear. s ince an 
unarmed man rarely arouses suspicion . I n  addition. no energy is lost 
bringing in needed equipment ,  and there is less danger that vital equip­
ment wi l l  be forgotten at the last moment , 
Under al l  circumstances , the local populat ion must not be antagon­
ized . Simi larly , defensive or positional warfare must be avoided ,  There 
are many other considerations too obvious to enumerate , such as avoiding 
val leys as camping locations and exposed areas when marching . These are 
common knowledge to the soldier.  
To accomplish their mi ssion ,  guerril la units may undertake varied 
and diversified assignments . They may . for example , dis rupt communica­
tions and transportation ; gather intel ligence ; capture . kidnap .  or k i l l  
key enemy personne l ;  protect friendly soldiers who e ither escaped o r  are 
temporarily iso lated from their units ; protect the indigenous popul at ion 
against banditry ; guard local indus try and natural resources from 
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exploitation by the enemy ; and a score of other activities . Sabotage may 
rightly be cons idered within the province of the guerril la unit ,  but 
generally such activity requires specialized training and ski l led execu-
tion. Usual ly such activities are left to specific groups who are 
experts in the particular destruction des ired . This is  the realm of the 
. 1 '  h 1 . . 14 spec1a 1st, not t e genera pract1t1oner. 
From the practical standpoint , al l guerri l la units ,  no matter what 
their job ,  need a source of supplies . 15 They have four major sources 
upon which they depend . The local popu lation is  the most readi ly avail -
ab le . I f  the population is  friendly,  there i s  usual ly very l ittle prob-
lem in obtaining at least meager subs istance- level supp lies . I f  the 
population is hostile ,  supplies are difficult to obtain and the unit may 
be forced to change its base of operations . In e ither case , popular 
animosity may develop as food and supplies become increasingly scarce 
during wartime . At best ,  this i s  a very l imited s ource , and for some 
equipment , as in the case of weapons , hardly dependable .  The members of  
a unit may make or grow many of  the necessities required to  survive , 
Total dependence upon such a source becomes increasingly difficult as 
operations against the enemy are stepped up . The difficulties of making 
the equipment , avoiding enemy surveil lance , and carrying out raids 
14 Ibid. , 89 , 1 38 ,  In the course of this study, no uni fied e xam­
ples of sabotage were noted.  Sabotage activities are associated with 
large industrial urban areas . None were noted in East Tennessee during 
the Civi l War. There is the possib ility that such methods were consid­
ered beyond the scope of warfare at that time. 
15 Ibid. , 9 8 ;  Ney, Guerri l la Warfare , 1 3 .  
-
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compound and are usual ly too much for any uni t  to l ive with for e xtende d  
peri od s  of time . P robab ly the b e s t  s ource of a l l supp ly for a gue rr i l l a  
i s  the enemy . By attacking h i s  supp ly line s , t he gue rr i l l as obtain 
nee de d food , ammun i t i on ,  and weapon s  which the enemy has transported into 
the are a .  In this way , guerri l l as are re l i eved of bringing in the i r  own 
supp l i e s  whi le forc ing the enemy to e mp l oy a l arge port ion of his  force 
as guards , thus re duc ing the enemy comb at e ffect ivene s s .  Thi s  has an 
adverse psycho l og i c a l  e ffec t  upon the morale of h i s  men , who c on s t ant ly 
face the threat of an attack at any t ime . The fourth s ource of supp l y  i s  
from a sympathe t ic out s ide s ource . A l l  four c omb ined accord t o  the 
gue rri l l a  the ab i l i ty to operate for extended peri ods w ithout running the 
ri s k  of exposed and vu lnerab le suppl y  l ine s . Of course , he is t ie d  t o  
h i s  base o f  ope rations and must confine his  act iv ities to a re l at ive ly 
l im i t e d  are a .  Wi thin i t s  c onfine s , howeve r ,  e xp l oit ing the enemy i s  the 
p re fe rred means of res upp ly . 1
6 I f  the bas ic ru le of s imp l ic i t y  in al l 
thi ngs is fo l lowe d ,  the guerri l l a uni t  c an be a s t rong and e ffect ive 
force . 
Thi s  e ffe c t iveness may usual ly be me asured from two s t andpoint s : 
the effects up on the enemy and upon the popu l at ion . Not on ly i s  the 
actual de s truct ion of enemy forces to be c on sidered , but also the numbe r 
of h i s  forces which c an be re tained in a non- comb at s t atus t o  act as 
guar ds and police behind the actual combat zone . On the othe r hand � to 
1 61\'i l l i am  C . Wi lkins on ,  " P rob lem s  o f  a r.uerri l l a Leade r , "  Hi I .  
� . . l!_.�. , XXXI I ( January , 1 93 2 ) , 2 7 . 
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the c iv i l  popu l at io n ,  guerri l l as act a s  a s ource o f  mora l e -bu i l ding ,  
Through the guerri l las , the peop l e  expre s s  the i r  ant ipathy against the 
enemy , which g ive s them a cohe s ivenes s  and a ral lying p oint under the 
nose of the enemy . F rom the s tandpoint of the guerr i l l a  uni t ,  it i s  an 
as surance of surviva l ,  for such a unit c annot long endure in a hos t i le 
env ironment . T .  E .  L awrence o f  Arabia m ade the p oint when he maint ained 
that about two p er cent of the popu l at ion is enough to organ i z e  a rev o lu­
t i on if the re s t  of the popu l at io n  is s ympathe t ic . 1 7 
The gue rri l l a  env ironment i s  one of harsh discipl ine and spart an 
life comb ined with a dedicat ion and zeal reaching a lmos t m i s s i onary pro-
port ions . Guerri l l as de a l  in ab s o lutes , i n  b lack s and whi te s , in ebbs 
and f l ows , in feverish act ions , and in ac t io n l e s s  hiding s . Under su ch 
c i rcum s tance s  • m any burn out qu ickly . Am ong those \vho survive there are 
often rad i c a l  change s  in v a lue prem i se s , mora l i ty ,  and s en s i t ivene s s .  I t  
o ften seem s  that anima l c raft ines s supp l ant s c onscienc e , and that l ofty 
i de a l s  are reduced to p rim i t ive j ung l e  law of the surv ival of the fittest 
w i th the norm o f  moral ity be ing that the end j u s t ifies the me ans . 
\forale hinges upon v ery s imp l e  thing s ,  s uch as be ing dry ,  a lump 
of sugar , or a sm i l e  from a sympathetic wcman . With speed and concea l -
ment e s sential t o  surv iva l , sma l l comforts as sume a d i sproport ionate 
s t atus . Thi s  l i fe i s  in no sense normal or , for that m at t e r ,  c ompat ib l e  
t o  the nature o f  m an .  "C,uerri l la f ight ing i s  probab ly the most vici ous 
1 7T .  E .  L awrence • "Guerri l l a Warfare , "  Encyc lopae dia Britann i c a  
(L ondon , 1 95 0 ) , X ,  95 3 .  F o r  an expans ion of thi s  theme , s ee h 1 s  Seven 
P i l l ars 2.!. Wi s dom , (! Triumph (Doub l e day , D oran , New York , 1 9 35 ) , 188- 96 . 
form of human warfare . The intens ity of fee l ing s inv o lved and the 
s acrifices incurred are pecu l i ar to guerri l l a fight ing . " 1 8  
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Though credited with near i nv i ncibi l i ty w ithin the i r  sphere of 
act ivit ies , guerr i l las do have definite l im itat ions . At the operat iona l  
l eve l ,  there i s  ofte n  a d i st inct l ack of training among c ommande rs . 1
9 
D i scipl ine may be hard to enforce , and rec ntit ing rep l acements may be 
ex treme ly hard due to the n ature of the w ork as we l l  as c on f l i c t ing m i l i-
t ary manpowe r  requ i rements . C ooperat ion w ith s imi l ar un i t s  may be 
impo s s ib l e ,  rendering any sort of uni fied e ffort against an enemy impo s ­
s ib le to accomp l i s h .  I n  add i t ion , there m a y  b e  po l i t ic a l  l im i tat ions and 
any c omb inat ion of a v ari ety of events b oth natural and contrived which 
m ay d i s rupt the e ffect ivenes s of the gue rri l l a  uni t .  
One further e l ement o f  guerri l la act ion mu st b e  ment ioned , that of 
terror . Terror i s  the most dangerous and at the same t ime the most 
effect ive weapon avai l ab l e  to the guerri l l a  fighter . 2 0  I f  the enemy u s e s  
terror in any of i t s  graduated form s upon t h e  popu lace of a n  are a ,  the 
guerri l l a  may has ten to i t s  defense .  I f  the e neny i s  prone to fo l l ow a 
conci li atory pol icy toward the inh ab i t ants in an effort to w in the i r  
support , the guerri l l a may use terror t o  provoke de l iberat e ly the enemy 
into an act of viol ence against the peop le .  Thi s  ag ain offers the guer­
ri l l a an opportun i ty to champ ion the peop le , The s ame methods may be 
1 8zawodny , "Guerri l l a  and Sabotag e , "  1 5 . 
1 9He i lbrunn , Part i s an Warfare , 1 8 - 2 0 . 
20Ney, Guerri l l a �. 1 5 ; He i lbrunn , P art i s an Warfare , 1 45 .  
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emp l oyed t o  influence enemy s o l d i ers to de sert , and converse l y  i t  may be 
emp l oyed within the uni t  i ts e l f  to prevent desert ion, I f  the inhab i t ant s 
are p rone to b e  uncomm i tted i n  the strugg l e , the thre at of terror may be 
emp l oyed to obt ain thei r  cooperat ion or to as sure the fact that they wi l l  
g ive none to the enemy . On the other hand , i f  need les s te rror is 
emp l oyed or i f  i t  is used unw i s e ly by the guerri l l a ,  the peop l e  may 
assoc iate them s e lv e s  w i th the governmenta l  authority and he lp to wipe out 
the gue rri l l a  force . The guerri l l a  i s  dependent upon the whim of the 
pe op le ,  and he mus t exp loit or cooperate w ith them as the c as e  may be . 
I n  the unconvent ional war , the outcome i s  in the hands of the peop l e , and 
succes s  in obt aining support i s  hardly pos s ib le without their sympathy . 
The org an i z at ional structure o f  guerri l l a uni t s  i s  such that any 
group m ay be e as i ly j oined w ith c onvent iona l  forces , become c onventional 
forces , or c ont i nue to funct ion as an unconvent ional uni t . Thi s  flexi­
b i l i ty p rovide s  them w ith the i r  b e s t  de fense ag ainst enemy forces de s i r­
i ng t o  destroy them . Since gue rri l l as en j oy v irtua l immunity from 
des t ruct ion by a regu l ar force emp l oyed in the c onvent iona l m anner ,  the 
b e s t  way to combat them i s  with the same type of force , c onfront them in 
k i nd . 2 1 Coun teri ng the oppo s i ng force in th e unconvent ional sense i s  
termed counteri nsurgency. It inc ludes a l l  m i l it ary , po l i t ic a l , econ om i c , 
p sychol ogical , and sociolog ic a l  act iv i t ie s  d i re cted ag ainst such i rreg­
u l ar uni t s  determi ned to ove rthrow a du ly e s t ab li shed government . The 
p rob lem i s  to maintain or restore internal security and cre ate a favorab l e  
2 1� C ounteri nsurgency C ou rs e , Se lected Read i ngs , 7 ,  
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c limate in which psychological activities may be carried out to reaffirm 
the faith of the people in the estab lished government . Civil  action 
programs are undertaken , des igned to improve the re lationship bet\'leen the 
mi l itary forces and the civil  population , and are a necessary part of 
guerril la operations , The aim of this program i s  to estab li sh rapport , 
thus el iminating discontent and with it the support which an irregular 
force must obtain from the indigenous popu lation to survive . 
Thus the component parts of unconventional warfare evolve into a 
pattern which may be used to study any unconventional warfare activity 
in which a people are situated to respond to an intolerab le situation ,  
E s sentially,  the reaction i s  highly personal because : 
Behind a guerri l la ' s gun is  a man ;  that man shoots in the direction 
from which there is no hope . He shoots because he does not be lieve 
that for him justice and satisfaction can be achieved in any other 
way . I n  the long run, therefore , he should be met on the level of 
his expectations and hopes and not with a rifle , For a partisan may 
be completely wrong on what he is fighting for, but is not likely to 
be nearly so wrong on what he is fighting agafnst , 22 
This survey of what the guerri l la doe s ,  how he does it , and under 
what conditions , is by no means complete because such activities are 
limited only by the human imagination , I t  is  probab ly this fact which 
makes the guerri l la such a form idable opponent and a worthy subject of 
study for the professional mi l itary man and civilian al ike . I t  is here 
that the gap between citizen and soldier is  bridged because in unconven-
t ional warfare the two meet as equals , 
22zawodny, "Unconventional Warfare ,"  394 , 
